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Abstract 
Self-control is an area of research that has received increased attention over the last couple of 
decades. Failures of self-control, in particular, are held to be the underlying cause of a number of 
societal ills. The strength model of self-control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998) purports to explain failures of self-control through the use of a limited resource model. 
According to the model, initial acts of self-control draw upon a resource, temporarily depleting it 
and making subsequent self-control acts more likely to fail – a process known as ego depletion. 
Although the model has inspired a great deal of research, researchers have begun to question 
both the model itself (e.g., Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), and the research findings that it has 
generated (e.g., Carter & McCullough, 2013). The current project argues that the strength model 
suffers from conceptual confusions that render the model untenable, necessitating its replacement 
with an alternative. A reconceptualisation of drive theory (Maze, 1983), in concert with the 
process model (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), is offered as a deterministic framework through 
which to reinterpret existing findings. In light of suggestions that the ego depletion effect has 
been overstated, this project also aimed to investigate whether and under what conditions the ego 
depletion effect could be produced. Three experiments were performed, manipulating both the 
difficulty and length of the initial self-control task, using common strength model tasks. For all 
three experiments it was hypothesised that there would be an ego depletion effect, and that the 
magnitude of the effect would vary as a function of time and difficulty of the initial task. In all 
three experiments the hypothesis was not supported. There is a shift in current psychological 
science to recognise the importance of replications and null results; it is in this light that the 
findings are discussed. The future of self-control research is discussed in light of the null results, 
and the reconceptualisation of self-control provided by drive theory.  
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Introduction  
 Do you reach for that final cookie, or do you deny yourself the immediate pleasure 
because you just have to look good for summer? When discussing racial politics with someone 
from a different race, do you choose your words carefully to avoid giving offense, or just speak 
your mind? Can you focus your attention during a boring university lecture, or does your mind 
wander? Do you like to actively choose between alternatives, or do you prefer to have someone 
else make the choice for you? While these appear to be unrelated situations, they are linked by a 
common theme: they have all been claimed to be situations in which a person may (or may not) 
exert “self-control” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). 
The paradigm case of self-control has often been taken to be impulse control – resisting a 
tempting immediate reward for delayed but greater rewards (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). It has been argued that the capacity for such 
acts of self-control (also referred to as “self-regulation”, “effortful control”, “impulse control”, 
“willpower”, etc.), is one of the most adaptive features of the human being (Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Evolutionary psychologists have argued that failing to resist 
tempting immediate reward can have potentially negative repercussions. They claim, for 
instance, that consuming more than a fair share of resources may lead to punitive reactions from 
others, lessening the chances of further survival. They also claim that, although mating as often 
as possible may produce more offspring, if resources are scarce, fewer of those offspring will 
survive, and those that do will potentially become competition for future resources (Brockelman, 
1975; Godfray & Parker, 1992). Thus, moderating such impulses can confer adaptive advantages 
to an organism or individual (Bernard, Mills, Swenson, & Walsh, 2005; Krebs, 2011). 
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Consistent with this evolutionary perspective, research into self-control has highlighted 
both the social benefits of demonstrating self-control and the social drawbacks of failure to 
exercise self-control. High levels of self-control have been associated with a number of positive 
outcomes for individuals. Research has found that self-control (as measured by a self-report 
scale) is a better predictor of academic achievement (measured by grade point average) than is 
intelligence (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005, 2006; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Tangney 
et al., 2004), suggesting that the ability to persist at a task, ignore distractions, and stick to 
deadlines can be more beneficial for long term performance than mere natural talent. Self-control 
can also be particularly important in fostering harmonious inter-personal relationships – the 
ability to self-sacrifice can lead to a number of positive outcomes in intimate relationships 
(Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005), while higher levels of self-control can assist in limiting the 
expression of aggression (Dewall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). 
 Conversely, low levels of self-control have been linked with an increased likelihood of 
committing crimes (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hay & Forrest, 2006), decreased inhibition of 
inappropriate sexual behavior (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007a), increased risk-taking (Bruyneel, 
Dewitte, Franses, & Dekimpe, 2009; Leith & Baumeister, 1996), increased lying and cheating 
(Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweizer, & Ariely, 2009), and increased aggression (Stucke & 
Baumeister, 2006). Many other societal problems such as drug abuse, eating disorders, 
unplanned pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases are also considered to have their roots, 
either directly or indirectly, in failures of self-control (Hagger et al., 2010; Wills & Stoolmiller, 
2002). 
 Overall, then, research suggests (in keeping with common-sense) that self-control is both 
adaptive and desirable (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). In contrast, research has not shown that 
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“overcontrol” (i.e., the idea that an individual is “overusing” their self-control) has any 
significant drawbacks (Tangney et al., 2004). Even in the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), which might seem to exemplify the negative effects of overcontrol (where compulsions 
are repetitive behaviours or mental acts performed according to rigidly applied rules in response 
to obsessive thoughts: American Psychological Association, 2013), there is no “overuse” of self-
control. In fact, the opposite appears to be true; OCD sufferers appear to suffer from impaired 
performance on response inhibition/motor inhibition tasks, and general impaired self-regulatory 
ability (Evans, Lewis, & Iobst, 2004). Thus, it is not overcontrol that characterises obsessive-
compulsive behavior, but a lack of control over intrusive thoughts and related compulsive 
behaviours. 
 Given its prevalence and the social importance of self-control, psychological research has 
also focused on trying to understand more about the nature of self-control behavior and its 
underlying mechanisms. This has led to the emergence of a single dominant theory – the strength 
model of self-control, developed and elaborated by Baumeister and his colleagues (Baumeister, 
2000; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). As a result of that 
development and elaboration, self-control has been broadened in scope beyond that of the 
paradigm case. Thus, the general categories of behavior that have been identified as involving 
self-control include: overcoming impulses (the paradigm case, as has already been noted); 
controlling attention (e.g., focusing on certain elements of a stimulus while ignoring 
distractions); controlling emotion (e.g., active suppression or enhancement of emotional 
responses and experiences); controlling thoughts (e.g., suppressing unwanted thoughts); active 
choice (e.g., making a number of choices in numerous contexts, or in a forced choice scenario); 
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social processing (e.g., processing social information and activating appropriate social 
behaviours, such as repressing prejudice or resisting persuasion); and cognitive processing (e.g., 
exerting mental effort to maintain high executive functioning in demanding cognitive tasks, such 
as figure tracing or anagram tasks) (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Hagger et al., 2010). 
According to Baumeister and his colleagues, each of these categories of behavior is an instance 
of “self-control” because each involves the essence of self-control; that is, each involves “the 
self” managing its states and actions in order to bring them in line with desired goals/states. As 
Baumeister (2001) claims:  
 
Self-regulation is one of the principal functions of the human self, and it consists of 
processes by which the self manages its own states and actions so as to pursue goals, 
conform to ideals and other standards, and maintain or achieve desired inner states. (p. 
13859) 
 
This is echoed by Baumeister et al. (2007), who state: 
 
 Self-control refers to the capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring 
them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations, and 
to support the pursuit of long-term goals. (p. 351) 
 
In Baumeister’s view, then, self-control differs from more automatic attempts to change internal 
states (such as homeostasis), in that it is considered to involve conscious, volitional action – that 
is, it is characterized by the individual’s awareness and experience of mental effort expenditure 
(Baumeister, 2002).  
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 The strength model of self-control has not been without its critics, and it has survived and 
evolved in response to a number of objections. Even in the face of recent potentially more 
damaging criticisms, it continues to remain the leading model in the field, providing a strong 
research impetus and generating a wide scope of research activity. For these reasons, the model 
is deserving of more thorough conceptual and empirical investigation. 
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PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW  
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Chapter 1: The Strength Model of Self-Control 
 
1.1 An Introduction to the Strength Model 
 The strength model has its genesis in attempts to understand self-control failure. Given 
the practical repercussions of self-control failure, there are obvious benefits to having a good 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon, and the strength model aims to provide just such 
an understanding. Initial research into the nature of self-control by Baumeister and colleagues 
was prompted by the dearth of comprehensive, unified research into failures of self-regulation. 
According to Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice (1994), “…we gradually came to the conclusion 
that what was most needed, most interesting, and most appropriate given the current state of 
knowledge was a synthesis of work on self-regulation failure” (p. ix). They go on to suggest that 
"Self-regulation failure is the major social pathology of the present time" (p. 3), while 
Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) similarly state that "...society suffers from a broad range of 
problems that have self-regulation failure as a common core" (p. 1).  
 In order to gain an understanding of how self-control can fail, it is necessary first to have 
a good understanding of what self-control is. Only with such an understanding can failures be 
defined, examined, and understood. At its most basic, according to Baumeister et al. (1994): 
  
Self-regulation begins with competition among…multiple processes. Self-regulation is a 
matter of one process overriding another, and that result emerges from competition 
among these parallel processes. (p. 8) 
 
In order to distinguish when such overriding constitutes self-control, Baumeister et al. suggest a 
hierarchy amongst processes, as “Higher processes involve longer time spans, more extensive 
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networks of meaningful associations and interpretations, and more distal or abstract goals” (p. 8). 
Self-control, then, occurs when such a higher process overrides a lower process; self-control 
failure, when the reverse occurs. In order for higher processes to override lower, Baumeister et 
al. suggest that there are three key ingredients required: clear, unambiguous standards; effective 
monitoring of oneself in relation to these standards; and the ability to make the self conform to 
these standards through some form of strength (similar in nature to the colloquial view of 
willpower (p. 9)). It is with the last of these – the notion of self-control strength, the lack of 
which can result in self-control failure – that the strength model primarily concerns itself. 
1.1.1 Central predictions and tenets of the strength model. 
 Baumeister and colleagues’ initial investigations into self-control failure were heavily 
influenced by feedback loop models of self-regulation, such as those proposed by Carver and 
Scheier (1981). In such models, a distinction is made between failures of self-control due to 
misregulation, and those due to underregulation (Baumeister & Heatheron, 1996). According to 
these models, misregulation involves the self exerting control, but in a misguided manner, 
resulting in the ultimate failure of the self-control attempt (e.g., dieting based on faulty 
nutritional advice), whereas underregulation involves the failure of self-control due to the self 
failing to adequately exert the effort required to achieve control (Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981). The strength model focuses primarily on failures of self-control 
due to underregulation, in an effort to understand why such underregulation can occur despite the 
potential negative consequences. 
 Underregulation can occur when any of the above mentioned three key ingredients of 
self-control fails. If standards are conflicting or unclear, it is hard to know what to base one’s 
self-regulation upon. If a person possesses clear standards, but fails to measure their actions 
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against the standards (i.e., they fail to correctly monitor), self-regulation will again be difficult. 
And, according to Baumeister et al. (1994), and Baumeister and Heatherton (1996), even if a 
person possesses clear standards and effectively self-monitors, there may be cases where they 
still feel unable to bring their actions in line with higher processes, thus failing at self-control. As 
Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) note, self-control failures occur when “…the person does not 
bother or does not manage to control the self” (p. 2). They elaborate on this by suggesting that 
“…impulses and motivations vary according to strength, and the weaker ones are those that are 
easier to control and stifle” (p. 3). This suggests that whatever agency is responsible for 
controlling or stifling impulses must also be possessed of some greater strength in order to 
accomplish this. As Baumeister et al. (1994) claim: 
 
In an important sense, self-regulation involves a contest of strength: the power of the 
impulse and its resulting tendency to act, against the power of the self-regulatory 
mechanism to interrupt that response and prevent that action. (p. 17) 
 
Thus, failures in this third case (where standards are clear, the individual effectively self-
monitors, and yet still feels unable to exert appropriate self-control) are suggested to be due to a 
lack of adequate self-control strength, resulting in an inability to adequately exercise self-control 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994, Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et 
al., 1998). 
 In keeping with the notion of self-control relying on some form of strength, Baumeister et 
al. (1994) suggest three reasons why an individual might have too little strength to effectively 
self-regulate. First, the person might chronically possess little of the suggested resource, a state 
which is akin to being “weak willed”. Second, the strength resource is a limited capacity that can 
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become “exhausted” through overuse, such that a previously overrideable impulse becomes 
impossible to control. Third, a particular impulse may be so strong that an individual is unable 
resist it, regardless of the state of depletion of their self-control strength.  
One implication of the second of these reasons is that factors that consume a person’s 
strength should contribute to self-control failures – physical tiredness, stress, or even other self-
regulation tasks should all cause a temporary decrease in self-control strength, making 
subsequent self-control attempts more difficult, and thus, more likely to fail (Baumeister et al., 
1994). That is, self-control relies on a limited resource that can (at least temporarily) be depleted. 
In an attempt to illustrate this idea via analogy, Baumeister et al. (1994) suggested the 
muscle metaphor – the idea that the self-control strength or resource functions in a manner 
similar to that of a physical muscle. Just as a muscle requires energy in order to exert force for 
any amount of time, so too do self-control acts draw on some strength resource. Just as a muscle 
becomes fatigued with overexertion (representing a decrease in the available energy for 
production of force), so too does self-control become “exhausted” after demands are made of it. 
Thus, for a limited resource account of self-control to be plausible, it would be expected that 
evidence could be found for self-control fatigue – decrements in self-control performance 
following initial self-control demands. 
 In their review of the literature concerning various instances of self-regulation failure, 
Baumeister et al. (1994) found evidence which they claimed to be consistent with a limited 
resource account of self-control. As they state: 
 
Self-regulation failures of many types are most likely to occur late in the day, when 
people are tired; this is true for dieting failures, aggressive acts, alcohol, and other 
substance abuse patterns. It is common knowledge that task performance, endurance, and 
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persistence decline with tiredness. Furthermore, there is evidence that coping with stress 
consumes some of people's strength, and so many forms of self-regulation break down 
when people are under stress… People resume smoking, drink too much, eat too much, 
stop exercising, lose control of their emotions and moods, and more. (p. 242) 
 
Such findings were in agreement both with the proposal that self-control is a limited resource, 
and with the claim of other self-control scholars - such as Mischel (1996) - that strength models 
were apt and useful for self-regulation research. On the basis of this, Baumeister and Heatherton 
(1996) put forward three major predictions to emerge from a limited resource account of self-
control. The first was that there would be important individual differences in self-control ability 
as a result of differing resource capacity, which would in turn predict a variety of interpersonal 
traits and behaviours which rely on self-control. The second was that, as a limited resource, a 
person’s self-control can become temporarily exhausted from multiple demands, such that they 
may fail at self-regulation tasks that would normally present little obstacle. Thirdly, just as an 
individual can become stronger through regular exercise, so too can someone increase their self-
control strength or reserve through constant use of it. 
  In addition to these predictions, in one of the first experimental studies of the strength 
model, Muraven et al. (1998) put forward a number of further claims which, to this day, form the 
three central tenets of the strength model. These tenets are: 
1. All forms of self-control draw upon the same resource, regardless of their sphere. 
2. Success at self-control relies on the availability of this resource, and may be a linear 
function of the resource. 
3. The process of self-control draws upon this resource, leaving it temporarily depleted 
afterwards. 
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Muraven and Baumeister  (2000) added two more to these basic tenets (although in logical order, 
these last two actually precede the other three): 
4.  Self-control strength is necessary for the executive component of the self. 
5. This strength is limited, in the sense that a person has a finite capacity for self-control. 
These basic tenets, in combination with the predictions made by Baumeister and Heatherton 
(1996), provided the basis for initial experimental testing of the model, through the use of 
sequential self-control tasks in an experimental method known as the dual-task paradigm. 
 The dual-task paradigm, as frequently employed by researchers in the strength model, 
typically consists of two consecutive, unrelated (in terms of their domain/sphere) self-control 
tasks (Hagger et al., 2010). Participants in the experimental group typically perform an initial 
self-control task (commonly referred to as the depleting task) (Baumeister et al., 1998), before 
performing a second self-control task at which their performance is measured (usually referred to 
as the dependent or secondary self-control task). Participants in the control condition also 
perform two tasks. However, their initial task, while usually similar in form to the depleting task, 
does not typically require self-control (or at least, requires far less of it) (Baumeister et al., 1998; 
Muraven et al., 1998). They then perform an identical dependent task to the experimental 
participants. According to the strength model, participants in the experimental group (having 
completed a task designed to deplete their self-control resource) should demonstrate relatively 
poorer performance at the dependent task than control participants, whose self-control resources 
should be largely intact – that is, they should suffer a depletion effect (Baumeister et al., 1998; 
Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven et al., 1998).  
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1.1.2 Seminal studies and experimental evidence for the strength model. 
 Initial research using the dual-task paradigm was conducted by Baumeister et al. (1998) 
and Muraven et al. (1998). In a series of studies, they found evidence consistent with a limited 
resource account of self-control, supporting the notion that self-control functions like a muscle. 
In one experiment, participants instructed to control their emotional response to a video clip 
(either suppressing or amplifying) performed significantly more poorly on a subsequent handgrip 
persistence task than did control participants, who were not given any instructions regarding 
emotional expression for the video clip. Amplifying or suppressing one’s emotions are both 
hypothesized to require some degree of control by the individual, depleting the self-control 
resource and leading to the observed decrease in subsequent self-control performance (handgrip 
stamina requires self-control as it involves persistence in the face of discomfort and overriding 
the impulse to quit). According to Muraven et al. (1998), "[This] provided initial support for the 
view that self-regulation operates like a strength or reserve of energy..." (p. 778). 
 Another experiment required participants to control their thoughts - participants in the 
ego depletion condition were instructed to suppress all thoughts of a white bear during a thought-
listing procedure. Participants in two non-depletion conditions were either given no instructions 
regarding white bears, or told to think about a white bear as much as they could (a supposedly 
easier thought control task than suppression, and not hypothesized to cause ego depletion). The 
second self-control task in the study was a measure of persistence – participants were asked to 
attempt to solve (unknown to them) unsolvable anagrams. Persistence in the face of frustration 
was hypothesized to require self-control, and thus constitute an appropriate measure of ego 
depletion (Muraven et al., 1998). Ego-depleted participants quit the anagram task significantly 
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earlier than did non-depleted participants, demonstrating less persistence and providing further 
support for the strength model. 
 Baumeister et al. (1998) conducted an experiment which utilized the paradigm case of 
self-control – resisting a tempting impulse. Participants in the experimental condition, having 
been asked to skip a meal and not eat for at least three hours prior to the experiment, were seated 
in a room filled with the aroma of freshly baked cookies, with a bowl of chocolate cookies and a 
bowl of radishes in front of them. Under the guise of a taste perception study, participants were 
then asked to spend several minutes eating radishes, but to avoid eating any of the chocolate 
cookies (compliance was assessed by way of observation through a one-way mirror). Participants 
were then asked to participate in a purportedly unrelated task, requiring them to attempt a 
geometric figure-tracing task, which was (unbeknownst to them) unsolvable – this formed the 
dependent self-control task, requiring persistence in the face of frustration. Control participants 
experienced similar conditions, except that they were asked to eat only chocolate cookies, and 
not the radishes. There was also a no-food control group who performed only the figure-tracing 
task. As with other experiments, participants who had had their self-control resource depleted 
(forced to eat radishes and resist the temptation to eat cookies) gave up much earlier on the 
figure tracing task, and also recorded fewer attempts at solving. Baumeister et al. (1998) 
concluded that this provided support for the resource model of self-control: “Resisting 
temptation seems to have produced a psychic cost, in the sense that afterward participants were 
more inclined to give up easily in the face of frustration” (p. 1255). 
 These experiments, and five others conducted by Baumeister et al. (1998) and Muraven 
et al. (1998), have in common the fact that all of them utilized the dual-task paradigm, and used 
self-control tasks of different spheres for the depleting and dependent tasks. In addition, all eight 
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studies produced results claimed to be consisted with a limited resource account of self-control – 
individuals who had engaged in tasks theorized to require self-control demonstrated 
subsequently poorer performance at unrelated self-control tasks. The testing of self-control 
depletion across multiple spheres or domains of self-control suggested that domain generality 
was indeed, as claimed by Muraven et al., a key feature of self-control – that is, that all acts of 
self-control, regardless of their sphere, draw on the same resource. However, while the results of 
these studies were taken as initial support for the strength model, it was noted that “…the present 
studies provided no direct measures of the limited resource and hence no direct evidence that 
some inner quantity is diminished by acts of volition” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1262). Thus, 
the notion that self-control relies on some limited inner resource is inferred based on behavioural 
observations.   
 Despite recognizing that the evidence for a limited resource model was based on 
inference only, the results of the studies by Baumeister et al. (1998) and Muraven et al. (1998) 
were still able to be used to eliminate several competing explanations for self-control. For 
example, it was considered that the observed reduction in self-control in some tasks could have 
been due to an increase in negative affect caused by the frustrating and difficult tasks. However, 
Baumeister et al. included numerous assessments of negative affect throughout their 
experiments, and “…did not find it to differ significantly among the conditions in the various 
experiments” (p. 1262). Another alternative mentioned by Baumeister et al. was that the 
depletion effect could have been caused by cognitive dissonance – self-control performance at 
the dependent task could have been negatively affected by participants having had to engage in 
counterattitudinal behaviours (such as repressing laughter at a funny movie, eating radishes 
instead of chocolates). However, as there was “…no apparent reason that dissonance should 
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reduce persistence on an unrelated, subsequent task” (p. 1261), it was dismissed as being a viable 
explanation for self-control depletion. Further alternative explanations dismissed by Baumeister 
et al. were that earlier quitting of the dependent task by depleted participants was actually 
adaptive self-regulation in response to recognizing that the tasks were unsolvable, and that 
participants in the depleted condition felt that they had already met an implicitly assumed level 
of obligation to the researcher and were thus unprepared to exert as much effort on subsequent 
tasks. The first of these was dismissed on the grounds that no evidence collected from debriefing 
sessions supported the idea that participants realized that the problems were unsolvable; 
participants exhibited surprise when confronted with the fact. While the second of these could 
conceivably explain the results of some of the experiments, the results of others (which involved 
participants watching a boring video clip and having to actively or passively choose to stop 
watching, or agreeing to make a speech without actually having to then make such a speech) 
were not so easily accounted for. Thus, although the evidence against this alternative was less 
compelling than that against the other alternatives, it was deemed sufficient to dismiss “implicit 
obligation” as a viable alternative explanation. 
 Other competing explanations ruled out by Muraven et al. (1998) included self-control as 
a knowledge structure/schema, self-control as a skill, or self-control as a limited but constant 
capacity. If self-control was a knowledge structure, such that there existed within an individual a 
master schema detailing information about how to control the self and manage its responses, then 
it was supposed that “…an act of self-regulation might prime or increase the accessibility of self-
regulation, and so an initial act of self-regulation would lead to better self-regulation 
subsequently” (Muraven et al., 1998, p. 775). If, however, self-control was a skill, such that it 
was “…an overlearned capacity to control the self” (p. 775), then it would be expected that self-
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control performance would remain relatively constant over short term trials, with an initial act of 
self-regulation having no effect on subsequent attempts. Finally, if self-control was to conform to 
a limited but constant capacity model, it would be expected that concurrent self-control tasks 
would impair one another, as they would be drawing on the same, limited, resource. However, in 
this view, the resources available for one self-control task would be fully available upon 
completion of the previous task – there would be no ego depletion effect. As the results of the 
series of experiments by Muraven et al. showed decrements in self-control performance amongst 
individuals who had previously completed self-control tasks (and thus, that were consistent with 
none of the proposed alternative views), they concluded that “…our findings contradict the 
predictions based on activation and skill models, and some of them also suggest that a constant 
capacity model may be inadequate” (p. 786).  
 The observed results of the combined experiments by Baumeister et al. (1998) and 
Muraven et al. (1998) were consistent with predictions made by a limited resource account of 
self-control, and were not consistent with those of a number of alternative models of self-control 
(e.g., as a skill, as a schema, as a constant but limited resource). In addition, measures were taken 
in order to discount alternative explanations for the observed results (e.g., negative affect, 
cognitive dissonance). Taken together, then, it was concluded that these results provided 
preliminary support for the strength model of self-control – that self-control relies on a limited 
resource which can be temporarily depleted by initial acts of self-control (across all spheres of 
control). The primary prediction of the muscle analogy, that self-control, like a muscle, would 
get tired from previous use, was thus claimed to be borne out. The ego depletion effect, however, 
was not the only prediction made by the strength model, with several areas of self-control 
functioning (such as the training of self-control) suggested by the muscle metaphor. 
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1.2 Extending the Muscle Metaphor 
1.2.1 Longitudinal improvement in self-control strength. 
 Adopting a strength model and illustrating it by using the muscle metaphor allowed 
Baumeister and colleagues to make several empirically testable predictions about the nature of 
self-control (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). The primary of these predictions – that self-control could be temporarily depleted by 
initial acts of self-control – was supported by the initial dual-task studies. In muscle metaphor 
terms, this is akin to a muscle becoming temporarily fatigued through exertion, and being less 
able to exert force until sufficient energy reserves are again available. Another key prediction put 
forward by Baumeister and colleagues was that just as muscles can be trained over time (and 
thus made stronger), so too might it be possible to “train” self-control and make it less 
susceptible to the effects of ego depletion.  
 Muraven, Baumeister, and Tice (1999) were the first to test the hypothesis that self-
control strength could be improved via longitudinal training. Participants were tested on two 
separate occasions, separated by a two-week interval. At the first session, participants engaged in 
a dual-task exercise similar to those used in previous research (using handgrip persistence as the 
dependent measure, and thought suppression as the depleting condition). All participants 
engaged in both tasks, in order to provide baseline data on individual self-control ability, and 
were then assigned either to one of four self-control training conditions, or to a no-effort control 
condition. Participants in the self-control training conditions were required to perform a number 
of regular self-control activities (unrelated to thought suppression or handgrip strength, which 
included: improving posture, mood regulation, and keeping a food diary) over the two-week 
break between testing sessions, while the control participants were given no instructions or 
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exercises for the two weeks. At the end of two weeks, participants’ self-control was measured 
using a dual-task exercise identical to that used in the first session. 
 According to Muraven et al. (1999), there were two potential mechanisms by which 
training could potentially increase the self-control “muscle’s” strength – through increasing 
power (i.e., baseline capacity to exert self-control), or increasing stamina (i.e., reducing 
vulnerability to fatigue/depletion). An increase in power would be indicated by greater baseline 
handgrip persistence (i.e., before engaging in the thought suppression task) at the second session. 
Analysis of the data did not support this: “…baseline scores were approximately stable from the 
first session to the second” (Muraven et al., 1999, p. 451). Increased stamina would be indicated 
by a smaller decrease in handgrip persistence following the thought suppression task at the 
second session. Analysis of the data supported this – participants who had engaged in regular 
self-control activities across the two-week break were found to, on average, exhibit greater self-
control stamina at the second session, evidenced by a decreased reduction of handgrip 
persistence. Furthermore, this effect was evident only for participants high in compliance with 
the self-control activity instructions over the two weeks; participants low in compliance typically 
showed a lack of improvement, and performance not significantly different from the control 
group (Muraven et al., 1999).  
 These results were taken as further support for the strength model – engaging in self-
control over an extended period appears to lead to an improvement in self-control stamina, as 
was predicted by Baumeister & Heatherton (1996), Muraven & Baumeister (2000), etc. 
Combined with the evidence supporting the notion of self-control fatigue/ego depletion (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998), the findings of Muraven et al. (1999) provided 
further evidence consistent with a limited resource account of self-control. In particular, the 
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results of Muraven et al. (1999) suggested that regular self-control training does not lead to an 
increase in baseline self-control strength, but does reduce the impact of depletion on subsequent 
self-control performance.  
More recent research has provided further support for this position. Oaten and Cheng 
(2006a, 2006b, 2007) demonstrated that regular engagement in a number of self-control activities 
(academic study, physical exercise, and financial monitoring) can lead to improved effectiveness 
in other areas requiring self-control, including reducing alcohol consumption and smoking, 
engaging in healthy eating, performance of household chores, and laboratory self-control tasks. 
Gailliot, Plant, Butz, and Baumeister (2007) found that, similarly to Muraven et al. (1999), two 
weeks of self-control exercises were enough to improve resistance to self-control depletion on 
Stroop and anagram tasks. Cranwell, Benford, Houghton, Golembewski, Fischer, and Hagger 
(2014) provided participants with four weeks of exposure to a smartphone-based self-control 
training application, and similarly noted subsequent improvements in self-control performance, 
in terms of resistance to depletion at a handgrip persistence task.  
Furthermore, Bertram and Schmeichel (2014) found that asking participants to engage in 
logical thinking for only a week led to subsequent improvement in performance at anagram-
solving when it was preceded by a depleting task, when compared to control participants (who 
had no such logical thinking requirements). However, unlike previous studies, Bertram and 
Schmeichel included a follow-up assessment one week after the second session, and found that 
the training effect may be extremely short-lived – at follow-up, there was no significant 
difference between control and experimental participants in anagram performance, suggesting 
that the initial “stamina” gains observed at the second session had already deteriorated. Bertram 
and Schmeichel interpreted this as still being consistent with the muscle metaphor, “…as 
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muscular strength and endurance also begin to fade in the absence of regular exercise or use” (p. 
426). They suggest that in the absence of regular self-control exercise or training, an individual’s 
self-control ability returns to trait levels, and that practice and use can enhance self-control 
ability above heritable levels.  
Overall, there is some evidence that consistently engaging in self-control can lead to 
improvements in an individual’s self-control ability, although the research of Bertram and 
Schmeichel (2014) suggests that this effect may be short lived. This improvement appears to be 
in the form of a decreased vulnerability to depletion, rather than an increase in baseline self-
control strength. However, research has not made clear whether this reduced vulnerability to 
depletion is a result of an increase in the amount of self-control resource available to an 
individual (i.e., a larger pool of strength to draw from), or whether it results from increased self-
control “efficiency”, possibly through the development of more effective self-control strategies 
that draw less deeply on the individual’s resources (i.e., the same amount of self-control strength, 
but self-control tasks require less of it to be successful) (Hagger et al., 2010). Furthermore, a 
recent meta-analysis of self-control training (Inzlicht & Bertram, 2015) found that after applying 
bias corrections to existing research the effect of training was reduced, and may be no different 
to zero (i.e., there may be no longitudinal training effect on self-control). They also suggested 
that the earlier results of Oaten and Cheng (2006a, 2006b, 2007) were anomalous in that they 
were much more extreme than other training research, the papers did not include key 
descriptives, it was not clear that the primary dependent variable actually tested self-control, and 
the authors were unable to provide the original data upon request. On these grounds, they suggest 
that further research is warranted regarding the effect of longitudinal self-control training, as the 
effect may be smaller than commonly believed, or may not exist at all. 
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1.2.2 Conservation or exhaustion: how does the self-control “muscle” tire? 
An important question that arises directly from the muscle metaphor/limited resource 
account of self-control is the nature of the depletion that occurs following initial self-control 
exertion. Specifically, Baumeister, Muraven, and Tice (2000), and Muraven and Baumeister 
(2000) raised the question of whether the depletion effect was due to a complete exhaustion of 
the self-control resource (such that an individual is unable to engage in further self-control), or 
due to a partial depletion of the resource resulting in an unwillingness to engage in further self-
control. This unwillingness could be due to a desire to conserve the remaining resource “…in 
case it is needed for responding to some extremely important situation” (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000, p. 256). In muscle metaphor terms, this is akin to an athlete conserving energy for a final 
effort towards the end of an event (Hagger et al., 2010). From an adaptive point of view, the 
depletion effect engendered by brief laboratory tasks would seem more likely to be conservation 
of remaining resources, rather than complete exhaustion – it is unlikely that individuals’ ability 
to exercise self-control could be so completely tapped by a five-minute laboratory task as to 
render them incapable of successfully exerting self-control for a brief while afterwards. As 
Baumeister et al. (2000) state:  
 
Given the broad power and potential adaptive benefits of the self’s executive function, 
some deeply rooted pattern of conserving a diminished resource would be in the 
individual’s best long-term interests. After all, being able to make effective, conscious 
decisions or to refrain from dangerous impulses can be helpful and possibly even life-
preserving. (p. 139)  
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1.2.2.1 The effect of believed future self-control exertion.  
There are two possible approaches to test between exhaustion versus conservation of the 
self-control resource. The first of these involves manipulating an individual’s expectations of 
future self-control requirements – if an individual anticipates further use (and therefore loss) of 
resources, they may prepare for this future loss by conserving what resources remain (Muraven, 
Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006). Muraven et al. (2006) tested this across a number of experiments. In 
one, participants engaged in a standard dual-task experiment (half were depleted using a thought-
suppression task, half engaged in a similarly difficult but non-depleting math task), before 
engaging in a dependent self-control task (holding their hand in ice water). However, before 
engaging in the dependent task, half the participants in each group were informed that they 
would have to engage in a third self-control task subsequent to the dependent task (thus 
motivating them to conserve their available resources), while the other half were informed that 
they would have to engage in a subsequent task not requiring self-control (no motivation to 
conserve). As expected, depleted individuals who were motivated to conserve their remaining 
resources by anticipating future exertion demonstrated the worst performance at the dependent 
task. These results were interpreted as support for the conservation hypothesis: “Individuals 
apparently anticipate self-control tasks and alter their behavior to conserve a limited resource” 
(Muraven et al., 2006, p. 527). Furthermore, individuals who were depleted in the initial stage of 
the experiment were more concerned with conserving their remaining resources than non-
depleted participants – that is, the relative scarcity of depleted participants’ self-control resource 
caused them to conserve more than those with more resource available. 
These results were replicated in a second experiment, using a similar form but slightly 
different tasks. A third experiment, rather than explicitly telling participants that they would be 
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required to take part in a third task, had them consider their predicted self-control demands for 
the following several hours. In keeping with the previous experiments, depleted participants who 
anticipated high future self-control use were more motivated to conserve their resources for the 
dependent task, relative to non-depleted participants or those who did not anticipate requiring 
high levels of future self-control. A fourth experiment replicated and extended upon these results 
by having participants actually take part in a third task, and measuring their performance. As 
with the previous experiments, participants motivated to conserve their resources for the second 
task performed worse than those who did not. Those who had conserved their resources actually 
performed better at the third task than those who had not, “…showing that conservation appears 
to be a reasonable and successful strategy” (Muraven et al., 2006, p. 535).  
Research by Tyler and Burns (2009) further supported the notion of conservation. Their 
first experiment was, in form, a replication of the study by Muraven et al. (2006) and found 
similar results – depleted participants expecting future self-control demands demonstrated 
relatively worse performance on the dependent self-control task than both non-depleted 
participants, and depleted participants not expecting further self-control exertion. Their second 
and third experiments manipulated the amount of time that participants believed to be remaining 
in the study, and found that those who believed that the experiment was almost over (and thus 
had less motivation to conserve self-control) demonstrated better dependent task performance 
than those who believed there to be a substantial amount of participation left (and were thus 
motivated to conserve).  
Finally, Graham, Bray, and Ginis (2014) likewise demonstrated the conservation effect 
by manipulating future anticipated self-control requirements, again finding that anticipating 
future self-control demands resulted in decreased dependent task performance. Unlike previous 
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studies, Graham et al. explicitly asked participants how much energy they were conserving for 
future tasks, and how important they felt it was that they conserve energy – in both cases, 
participants anticipating future self-control demands scored higher than those who anticipated no 
such demands. However, unlike Muraven et al. (2006, study 4), Graham et al. found no 
protective effect of conservation – participants who had anticipated future exertion and 
conserved resources did not perform any better on the second dependent task than participants 
who had not conserved. Graham et al. suggested that this disparity could be due to the domains 
of the tasks used (a series of cognitive tasks for Muraven et al.; a mixture of cognitive and 
physical tasks for Graham et al.), possibly because “...the purposeful preservation of self-control 
strength is more pronounced in similar (i.e., cognitive - cognitive) than dissimilar (i.e., cognitive 
- physical) domains” (Graham et al., 2014, p. 94). This claim appears to be at odds with the 
general assertion of the strength model, that acts of self-control, regardless of domain, draw on 
the same resource. If that is the case, then the protective effect of conservation should not 
demonstrate domain specificity. As Muraven et al. (2006) and Graham et al. (2014) are the only 
studies to have explored the distal effects of conservation on self-control performance, this 
remains an area for further investigation. 
1.2.2.2 The effect of motivation on depletion. 
Testing the effect of anticipated self-control demands has provided evidence supporting 
the notion of conservation of the self resource (e.g., Graham et al., 2014; Muraven et al., 2006; 
Tyler & Burns, 2009). The second approach to testing the conservation hypothesis involves 
offering individuals incentives to exert self-control when they have been depleted. If they are 
conserving resources (as opposed to being completely exhausted), then appropriate incentives 
should ameliorate the depletion effect (Baumeister et al., 2000). Conversely, should an 
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individual’s self-control be exhausted (rather than conserved), then no amount of motivation 
should be able to overcome the depletion effect. 
Research by Muraven and Slessareva (2003) tested the conservation hypothesis in a 
series of experiments, in which individuals’ motivation to persist with self-control exertion 
following initial depletion was manipulated. In one experiment, participants depleted via a 
thought-suppression task, who believed that their performance on a second self-control task 
(unsolvable figure-tracing) would benefit others, outperformed depleted participants with no 
such belief, and performed comparably to non-depleted participants. As Muraven and Slessareva 
claimed, “People can compensate for depletion if their motivation is great enough” (2003, p. 
897). Such a finding is consistent with the conservation hypothesis – the ability of motivation to 
overcome the depletion effect suggests that the resource is not completely exhausted, and is 
instead being conserved by individuals. In a second experiment, reducing the motivation of 
depleted participants to persist at a second self-control task (by informing them of the futility in 
persisting at it) increased the depletion effect. Such results were consistent with the results of the 
first experiment, and could be taken as further support for the conservation hypothesis – if the 
individual believes that further exertion is unlikely to prove beneficial, then they are more likely 
to hoard their remaining resources for situations where they could prove useful. In a third 
experiment, Muraven and Slessareva provided a material incentive for participants to exert self-
control. Participants were either depleted or not, and then offered the chance to consume as much 
of a flavoured drink as they wished. For half of the participants, the drink was sweet; for the 
other half, the drink was soured with vinegar. Participants were offered a cash incentive per 
ounce of drink consumed, split into high pay ($0.25/ounce) or low pay ($0.01/ounce) conditions. 
As with the first two experiments, depleted participants provided with adequate motivation (i.e., 
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the high-pay condition) to exert self-control (consuming an unappetising drink) outperformed 
depleted participants with less motivation (i.e., the low-pay condition), further supporting the 
notion that their resources were being conserved, rather than exhausted: “The results suggest that 
depleted individual are not unable, but perhaps unwilling, to exert self-control” (Muraven & 
Slessareva, 2003, p. 903). 
While strength model researchers consider the results of Muraven and Slessareva (2003) 
to be consistent with (and indeed, supportive of) the conservation hypothesis, they recognise that 
such results could also be consistent with a motivation-only account of self-control (Baumeister 
& Vohs, 2007). That is, if motivation alone can eliminate the depletion effect, it may be that the 
depletion effect is nothing more than a reduced motivation to complete difficult/frustrating tasks 
among those who have previously done so (i.e., depleted participants). However, Baumeister and 
colleagues argue that this is unlikely to be the case, considering motivation instead to be a 
moderator of the depletion effect, but not the ultimate constraint (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Schmeichel, 2013). As Baumeister and Vohs (2007) state: 
 
It is tempting to interpret Muraven and Slessareva’s (2003) findings as indicating that ego 
depletion is essentially a state of motivation, but we think that would be a 
misinterpretation…the most plausible conclusion is that motivation…can compensate for 
the reduced ability to self-regulate that ordinarily marks the depleted state. (p. 124) 
 
Although the experimental results of Muraven and Slessareva (2003) suggest that motivation 
may be able to compensate for some level of ego depletion, Baumeister has countered that this 
may be due to the fact that the level of depletion engendered by typical laboratory tasks is quite 
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low, and that there exists a point at which ego depletion would overcome the compensatory 
abilities of motivation: 
 
To be sure, we think there are levels of depletion beyond which people may be unable to 
control themselves effectively, regardless of what is at stake. Pragmatic and ethical 
limitations have prevented us from showing this in laboratory work thus far. Again, the 
muscle analogy is relevant: Mildly tired athletes can indeed manage to summon the 
strength for a major exertion at decisive moments, but after a certain point fatigue 
becomes insurmountable. (Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 353) 
 
 Thus, drawing on the muscle metaphor allows strength model researchers to preserve the 
strength model against the suggestion that motivation might be the sole mechanism behind the 
ego-depletion effect. Rather, researchers have suggested that motivation may act as a fourth 
ingredient of self-control (along with clear standards, the ability to monitor, and available 
resources to effect self-controlled behavior; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). Motivation, in this 
sense, is a necessary ingredient of self-control (if there is no motivation to be self-controlled, 
there will be no self-control), but not a sufficient one – according to the strength model, if 
resources are completely depleted then no amount of motivation will overcome this (Baumeister 
& Vohs, 2007).  
 While drawing on the muscle metaphor allows strength model researchers to make a 
convincing argument for motivation being a moderator of the depletion effect, and thus preserve 
the conservation hypothesis, it also raises the question about just how far the muscle metaphor 
can be taken in illustrating the strength model. The research discussed thus far has provided 
support for analogous versions of muscle tiredness (ego depletion; Baumeister et al., 1998), 
muscle training (longitudinal improvement in self-control strength; Muraven et al., 1999), and 
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the conservation of energy like a tired runner saving themselves for the end of a race (Muraven 
et al., 2006). However, just as muscular tiredness does not permanently incapacitate individuals, 
ego depletion is likewise merely a temporary deficit in self-control ability. Following the muscle 
analogy, this suggests two mechanisms worthy of investigation – the manner in which the self-
control “muscle” replenishes its strength, and the nature of the resource underlying the strength. 
1.2.3 Recovery and replenishment: how does the "muscle" recover? 
 If every instance of self-control exertion permanently depleted an individual, they would 
very quickly lose all ability to demonstrate self-control at all, with presumably disastrous 
consequences for civilization. As this doesn’t occur, then accepting the premises of the strength 
model suggests that the resource upon which self-control is hypothesised to rely must somehow 
replenish or recover. Without explicitly identifying the resource hypothesised to underlie self-
control, several mechanisms have been identified that purportedly restore the resource or 
otherwise ameliorate the depletion effect. 
 Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, and Muraven (2007) examined the effect of positive affect on 
ego depletion in a series of four experiments. Positive affect was manipulated through either 
small gifts or humorous videos. In all four experiments, depleted participants who were induced 
with positive affect performed equally well as non-depleted participants, and significantly better 
than depleted participants who experienced a sad mood induction, neutral stimulus, or even a rest 
period – a positive mood appeared to counteract the depletion effect. Furthermore, the effect of 
positive affect appeared specific to depleted participants – positive affect had no effect on non-
depleted participants. That is, positive affect appeared to remedy ego depletion, rather than 
simply being responsible for a broad increase in self-regulatory capacity across the board (Tice et 
al., 2007).  
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 Similarly to Tice et al. (2007), Webb and Sheeran (2003) investigated factors with a 
protective effect on depletion, and had participants form implementation intentions 
(“if…then…” statements). For example, participants engaging in a Stroop task were told to form 
the implementation intention: “As soon as I see the word I will ignore its meaning (for example, 
by concentrating on the second letter only) and I will name the color ink it is printed in.” (Webb 
& Sheeran, 2003, p. 280). Although participants in the implementation intention condition rated 
their participation equally as difficult as did participants in the ego depletion (no implementation 
intention) condition (both of whom rated it as significantly more difficult than did the control 
condition), their performance at a subsequent dependent self-control task was not significantly 
different from the control condition, and was significantly better than that of ego depleted 
participants (i.e., there was no depletion effect). A second experiment found similar effects, and, 
just as Tice et al. (2007) found no increase in self-control ability as a result of positive mood, did 
not find that implementation intentions led to an improvement in non-depleted participants – the 
effect of implementation intentions appears to specifically repair the effects of ego depletion, 
rather than providing a broad boost to self-regulatory ability. 
 Various other methods have demonstrated a similar ability to circumvent the ego 
depletion effect, while demonstrating no appreciable benefit in non-depleted participants. These 
include increasing self-awareness in participants (Alberts, Martijn, & de Vries, 2011), priming 
participants with the concept of persistence (Alberts, Martijn, Greb, Merckelbach, & de Vries, 
2007), having participants monitor themselves against some standard (Wan & Sternthal, 2008), 
and having participants engage in brief mindfulness meditation (Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 
2012). The activation of certain concepts counteracting the depletion effect is not limited to 
abstract ideas (e.g., self-awareness, persistence), but can include more concrete concepts, such as 
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the concept of money. In two experiments, Boucher and Kofos (2012) found that activating the 
concept of money in participants counteracted the ego depletion effect, and even caused a 
reduction in the perceived subjective difficulty and required effort on the dependent self-control 
task. 
 If one accepts the muscle metaphor as a parallel for what occurs during ego depletion 
(i.e., some actual resource is depleted through exertion, as the strength model suggests), then it is 
not clear how any of the above mentioned methods would serve to replenish this resource – 
while a good mood might cause an increase in certain neurotransmitters in some areas of the 
brain, activating concepts of persistence or money is unlikely to act in a similar manner, yet they 
have the same effect. Alberts et al. (2011) suggest that, in the case of increasing one’s self-
awareness at least, the decreased ego depletion effect might be due to an increase in motivational 
intensity – increasing the importance of success by making self-awareness more salient to the 
participant will lead to a corresponding increase in motivation for the self-control task. As 
Alberts et al. (2011) state: "When self-aware, the salience of successful performance increases 
which, according to motivational intensity theory, motivates people to mobilize resources" (p. 
61). In keeping with the strength model, this suggestion avoids the claim that such self-
awareness is replenishing any resource, but is rather motivating a deeper drawing on that 
resource – just as Muraven and Slessareva (2003) argued regarding the moderating effect of 
motivation. Baumeister et al. (2007) addressed the findings of Tice et al. (2007), and Web and 
Sheeran (2003) by similarly claiming that the ability of positive moods and implementation 
intentions to reduce ego depletion occurred as result of individuals drawing more deeply on their 
ego resource: 
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To be sure, none of these procedures clearly counteracts the depleted state in the sense of 
replenishing the depleted resource. Rather, they may all operate by inducing the person to 
expend more of the depleted resource. (p. 353) 
 
 A common theme connecting the findings of Alberts et al. (2007), Alberts et al. (2011), 
Tice et al. (2007), and Webb and Sheeran (2003), is one of motivation - while they may not 
suggest any kind of resource replenishment, they all relate to a shift in motivational intensity. 
Implementation intentions make self-control success more salient, as does a heightened sense of 
persistence or self-awareness. A positive mood, engendered in the manner in which Tice et al. 
used (small gifts, humorous videos), might be perceived as a reward for self-control exertion, 
and thus motivate individuals to try harder in subsequent attempts. However, that shift in 
motivation may, as Alberts et al. (2011) and Baumeister et al. (2007) suggest, merely lead to 
increased drawing on the ego resource (and presumably greater subsequent depletion), rather 
than genuinely assisting in the replenishment of the self-control resource. One mechanism which 
might actually replenish a self-control resource is rest – just as muscles need time to restore 
energy levels (glycogen, ATP, etc.), so too might the ego require time to replenish the resource 
fueling self-control.  
 Research by Tyler and Burns (2008) tested the notion that the opportunity to rest between 
self-control tasks might reduce or eliminate the depletion effect. Using the standard dual-task 
procedure (the depleting task involved standing on one leg and counting backwards from 2000 
by 7, and has been hypothesised to require self-control to avoid quitting; the dependent task was 
handgrip persistence), the experimenters manipulated the length of time between the two tasks 
(one, three, or ten minutes). While there was no significant difference in depletion between 
depleted participants given a one or a three-minute interval between tasks, participants given a 
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ten-minute interval between depletion and the dependent task demonstrated no depletion effect – 
their handgrip persistence increased relative to that of non-depleted participants. These results 
were taken as indicating that rest could successfully allow the self to replenish its resources: 
"...allowing a 10-minute interlude to occur between the two regulatory acts provided sufficient 
time to replenish the self’s depleted resource" (p. 318). 
 In a second experiment, Tyler and Burns (2008) tested the effect of relaxation on 
depletion, using a set three-minute interval between depleting task (thought-listing task, with 
participants in the depletion condition instructed to avoid thinking about a white bear) and 
dependent task (difficult math multiplication task; measured as length of persistence). 
Participants in the relaxation condition listened to relaxing music in the interval between tasks; 
control participants received no music. The results showed that depleted participants in the 
relaxation condition performed equally as well as non-depleted participants, showing no signs of 
ego depletion. Depleted participants in the non-relaxation condition, however, showed the typical 
pattern of ego depletion. These results, as with those of the previous experiment, were taken as 
indicating that relaxation provided some mechanism by which the self could restore resources. 
 Tyler and Burns (2008) implicitly treat rest and relaxation as equivalent in terms of their 
mechanism for replenishing the self-resource – indeed, they outright claim "The results suggest 
that when the 3-minute interval involves concentrated efforts to relax, the self’s depleted 
resource becomes effectively replenished" (p. 318). However, as an explanation for ego resource 
replenishment, the ability of relaxation to reduce the depletion effect encounters similar 
problems as do implementation intentions, positive mood, etc. The difference between a three-
minute interval with relaxation (which can negate ego depletion) and one without (which has no 
significant effect on it) appears to be qualitative in nature – it is the individual's experience of the 
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interval that differs. This suggests that, as with the findings of Tice et al. (2007), Webb and 
Sheeran (2003), etc., what might be occurring is a shift in motivation – either to be self-
controlled, or to draw more deeply on the ego resource. It could be that an increased rest period 
operates in exactly the same manner – a long interval between self-control tasks causes some 
shift in motivational priorities, rather than actually replenishing any resource. However, if 
working within the parameters of the muscle metaphor, increased rest would appear to be the 
most likely mechanism by which ego resources could be replenished, just as with actual muscles. 
If rest truly operates to reduce the ego depletion effect in a way that is qualitatively different 
from the other mechanisms discussed thus far, by allowing for the replenishment of an actual ego 
resource of some kind, then the question that must be addressed is that regarding the nature of 
the resource underlying self-control strength/the self. 
1.3 The Resource Underlying Self-Control 
1.3.1 The glucose account of self-control. 
 Attempts to find a physiological mechanism able to account for the depletion effect 
resulted in researchers providing evidence that blood glucose could be the underlying "resource" 
upon which self-control relies (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007). Because the 
brain uses glucose as its primary source of energy, and earlier research had suggested that low 
levels of blood glucose were correlated with decreased performance at tasks requiring effortful 
control and executive function (e.g., incongruent Stroop tasks [Benton, Owens, & Parker, 1994], 
and complex reaction time tasks [Owens & Benton, 1994]), Gailliot et al. (2007) suggested: 
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Self-control…may be highly susceptible to fluctuations in glucose. Indeed, indirect 
evidence suggests that self-control failure may be more likely when glucose is low or when 
glucose is not transported effectively from the body to the brain. (p. 326) 
 
In order to test these claims, Gailliot et al. (2007) conducted a series of experiments 
designed to examine the interplay between blood glucose and self-control. In their first two 
studies, they measured participants’ blood glucose prior to exerting self-control, had them 
engage in either a depleting (attention control, Study 1; prejudice suppression, Study 2) or a non-
depleting (no attention control, Study 1; no prejudice suppression, Study 2) task, and then 
measured their blood glucose again to assess any changes. In both studies, they found that 
participants who had engaged in depleting tasks displayed decreased blood glucose relative to 
control participants, suggesting that the self-control required for the depleting tasks required 
greater energy expenditure than did non-depleting tasks. In their third to sixth studies, they 
measured participants’ baseline blood glucose, depleted all participants using a variety of 
standard self-control tasks, measured blood glucose again, and then had participants engage in 
the dependent tasks. While initial blood glucose levels in all four studies were found to be 
uncorrelated with dependent task performance, lower blood glucose following the depleting task 
was found to be significantly correlated with poorer task performance in all four studies. It was 
concluded that “The consistency of findings across the…samples and methods lends confidence 
to the conclusion that low levels of glucose are associated with decrements in self-control” 
(Gailliot et al., 2007, p. 330). The final three studies from Gailliot et al. were all designed to 
further test the relationship between blood glucose and self-control by directly manipulating 
glucose levels through administration of a glucose drink. Similarly to the results of other 
research examining methods of negating the ego-depletion effect (e.g., Alberts et al., 2007; Tice 
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et al., 2007; Tyler & Burns, 2008; Webb & Sheeran, 2003), Gailliot et al. found that glucose 
supplementation following depletion could eliminate the ego depletion effect, although there was 
no evidence that it improved it above control levels. It was concluded that "A glucose 
drink...eliminated the tendency for an initial self-control task to impair...performance, consistent 
with the hypothesis that glucose replenishes what has been depleted" (Gailliot et al., 2007, p. 
331). 
Further evidence supporting glucose as a potential resource for the strength model comes 
from a number of sources. Dvorak and Simons (2009) included glucose measures in their study 
of self-control and found significant decreases in blood glucose following self-control exertion, 
and also that those decreases partially mediated the depletion effect observed, consistent with the 
results of studies 1 and 2 by Gailliot et al. (2007). DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, and Maner 
(2008) found that a glucose drink reversed an observed decrease in helping behavior caused by 
ego depletion in participants, but a similarly sweet non-glucose drink did not (Study 2), 
consistent with studies 7-9 in Gailliot et al. (2007). Masicampo and Baumeister (2008) found that 
a sugar drink reduced reliance upon heuristic (rather than effortful) processing amongst depleted 
participants, while Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, and Baumeister (2009) found that drinking a glucose 
drink (rather than a non-glucose placebo drink) reduced reliance on stereotypes when writing an 
essay about a gay man. Glucose supplementation has been found to reduce aggressive impulses 
in depleted individuals high in trait aggression, or to reduce aggressive responses to provocation 
in high trait-aggression individuals (Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & Teo, 2010; DeWall, 
Deckman, Gailliot, & Bushman, 2011, Study 1). Glucose has even been found to eliminate the 
depletion effect in dogs (Miller, Pattison, DeWall, Rayburn-Reeves, & Zentall, 2010). A meta-
analysis of four studies including glucose supplementation (DeWall et al., 2008; Gailliot et al., 
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2007; Gailliot et al., 2009; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008) revealed a large, homogenous effect 
size, and that “…supplementing people with glucose is associated with significantly better 
performance on self-control tasks among depleted people relative to controls provided with a 
sweet placebo” (Hagger et al., 2010, p. 514).  
Finally, DeWall et al. (2011) found a relationship between diabetes (associated with 
impaired glucose processing) and aggression, and also found that states in the US with high 
diabetes rates had higher violent crime rates than did states with lower diabetes rates. Similarly, 
they found a relationship between countries with high incidences of glucose-6-phosphate 
dehydrogenase deficiency (a metabolic disorder related to low glucose levels) and higher killing 
rates (both war and non-war related). There are a number of cautions when interpreting such 
data, however. For one, their study which found a relationship between diabetes and aggression 
(Study 2) found only an indirect relationship between diabetes and aggression that was mediated 
by self-control: "People with diabetic symptoms...have low self-control. Low self-control, in 
turn, is related to high levels of aggressiveness" (p. 76). This leaves open the possibility that 
people already low in self-control develop diabetic symptoms as a result of their low self-control 
(as a result of poor diet, lack of exercise, etc.), rather than diabetes causing low self-control. It 
should also be noted that participants in this study were not clinically diagnosed as diabetic, nor 
did they have their blood glucose measured, but were assessed using a self-report symptom 
checklist. Likewise, the results of Study 3, which found a relationship between US states with 
high levels of diabetes and violent crime, were purely correlational in nature - again, it could be 
that some other factor causes poor self-control, which in turn leads to increased diabetes 
prevalence and also accounts for higher levels of violence. Lastly, the results of Study 4, which 
suggested a link between countries with high levels of glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase 
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deficiency and violent killings is also correlational in nature and fraught with interpretative 
difficulty, as the authors themselves acknowledge: 
 
...because these data are correlational we cannot be sure that individuals with the disorder 
contributed to violent killings. The results for deaths in war would be particularly 
problematic because the number of war related deaths in one country may well be due to 
the aggression of another country...Additionally, it is much harder to make the case that 
war deaths are due to 'lack of self-control'. (DeWall et al., 2011, p. 77) 
 
Despite these potential problems, the authors interpret the results of these studies as supporting 
the hypothesis that glucose is the resource underlying self-control. 
Taken together, the assorted findings related to glucose and self-control seem to suggest 
that glucose has a role to play in individuals' ability to control their behaviour. As Gailliot and 
Baumeister (2007) argue: "...a large body of evidence converges upon the hypothesis that self-
control is highly susceptible to glucose. Self-control failure seems more likely when periphery 
glucose levels are too low or when glucose is not efficiently metabolized" (p. 319). Self-control 
appears to deplete blood glucose relative to non-self-control tasks; low levels of blood glucose or 
poor glucose metabolism appear to be related to a variety of decrements in self-control 
(increased aggression, decreased performance at laboratory self-control tasks); and glucose 
supplementation can eliminate the ego depletion effect (in both humans and animals). While this 
notion has proved popular, and quickly gained traction amongst researchers, recent critiques of 
the glucose account have cast doubt on the likelihood of its role in self-control depletion. 
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1.3.2. Conceptual and analytical critiques of the glucose account. 
 One of the most damaging critiques of the glucose account comes from Kurzban (2010), 
who presented a conceptual and analytical critique of the idea that the “strength” referred to by 
the model might be brain glucose. His critique focused on a proposition of logical necessity (i.e., 
the proposition must hold true; if it can be shown to be false then the glucose account as it stands 
must be false) derived from Gailliot et al.'s (2007) claims. That proposition was that "Performing 
a self-control task reduces glucose levels relative to glucose levels before the task", later restated 
more strongly as: "For any subject in whom glucose does not go down relative to baseline, it 
cannot be the case that glucose is the resource in question" (Kurzban, 2010, p. 245, original 
emphasis) 
 Kurzban's (2010) critique of this proposition was broken into two parts: in the first, he 
critically assessed existing empirical knowledge regarding brain metabolism and glucose 
consumption to determine how plausible Gailliot et al.'s (2007) claims were; in the second, he re-
examined experimental data from some of Gailliot et al.'s key studies to determine whether or 
not they were consistent with the proposition that "Performing a self-control task reduces glucose 
levels relative to glucose levels before the task" (Kurzban, 2010, p. 245). 
 The claim by Gailliot et al. (2007) that glucose was likely to be the "resource" underlying 
the strength model was, in part, predicated upon the fact that the brain consumes up to 20% of 
the body's energy throughout the day, making it very energetically demanding. Due to the brain's 
relatively high energy demands, Gailliot et al. suggested that particularly taxing cerebral activity 
might deplete glucose faster than it can be replenished, making controlled, effortful processes 
more likely to fail due to a lack of energy. As they argue, "Self-control relies on controlled or 
executive processes in that the self must effortfully override urges, thoughts, emotions, and 
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habitual or automatic response tendencies. Self-control, therefore, may be highly susceptible to 
fluctuations in glucose" (p. 326). 
 Kurzban (2010), however, suggests that the types of task that have been typically 
demonstrated to cause an ego depletion effect in the laboratory are unlikely to cause any 
significant fluctuation in the brain's energy levels. As it has been suggested that the brain 
consumes roughly a quarter of a kilocalorie of energy per minute (Clarke & Sokoloff, 1998), 
Kurzban showed that even if one were to assume that self-control tasks increased brain glucose 
consumption by an order of magnitude across the entire brain, then the overall increase in 
glucose consumption compared to controls (across the time of a typical depletion task, claimed 
to be approximately five minutes) would equate to less than 0.2 of a calorie (the equivalent of a 
moderate jog for one second). As his calculations represented an increase across the entire brain 
(rather than only the sections typically responsible for self-control, such as the prefrontal cortex 
[Wagner & Heatherton, 2011]), and they were artificially inflated, the true amount is likely to be 
much smaller than that reported. Kurzban points out that claims of depletion based on glucose 
therefore hinge on fairly miniscule changes in blood glucose, and that based on this reasoning, 
performance on self-control tasks should be worse after vigorous exercise. This, however, does 
not appear to be the case: a review of research on the effect of physical exertion on subsequent 
cognitive functioning by Audiffren and André (2015) found that exercise could in fact have the 
opposite effect – a number of studies (e.g., Hogervorst, Riedel, Jeukendrup, & Jolles, 1996) 
found significant improvement in self-control tasks (e.g., the Stroop task) following extensive 
exercise. If glucose truly were the resource underlying the depletion effect, the results of studies 
including physical exertion should demonstrate no such positive effect – any degree of exertion 
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causing more than a minute change in blood glucose should show a consequent drop in self-
control performance.  
 Having demonstrated that the claim by Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) and Gailliot et al. 
(2007), that the resource underpinning the strength model is glucose, is an implausible one, 
Kurzban (2010) then critiqued those studies of Gailliot et al. that supported their claim that lower 
levels of blood glucose were significantly correlated with impaired self-control performance 
(Gailliot et al., 2007, studies 3-6). Kurzban began his critique by first suggesting that the analysis 
techniques chosen by Gailliot et al. were not appropriate, for two reasons. One, that Gailliot et al. 
based their analysis on the difference between pre- and post-depletion measures of glucose 
without ever reporting the actual differences; and two, that using the drop in glucose between 
pre- and post-depletion measures rather than the absolute measure was inconsistent with their 
stated theory. As he says: 
 
...using the drop in glucose rather than the absolute measure as the predictor variable is 
inconsistent with the stated theory (though it might be consistent with a different theory). 
The stated theory is that glucose is a limited resource, so the prediction should be that 
performance depends on the level of the resource. The analysis presented, however, is 
based on the change, which means their implicit theory is that performance depends on 
the recent change in glucose. (Kurzban, 2010, p. 250) 
 
 Having made this claim, Kurzban (2010) then provided a re-analysis of the data gathered 
by Gailliot et al. (2007) in their studies. He found that in three of the four studies, mean blood 
glucose actually increased from pre-task to post-task, and that it had increased in at least 50% of 
participants (there were no control participants in any of the four studies). For the one study in 
which mean blood glucose had decreased from pre-task to post task (although 6 of 15 
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participants still recorded an increase), the decrease was found to be non-significant. Kurzban 
(2010) concluded that "The data in Gailliot et al. (2007) do not support the claim that, at least for 
non-fasting subjects, self-control tasks reduce the level of glucose in the blood" (p. 253). This 
evidence, taken with the analysis of evidence concerning brain metabolism, suggests that the 
logical proposition "Performing a self-control task reduces glucose levels relative to glucose 
levels before the task" is very unlikely to hold true – that acts of self-control do not decrease 
blood glucose levels relative to those before the task. Experimentally, this critique has been 
supported by Molden et al. (2012), who, using more sensitive instruments than those used by 
Gailliot et al. (2007), showed no increase in carbohydrate metabolisation during self-control 
tasks. 
 Other researchers have critiqued the glucose account (and by extension, the strength 
model) as being theoretically unsound and based on an error in reasoning – that glucose does not 
"recharge" any underlying resource. Flora and Polenick (2013) accept the empirical research that 
suggests that glucose consumption can have a positive effect on self-control performance (as 
well as providing improvements in athletic, cognitive, and academic performance, and reducing 
aggressive behaviour). However, they reject the notion that it does so through "refueling" the 
brain, or any theorised resource underlying self-control. This rejection rests on the accusation 
that modern psychology has been engaged in dualistic thinking by inventing "explanatory 
fictions" to account for experimental results. As they state: 
 
Instead of recognizing that thinking is behavior, modern psychology has invented a 
modern homunculus, 'the central executive,' and reassigned thinking to 'executive 
functions.' To the current point, rather than acknowledge that thinking is behavior and 
behavior is activity that uses energy (e.g., glucose, sugar), thinking or 'willpower' is said 
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to be an 'executive function,' that requires glucose... Fueling the brain per se, much less 
the 'mind,' may not be what accounts for sugar’s performance-enhancing effects at all. 
The stimulating effects of glucose or the use of glucose by other physiological systems in 
the organism, such as glucose receptors in the liver, vagus nerve stimulation, hormonal 
activity, glucocorticoid secretion, pancreatic function, or any number of other biological 
systems, could also partially, or wholly, account for the performance-enhancing effects of 
sugar consumption. (Flora & Polenick, 2013, p. 520) 
 
While Flora and Polenick's (2013) critique touches upon a number of important theoretical issues 
about the strength model, of particular relevance here is the conclusion that they draw regarding 
the role of glucose in self-control. They conclude that glucose almost certainly has a role to play 
in influencing self-control, but that that influence is very unlikely to be in the form of an 
"underlying resource" as suggested by DeWall et al. (2008), Gailliot and Baumeister (2007), 
Gailliot et al. (2007), etc. The notion that glucose may serve as an input into the self-control 
process, however, rather than acting as the limiting factor, is one that has been echoed by other 
researchers, and is gaining traction as an alternative to the glucose account of the strength model. 
 The strength of the claims against the glucose account are enough that Baumeister (2014) 
adopted a revised position, claiming that "...at present it seems unlikely that ego depletion's 
effects are caused by a shortage of glucose in the bloodstream" (p. 315). He maintains, however, 
that low blood glucose predicts poorer self-control, and that supplementation of glucose can 
repair the depletion effect, and on the basis of this suggests that glucose is best understood as 
having an input role into self-control. As he claims, "The most plausible current view is that 
there are extensive stores of glucose but the body resists running down its stores, and so it 
allocates selectively – and as depletion increases, it increasingly resists further allocation" (p. 
315). 
45 
 
1.3.3 Glucose as an input rather than a limiting factor. 
 Although his critique of the glucose account was scathing, Kurzban (2010) did not rule 
out the possibility (indeed, likelihood) of glucose playing some inputive role into self-control, 
just as Baumeister (2014) now advocates. In this sense, mechanisms in the body that monitor 
glucose levels might register fluctuations in those levels, which in turn would act as one of many 
inputs into the individual's decision making process (similar to the suggestion of Flora & 
Polenick, 2013). A similar idea was proposed by Wang and Dvorak (2010), who proposed an 
"energy budget" model of self-control. They argued that the brain treats energy (blood glucose) 
like money - it will expend it when resources are high, but become more miserly as resources 
drop. In an experimental study, they first measured participants' blood glucose levels and then 
assessed their level of future discounting using a delay discounting task (smaller, sooner reward 
vs. larger, more delayed reward). They then administered participants either a full-sugar soda, or 
an artificially sweetened (i.e., sugar-free) soda, before performing a second delay discounting 
task. Participants who had consumed the full-sugar soda (and showed an increase in blood 
glucose levels) demonstrated significantly reduced levels of future discounting (i.e., they were 
more prepared to wait for a larger reward) at the second delay discounting task than the first. 
Conversely, participants who had consumed the sugar-free soda (and showed a significant drop 
in blood glucose levels) exhibited a significant increase in future discounting (i.e., increased 
value placed upon smaller, more immediate rewards). Like Flora and Polenick (2013) and 
Kurzban (2010), Wang and Dvorak suggest that glucose may have an inputive role into 
behaviour, without being the primary "resource": 
 
A variety of studies in the literature have suggested that there are many ways to influence 
future discounting and intertemporal choice... This study adds to the list a metabolic 
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mechanism of using daily fluctuating blood glucose levels as cues in regulating body-
energy balance and its behavioral manifestation in future discounting. (p. 187) 
 
1.3.3.1 Beedie and Lane’s Resource Allocation Model. 
A similar line of reasoning was put forward by Beedie and Lane (2012), who suggested 
that the role of glucose in self-control may have to do with the prioritisation of allocation, rather 
than being a problem of limited supply. They support this claim with arguments from three 
different perspectives: the evolution of mental processes at the species level; the adaptation of 
those processes at an individual level; and the physiology of glucose transport. 
When considering self-control from a species-level evolutionary perspective, Beedie and 
Lane (2012) consider it likely that the ability to demonstrate self-control appeared early in our 
species’ history. In considering the example of using self-control to overcome fear, they state:  
 
Natural selection likely would have favored individuals who were able to respond in 
accordance with their fear when it was consistent with priorities and to exert self-control 
over that fear when it was inconsistent with priorities. (p. 146) 
 
They go on to claim that if it is the case that self-control was an adaptive behavioural mechanism 
from earliest human times, it is likely that “…evolutionary processes would have ensured the 
relative economy of self-control” (p.146), and that: 
 
…it might be presumed that given self-control was often required for survival, natural 
selection would have ensured either the economy of the brain activity underlying self-
control or the sufficient replenishment of brain glucose. (p.146). 
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They further argue against a claim made by Gailliot and Baumeister (2007), that 
“…evolution might have repeatedly selected in favor of hominids with a progressively higher 
capacity for self-control, even if it did burn a lot of fuel” (p. 305). This point, claim Beedie and 
Lane, is tantamount to claiming “…that a cognitive mechanism that requires energy to function 
evolved in the absence of an adequate energy supply” (p. 146). In short, Beedie and Lane claim 
that evolutionary pressures on the human species are likely to have ensured that, self-control 
being as adaptive as it is, there is an adequate energy delivery system in place, unlikely to be 
affected by single, relatively brief self-control tasks. 
Beedie and Lane (2012) strengthened their argument against the glucose account by 
arguing from an individual-level adaptation mechanisms perspective as well. Individuals, they 
claim, are capable of adapting to repeated environmental stressors (including physical demands, 
nutrient availability, etc.), which can include self-control demands. As they point out: “Repeated 
demands for the same response generally lead to one or more physiological adaptations, ensuring 
that the required response is more economical or effective in similar future situations” (p. 147). It 
makes sense then, they argue, that if self-control did require glucose, “…one or more of the 
organs or systems involved in self-control would adapt to ensure more effective and economic 
self-control in future situations” (p. 147). This would result in either increased self-control 
efficiency (i.e., self-control would require less glucose), or increased energy supply, with the net 
result that ordinary self-control demands (e.g., those commonly encountered in strength model 
research) would be unlikely to cause any decrement in self-control performance. As they 
conclude, “…it seems unlikely that the organs and systems responsible for the supply of glucose 
to the brain would be unable to adapt to ensure efficient self-control” (p. 147). 
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The final perspective presented by Beedie and Lane (2012) in their critique of the glucose 
account regards the physiology of glucose transport, a subject also touched upon by Kurzban 
(2010). The critique focuses primarily on Gailliot and Baumeister’s (2007) claim that “…glucose 
can be consumed in the brain faster than it can be replenished…and so cerebral activities can 
deplete the brain’s supply of glucose” (p. 306). Assessing the validity of this claim is critical, 
claim Beedie and Lane, as it “…suggests a disparity between the energy required by the brain 
and the body’s ability to supply that energy” (p. 148). In investigating the validity of the claim, 
Beedie and Lane examined evidence suggesting that the body is capable of providing energy 
quickly and efficiently to the brain, and has likely evolved to do so. Examples of this include 
noting that the brain is the only organ to not demonstrate weight loss during 
malnutrition/starvation, suggesting its primary position in nutrition and survival; and a number of 
physiological mechanisms (e.g., ketone production, metabolism of blood lactate, etc.) through 
which the brain can ensure its own glucose supply (Beedie & Lane, 2012). They also note that 
peripheral processes in the body can often be fueled by sources other than glucose (e.g., proteins 
and fats), meaning that the brain can continue to consume the body’s supply of glucose without 
compromising peripheral functions. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that the liver will 
release more glucose into the bloodstream in response to stress (Coker & Kjaer, 2005), and thus 
“...the idea that the body is able to produce extra glucose in response to stress yet is unable to do 
so in sufficient time or quantity to maintain self-control is…at odds with evolutionary theory and 
with the principles of physiological adaptation” (Beedie & Lane, 2012, p. 148).  
Overall, Beedie and Lane (2012) suggested that the body is entirely capable of providing 
the brain with sufficient glucose to be able to exert self-control without suffering negative effects 
on future behavior. The metabolic limitation suggested by the glucose account of Gailliot and 
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Baumeister (2007), Gailliot et al. (2007), etc., seems implausible in the face of evolutionary 
evidence, individual adaptation abilities, and the physiology of glucose transport. However, 
while Beedie and Lane argue against glucose as a limited resource (as the strength model 
suggests), they do argue that glucose has a crucial role to play in the expression of self-control. 
Beedie and Lane (2012) argue that the key to the issue of self-control and glucose is not 
whether glucose is frequently limited (as the strength model would suggest), but rather the sites 
in the brain to which glucose is allocated. On the basis of situational appraisals and personal 
priorities, they argue, glucose is allocated to areas of the brain as needed – a concept which they 
termed the “Resource Allocation Model of Self-Control” (RAMS). They state: 
 
The body has sufficient glucose to fuel mental processes in all but the most extreme 
situations. However, this resource is allocated only when necessary, and that necessity is 
determined by responses to the environment in relation to personal priorities. (p. 149) 
 
This would mean then that the decrease in self-control performance evidenced in much of the 
strength model literature may have been “…symptomatic of efficient and economic brain 
function” (p. 149), rather than the inefficient depletion of resources. Thus, when glucose is 
readily available and a task is consistent with an individual’s priorities, self-control will be easy. 
When glucose availability is reduced, if a task is consistent with an individual’s priorities then  
“…a motivational response results that has implications for energy release and transport” (p. 
150), and if the response is sufficient, self-control should still be achieved. If, however, glucose 
availability is low and the task is viewed as not being consistent with personal priorities, there 
will be no motivational response resulting in increased resource availability/allocation, and thus 
self-control will likely fail. Beedie and Lane explain such a situation as: 
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If the appraisal of a task is that it is inconsistent with priorities, the participant will not 
benefit from any increase or redirection of glucose with which to fuel that or any further 
self-control attempts. On that basis, he or she would either fail to exert self-control or 
disengage from the task. (p. 150) 
 
The RAMS, as presented by Beedie and Lane (2012), preserves a role for glucose in self-
control as a physiological mediator of the motivational and behavioural processes of self-control. 
However, while it ostensibly moves away from suggesting that a lack of glucose imposes a 
metabolic limitation on self-control, it still suggests that the lack of glucose in some areas of the 
brain (as a result of allocation based on situational appraisals) is an underlying cause for self-
control failure. It is to their credit that Beedie and Lane attempt to move away from the glucose 
account of the strength model, which their critique, as well as that of Kurzban (2010), makes 
untenable. Their insistence on a role for glucose in determining self-control success, however, 
seems directly at odds with the arguments they present earlier in their paper - the same 
arguments which they used to argue against the strength model's glucose account. 
In their refutation of the glucose account, Beedie and Lane (2012) argue that the brain is 
more than capable of keeping itself supplied with glucose in all but the most extreme of 
circumstances. To then suggest that "...insufficient glucose availability is the result of 
insufficient blood flow, itself the result of the self-control task not being sufficiently consistent 
with personal priorities to cause physiological reprioritization" (p. 149) 
is tantamount to saying "self-control fails because of a lack of glucose". The only difference 
between this and the strength model's account is the reason for the lack of glucose. In the 
RAMS, it is that the glucose has been allocated to other areas of the brain due to personal 
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priorities; in the strength model, glucose is depleted en masse across the brain. Beedie and Lane 
are ultimately arguing, then, that glucose is still the resource underlying self-control, mediated 
via individual situational appraisals and personal priorities. Given Kurzban's (2010) arguments 
about the potential glucose requirements of standard self-control tasks (i.e., that they are 
minimal), and Beedie and Lane's own arguments about the brain's efficiency, such a claim seems 
odd – by their own admission, self-control tasks in strength model research are unlikely to cause 
any significant hardship to the brain with regards to glucose supply. In the RAMs, however (and 
despite its claims to the contrary), glucose is retained as the resource underlying self-control, and 
the mechanism directing its allocation is never explored. 
The RAMS model as explained by Beedie and Lane (2012) also fails to adequately 
account for the research demonstrating the protective effect glucose supplementation can have on 
self-control following exertion (e.g., DeWall et al., 2008; Gailliot et al., 2009; Masciampo & 
Baumeister, 2008). Beedie and Lane argue that self-control tasks should not cause a significant 
decrease in glucose levels in the brain, and that decrements in self-control (i.e., ego depletion) 
following initial exertion are due to the brain "...directing blood to where it is needed and away 
from where it is not needed" (p. 149), thus changing the availability of glucose in those areas. 
Presumably, their explanation for ego depletion is that an initial self-control task causes a shift in 
personal priorities (although this is never directly stated), which in turn changes the allocation of 
glucose. The supplementation of glucose, then, should not change that effect - the glucose is 
being directed to "where it is needed", and the availability of it should not matter. What would 
change the effect would be if the consumption of glucose caused a shift in the personal priorities 
directing glucose allocation – a potentially key point, yet largely unexplored in the RAMS. 
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1.3.3.2 The role of glucose in changing self-control motivation. 
The RAMS is a laudable attempt to provide a more mechanistic model of the role of 
glucose in self-control. However, in its efforts to explain how self-control relies on the adequate 
allocation of glucose, it neglects to adequately investigate the mechanism behind the allocation – 
the "situational appraisals and personal priorities" mentioned by Beedie and Lane (2012). While 
it is obvious that self-control requires appropriate levels of blood glucose (as does any other 
brain function), some researchers have suggested that the motivational effects of glucose are far 
more important than its metabolisation (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013; Job, Walton, Bernecker, 
& Dweck, 2013; Molden et al., 2012). This would suggest that glucose still has a role to play as 
an input into self-control, without being a limiting factor as suggested by Gailliot et al. (2007) 
etc. (and implied by Beedie & Lane, 2012). 
Evidence for this comes from research showing that glucose mouth rinses (where an 
individual rinses their mouth with, but does not ingest, a glucose solution) have immediate 
positive effects on depleted individuals (Molden et al., 2012), even when compared with 
similarly sweet placebo rinses (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013). Similarly, researchers have 
found that endurance performance at running or cycling trials can be improved as a result of 
glucose or carbohydrate mouth rinses (Carter, Jeukendrup, & Jones, 2004; Chambers, Bridge, & 
Jones, 2009), suggesting that mere detection (as opposed to ingestion/metabolisation) of glucose 
is sufficient to repair the depletion effect. 
The fact that detection of glucose remedies the depletion effect could be taken as support 
for a resource account of self-control. If the presence of imminent resources can remedy the 
depletion effect, then the temptation is to assume that it is the lack of those resources that causes 
impaired self-control. However, the fact that it is the mere detection of those resources, rather 
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than their actual ingestion/metabolisation that remedies the depletion effect suggests that the 
effect is a motivational one, rather than a physiological one. This notion integrates well with the 
idea of glucose as an input into self-control behaviour. Lower glucose levels in an individual 
likely increase the motivation towards consummatory/appetitive behaviours, in an attempt to 
gain more resources. The detection of such resources in the oral cavity would, therefore, reduce 
the motivation towards impulsive consumption, as it would signal to the brain that resources are 
imminent/available. Crucially, however, the actual level of resources available to the individual 
does not change – it is the motivation to consume them that changes.  
Research by Miller, Bourrasseau, and Blampain (2013), however, argues against the 
notion that detection of resources modifies people’s motivations (and thus, modifies self-control 
behaviour) due to activation of motivational reward pathways. Miller et al. investigated the 
differential effects of glucose, fructose, or a placebo on self-control performance. Fructose was 
selected because, as the authors argue, “…fructose does not elicit activation of dopamine 
receptors along motivational reward pathways in the brain during digestion”, and “…fructose 
differs from glucose in its ability to enhance activity in motivational reward pathways following 
initial consumption” (Miller et al., 2013, p. 646). 
Using a difficult anagram-solving task as the measure of self-control (including both the 
number of anagrams completed, and persistence time), Miller et al. (2013) found that both 
glucose and fructose ingestion resulted in greater self-control performance than did the placebo, 
and did not differ significantly between each other in their ability to do so. Because fructose 
“…does not affect blood glucose levels, inhibits cortical responding, and cannot entrain a taste 
preference post-ingestion” (p. 645), these results were taken as support for the notion that they 
improve self-control via some mechanism other than reward pathway motivation. Such an 
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interpretation may very well be valid – the authors present evidence to suggest that fructose has a 
similar positive effect on self-control as does glucose, but is unlikely to activate the same 
motivational reward pathways.  
However, given that fructose ingested by itself is absorbed exceptionally poorly by the 
body (Bray, 2007), it cannot be that the improvement in observed self-control is due to actual 
energy replenishment – the process must be one of detection, rather than actual energisation. 
Infant studies have shown that fructose and glucose both have calming effects on infant crying, 
and that the effect can occur within seconds of ingestion (prior to any metabolisation of the 
substances themselves) (Blass & Smith, 1992). This suggests that, despite Miller et al.'s (2013) 
claim that fructose fails to activate dopamine receptors along motivational pathways, it is 
nonetheless detected upon ingestion and has some form of motivational effect (whether as a 
signal of imminent resources due to its sweetness, whether it has an antinociceptive effect 
through opioid mechanisms as Blass & Smith, 1992, suggest, or some other effect). 
Overall, the strength of the arguments against the glucose account as conceived by Gailliot 
and colleagues (e.g., Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007; etc.) suggest that it is 
unlikely to be the “resource” underlying self-control. Conceptually and experimentally, it 
appears extremely unlikely that the act of exerting self-control itself causes a decrease in 
available blood glucose - certainly not in any predictable manner, or with any great magnitude 
(Kurzban, 2010; Molden et al., 2012). This being the case, the glucose model as it was originally 
conceived is incapable of providing a satisfactory mechanism by which self-control depletion 
might function. It appears more likely that glucose merely plays a role as an input into self-
controlled behavior, as do various other factors (such as motivation), rather than acting as a 
resource-like constraint upon it (Baumeister, 2014; Beedie & Lane, 2012; Hagger & 
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Chatzisarantis, 2013; Hood, 2011). This, however, leaves the model in the position of needing to 
suggest another plausible "resource" to underlie self-control – with the demise of the glucose 
account, the strength model's claim of an ego resource is once again relegated to metaphorical 
territory.  
1.4 The Effect of Beliefs and Perceived Effort on Self-Control 
The strength model, as has been mentioned, suggests that decrements in self-control 
performance may be due to the depletion of a hypothesised self-control "resource" (the nature of 
which, discounting glucose, remains unclear). Some research, however, suggests that this 
depletion effect may in fact be due to implicit lay beliefs about self-control or effort, rather than 
a function of any underlying resource. 
1.4.1 Implicit lay beliefs about self-control affect self-control performance. 
Beliefs about how self-control operates can have a significant effect on ego-depletion. 
Martijn, Tenbült, Merckelback, Dreezens, and de Vries (2002) tested the theory that peoples’ 
naïve expectancies about how self-control operates would determine whether or not they 
experienced ego depletion when completing consecutive self-control tasks (i.e., engaging in 
standard dual-task research). Their research was based on the premise that “…expectations about 
self-control and its consequences determine how people perform on demanding tasks” (p. 444), 
and the claim that “Baumeister et al.’s metaphors are just what they are: metaphors that describe 
people’s naïve theories about self-control rather than necessary and invariant processes 
underlying self-control…” (p. 444). Martijn et al. suggested that believing that self-control 
consumes some form of energy would make individuals more susceptible to ego depletion; not 
holding such a belief would make them relatively immune to the effect.  
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In one study, Martijn et al. (2002) replicated Baumeister et al.’s (1998) Experiment 1 – 
testing the effect of emotional regulation on subsequent muscular endurance (i.e., having 
experimental participants suppress emotional expressions to an upsetting video, and testing 
handgrip persistence before and after the task. Control participants were not required to engage 
in emotion suppression). However, the study was modified by challenging some participants’ 
expectancies about the effect of exercising self-control: half of the experimental participants 
were informed that controlling emotions did not undermine subsequent physical performance; 
the other half received no such information. The results indicated expected results for control 
participants and experimental participants whose expectancies were not challenged: control 
participants exhibited no ego depletion effect, experimental participants did. However, 
experimental participants whose self-control expectancies had been challenged showed no 
evidence of ego depletion; rather, their self-control performance following the emotion 
suppression was significantly better than pre-suppression, suggesting that challenging peoples’ 
beliefs about self-control can negate the depletion effect. As Martijn et al. claim, “Our results 
clearly show that a simple challenge of the expectation that self-control wears oneself out has a 
direct positive effect on performance” (p. 454).  
 In their second experiment, Martijn et al. (2002) explicitly tested the assumption that 
individuals, in general, endorse the point of view that self-control is matter of energy, as opposed 
to being primarily a result of a person’s state of mind or level of motivation. Presenting 
participants with statements relating to both the “self-control as energy” and “self-control as a 
state of mind” views, Martijn et al. found that participants more strongly endorsed the view of 
self-control as relying on energy (although both views were endorsed to a greater or lesser 
degree). They concluded that, when presented with a number of self-control tasks (as typically 
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occurs in dual-task research), the “self-control as energy” theory is activated. However, when 
this view is challenged (as Martijn et al. did in their first experiment), then they suggest that 
“…people switch to another self-control theory that assumes no limit to their self-controlling 
abilities” (p. 458).  
 The results of their two experiments led Martijn et al. to conclude that “…self-control 
performance is highly susceptible to how people think self-control operates. The behavioural 
consequences of a negative control-expectancy should probably not be underestimated.” (Martijn 
et al., 2002, p. 458). However, their study did not provide enough information to determine 
whether a negative control-expectancy produced a deleterious effect, or whether challenging 
such an expectancy provided a positive one (as the Strength model would counter, the lack of 
depletion effect may be due to challenging individuals self-control beliefs having the effect of 
causing them to draw more deeply on the self-control resource for the second task, leading to 
greater exhaustion on any further tasks). 
 Similar results (and limitations) were reported by Miller, Walton, Dweck, Job, 
Trzesniewski, and McClure (2012), who artificially manipulated participants’ beliefs about 
whether willpower was a limited or non-limited resource before requiring them to complete a 20-
minute (540 trial) spatial task. Participants’ beliefs about whether willpower was limited or not 
were manipulated using an 8-item biased questionnaire designed to elicit agreement with one of 
the two theories about willpower (i.e., whether it was limited or unlimited). Participants then 
completed the 540-trial spatial task. Each trial presented the participant with a stimulus at one of 
four locations. Participants were then required to indicate the position of the stimulus that 
appeared three trials prior, requiring constant updating and maintenance of working memory. 
While not a typical dual-task method of testing self-control, the task requirement for focused 
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attention over time was considered to require self-control. Sustained learning over time 
(indicated by improved performance at the task) was considered to be successful exercising of 
self-control.  
 It was hypothesized that participants’ beliefs about willpower would influence their 
ability to demonstrate sustained learning over time. Consistent with this, participants in the 
“limited willpower” condition, following an initial learning period, demonstrated a skill/ ability 
plateau in the second half of the trial, while participants in the “non-limited willpower” condition 
evidenced continued improvement over the second half of the trial (i.e., “non-limited willpower” 
participants showed greater ability at sustained learning). As with the Martijn et al. (2002) study, 
however, the study by Miller et al. (2012) was unable to “…state whether a non-limited theory 
improves sustained learning, whether a limited theory undermines sustained learning, or both” 
(p. 3). 
 One study which has sought to address this problem is that by Job, Dweck, and Walton 
(2010), which addressed the notion that individuals’ beliefs about self-control (and its limits) can 
affect their performance on sequential self-control tasks. In a series of three laboratory studies, 
Job et al. (2010) either measured participants’ existing beliefs about self-control (study 1), or 
manipulated participants’ beliefs about self-control (to conform with either limited or non-
limited resource accounts; studies 2 and 3). They then manipulated depletion levels using 
standard strength model self-control tasks, and measured subsequent self-control performance. 
The tasks used in these studies were adapted from existing Strength model studies (e.g., using a 
crossing off “e”s task to manipulate depletion, using a Stroop task to measure it, etc.), so the 
results are directly comparable with those of existing Strength model research.  
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While studies 1 and 2 of the paper sought only to firmly establish that implicit theories of 
self-control do affect the depletion effect (just as Martijn et al., 2002, and Miller et al., 2012 did), 
study 3 attempted to directly address the question of whether a non-limited resource account was 
simply causing participants to draw more deeply on the self-control resource in order to maintain 
performance. Job et al. (2010) hypothesized that if participants holding a non-limited view of 
self-control were merely drawing more deeply on their resources (thus overusing their resources 
on a task following initial depletion), then they would show a decrement in performance on 
subsequent tasks relative to participants who held to a limited resource account (who had not 
overused their self-control resources). Participants’ performance was therefore measured at two 
dependent tasks following the initial depleting task, a Stroop task and eight challenging IQ 
questions. The IQ questions were included as intellectual performance has been shown to be 
sensitive to ego depletion (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). Importantly, Job et al. 
(2010) also measured participants’ subjective feelings of exhaustion. Feelings of mental fatigue 
are often used as a manipulation check in Strength model research, as mental fatigue has been 
shown to increase following expenditure of mental effort (Belmont et al., 2009), and individuals 
regularly report an increase in fatigue following a depleting task (Baumeister et al., 1998; Friese 
et al., 2008; Muraven et al., 1998). Job et al. (2010) were interested both in whether implicit 
theories of self-control moderated the extent to which an individual reported subjective fatigue 
following the depleting task, and whether implicit theories changed the degree to which the 
subjective experience of the task as exhausting undermined subsequent performance. 
This is a crucial difference in research methodology – as research has previously 
suggested, motivation could be considered to moderate the depletion effect by causing 
individuals to draw more deeply upon existing self-control reserves (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; 
60 
 
Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). By including a second dependent 
measure, and in controlling for the effects of subjective exhaustion, Job et al. (2010) aimed to 
demonstrate a causal effect of implicit beliefs about self-control that goes beyond the Strength 
model. Indeed, that is what they found – non-limited resource account participants exhibited no 
evidence of self-control depletion even on a series of tasks. Additionally, while implicit theories 
did not affect feelings of subjective exhaustion following the depleting task, they did moderate 
the relationship between subjective exhaustion and subsequent performance. Specifically, 
participants who held a non-limited resource account of self-control experienced the depleting 
task as similarly exhausting as limited resource account participants, but for them there was no 
evidence that such feelings in any way undermined their subsequent self-control performance.  
1.4.2 Perceived depletion and effort affect ego depletion. 
The research of Job et al. (2010), Martijn et al. (2002), and Miller et al. (2012) suggests 
that individuals’ implicit beliefs about how self-control operates can affect whether they 
demonstrate ego depletion or not. Another factor which can have a significant influence on the 
ego depletion effect is the degree to which an individual believes they have actually experienced 
some form of resource depletion, or how much effort they feel they have expended.  
Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, and Alexander (2010) investigated the effect of manipulating 
individuals’ perceptions of resource depletion on subsequent self-control performance. 
Participants were exposed to either depleting or non-depleting self-control tasks (crossing off 
“e”s task, Studies 1, 2, and 4; thought-suppression task, Study 3), before having their subsequent 
self-control measured (problem-solving persistence, Studies 1 & 2; attention regulation, Study 3; 
processing a persuasive message, Study 4). However, an addition to these studies over standard 
dual-task research was a manipulation of participants’ perceived resource depletion. This was 
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accomplished through providing participants with cues that did or did not provide situational 
attributions for their internal state. 
In all four experiments, Clarkson et al. (2010) found that participants who perceived that 
they were highly depleted (regardless of whether they had actually experienced a depleting task 
or not) performed worse than those who did not perceive themselves to be depleted (even those 
who had engaged in depleting versions of the experimental tasks). As Clarkson et al. (2010) 
state: 
 
Individuals who perceived they were highly depleted repeatedly performed more poorly 
on a subsequent self-regulatory task than did individuals who perceived they were 
modestly depleted… these effects were shown to be independent of actual resource 
depletion, as individuals both high and low in actual depletion succumbed to their 
perceptions of mental resource availability. (p. 43) 
 
The findings of Clarkson et al. (2010) were claimed to support the notion that mere 
perception of self-control depletion affected self-control abilities. However, an alternative 
explanation for the observed effect of depletion perception on subsequent self-control 
performance could have been that shifts in perceived depletion caused shifts in motivation to 
expend resources (Clarkson, Hirt, Chapman, & Jia, 2011). Strength model researchers have 
previously argued that shifts in motivation could cause an individual to draw more deeply on 
their strength “resource”, giving the appearance of immunity to depletion, but actually causing 
even greater subsequent depletion (Muraven et al., 2006; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). To test 
this claim, Clarkson et al. (2011) replicated the experimental method of Clarkson et al. (2010) – 
using a “crossing off ‘e’s” task to deplete participants, providing false feedback to manipulate 
perceived depletion, and assessing subsequent performance at a dependent self-control task. 
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Their replication, however, included the addition of a measure of individuals’ motivation to 
complete the dependent self-control task. Their results demonstrated that, as expected, perceived 
depletion affected self-control performance more than did actual depletion. Furthermore, 
perceived depletion had no effect on participants’ motivation to complete the dependent self-
control task, “…further suggesting that the mere perception of resource availability can directly 
affect individuals’ access to their cognitive abilities” (p. 235).  
While the studies by Clarkson et al. (2010) and Clarkson et al. (2011) focus on the effect 
of perceived depletion on subsequent self-control performance, other research has focused on the 
effect of perceived effort on self-control performance. Kivetz and Zheng (2006) had participants 
engage in a sentence unscrambling task, manipulating the perceived level of relative effort by 
providing false feedback about how many sentences each participant was required to unscramble 
in relation to the rest of the participant cohort. In this way, half the participants believed that they 
had exerted more effort than other participants (high-effort condition), while half believed that 
they had exerted less than others (low-effort condition). In reality, all participants completed 
exactly the same number of sentence unscrambling tasks, requiring the same amount of effort. 
All participants were then offered the opportunity to obtain either a “vice” reward (i.e., more 
immediately rewarding; a low-brow movie) or a “virtue” reward (less immediately rewarding, 
but more fulfilling in the long term; a high-brow movie). Participants in the high-effort condition 
(i.e., those who believed that they had exerted more effort relative to others) showed an increased 
preference for vice rewards than did participants in the low-effort condition. Kivetz and Zheng 
then replicated this finding, using chocolate cake as the vice reward and fruit salad as the virtue 
reward, and found a similar effect – participants who believed that they had expended more 
effort were more likely than those who did not hold such a belief to choose a vice reward. 
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The research by Kivetz and Zheng (2006) suggests that rather than failures of self-control 
being due to the depletion of any resource, they may be due to a shift in motivation caused by 
perceived effort exertion. That is, participants in dual-task research may feel that they have 
expended more effort on the depleting task than do participants engaged in the non-depleting 
version, and subsequently pursue the “vice” reward of exerting less effort at the subsequent 
dependent self-control task. Research on moral licensing suggests that beliefs about past 
behaviour (particularly those related to previous moral behaviour) can affect future moral 
behaviour by justifying excess or immediate gratification (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2002). While 
the research of Kivetz and Zheng focused primarily on the damaging effect of perceived effort 
on subsequent self-control, it could be argued that changing an individual’s perception of 
expended effort could have a similar protective effect on the ego depletion effect as do 
perceptions about level of depletion (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2010, 2011). That is, by manipulating 
an individual’s perceived level of effort to be lower than it actually is, it may be possible to 
negate or minimise the ego depletion effect, just as manipulating an individual’s perceived level 
of depletion does. 
While such a position seems plausible, the strength model would argue that the apparent 
protective effect of beliefs on self-control is a result of the individual drawing more deeply on 
their self-control resource, ultimately causing greater depletion. Indeed, that is exactly the claim 
made by Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel (2012). Using a modified form of the dual-task 
paradigm, wherein participants were exposed to either zero, two, or four initial tasks (Experiment 
1); or zero, one, or three initial tasks (Experiment 2), they tested the protective effects of implicit 
beliefs about willpower (Experiment 1) and motivation regarding task importance (Experiment 
2). The depleting tasks used were all versions that had been successfully used in previous 
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strength model research (e.g., crossing off “e”s, emotion suppression, Stroop task, etc.). In both 
experiments, participants engaged in two dependent tasks, a delayed-gratification choice task, 
and a 20-item test requiring self-regulation to form reasonable answers to ambiguous questions 
(the Cognitive Estimation Test; CET, Bullard et al., 2004). 
For zero, one, or two initial self-control tasks, believing that self-control was unlimited 
(as opposed to believing that it was limited) or having high motivation to be self-controlled (as 
opposed to having a neutral motivation) had a strong protective effect on participants’ self-
control, with participants showing no significant ego depletion effect. These findings were in 
accord with those of Job et al. (2010), who found that believing that self-control was unlimited 
could negate the depletion effect, and Muraven and Slessareva (2003), who found that sufficient 
motivation could likewise ameliorate the effect. However, when participants were required to 
engage in three or four initial self-control tasks, the protective effects of belief and motivation 
were rendered ineffective, with participants demonstrating similar levels of depletion to 
participants in the limited-resource belief or neutral motivation conditions (Vohs et al., 2012). 
These findings were taken to be support for the strength model and a physiological basis for the 
ego resource: 
 
…these findings parallel the effects with physical fatigue: Beliefs and motivations can 
sustain performance when fatigue is mild, but not so much when fatigue is severe. Thus, 
our findings suggest that human performance at self-control reflects an interaction 
between subjective, psychological factors and physiologically based energy states. Acts 
of self-control and decision making do in fact deplete some energy resource. When the 
depletion is slight, there is ample and profound room for subjective beliefs and 
motivations to moderate the effects…the impact of subjective factors diminishes as ego 
depletion increases and energy diminishes. (Vohs et al., 2012, p. 187) 
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While the research by Vohs et al. (2012) seems to provide a strong refutation of the claim 
by Job et al. (2010) that ego depletion may be “all in the head” (i.e., a result of people’s beliefs 
about the availability of willpower, rather than true resource depletion), it nonetheless insists on 
the existence of a physiological substrate for depletion. Given the compelling arguments against 
the glucose account (e.g., Beedie & Lane, 2012; Kurzban, 2010), and the failure of the strength 
model to suggest a viable alternative, such insistence is unconvincing. That is, the fact that 
beliefs and incentives fail to negate the depletion effect after a large number of initial tasks, 
while consistent with the depletion effect, does not thereby rule out that the observed effect may 
be due simply to motivational or belief factors (e.g., flagging motivation after so many tasks; the 
participant's belief that they have met their implicit obligation to the experimenter). 
Furthermore, Vohs et al.'s (2012) insistence upon an underlying physiological resource 
(moderated by beliefs and motivations) is inconsistent with findings such as those of Converse 
and DeShon (2009), who found that engaging in multiple initial self-control tasks appeared to 
eliminate the depletion effect even in the absence of motivational incentives or belief-
manipulations. In a series of three experiments, Converse and DeShon had participants engage in 
either two high self-control tasks or two low self-control tasks (studies 1 and 2) prior to 
completing a dependent measure of self control, or engage in either one or two initial tasks (with 
high or low required self-control) before the dependent task (study 3). There was no explicit 
manipulation of motivation or beliefs regarding self-control. In all three studies, it was found that 
participants who had completed two initial self-control tasks (and should, therefore, have been 
more depleted) demonstrated significantly better subsequent performance than did participants 
who had completed either a single initial self-control task, or two initial non-self-control tasks. 
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The authors suggested that the number of tasks used in self-control research may affect results – 
when standard dual-task designs are used, depletion may occur; when three or more are used, 
they suggested, adaptation or learned industriousness may be the processes governing 
performance. 
Similar results were reported by Xiao, Dang, Mao, and Liljedahl (2014), who suggested 
that the findings of Vohs et al. (2012) may have been due to a failure to adequately control for 
confounding variables (such as differences in task duration leading to different states of physical 
exhaustion, rather than being due to self-control depletion). In Vohs et al.'s (2012) study, 
participants engaged in various self-control tasks depending upon the condition they were in – 
some received zero tasks, others received two, others received four, etc. Thus, participants in 
conditions with fewer initial tasks differed not only in how much self-control they were required 
to exert, but also in how much time they spent engaged in any type of task, depleting or not. Xiao 
et al., therefore, suggested that changes in observed depletion could have resulted from an 
increase in physical tiredness amongst those participants who had engaged in more tasks, rather 
than truly being a depletion effect.  
In an effort to test this, Xiao et al. performed a replication and extension of previous 
"multiple-task" depletion research (e.g., Coverse & DeShon, 2009; Vohs et al., 2012), carefully 
controlling task content and duration. Participants were assigned to either a zero-, one-, or two-
task condition, representing the number of depleting tasks they would need to engage in prior to 
the dependent task. However, in contrast to previous multiple-task studies, participants in all 
conditions completed a total of two tasks prior to the dependent task – for participants in the 
zero- and one-task conditions, the additional tasks were non-depleting versions  of the depleting 
tasks (i.e., the two-task condition completed two depleting tasks; the one-task condition 
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completed one depleting task and a non-depleting task; and the zero-task condition completed no 
depleting tasks and two non-depleting tasks). This change to previous experimental design 
ensured that all participants engaged in the same amount of task-engagement, differing only in 
terms of how many depleting tasks they were exposed to. 
Consistent with the findings of Converse and DeShon (2009), and in opposition to the 
findings of Vohs et al. (2012), Xiao et al. (2014) found that participants who engaged in a single 
initial self-control task demonstrated greater self-control depletion than did participants who 
engaged in two initial depleting tasks (whose performance did not significantly differ from that 
of control participants) – that is, completing a greater number of self-control tasks appeared to 
repair or reverse the depletion effect. As with Converse and DeShon, these findings were taken 
to be support for learned industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992) and adaptation-level theory 
(Helson, 1964), and as a challenge for the typical view of self-control depletion espoused by the 
strength model. Both learned industriousness and adaptation-level theory are consistent with the 
notion that motivations can cause a shift in self-control performance (e.g., if an individual adapts 
to the amount of effort required of depleting tasks, they are less likely to experience motivation 
to quit early on a subsequent self-control task as they expect to have to work hard at it). Thus, 
while it is difficult to entirely rule out the claim of Vohs et al. (2012) – that motivation can only 
overcome depletion to a certain extent, beyond which depletion is unavoidable – the finding that 
self-control depletion appears to disappear after a greater number of initial tasks when total task 
duration is controlled for is problematic for the strength model, as it runs counter to the main 
premise of the model.  
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1.5 Summary of the Strength Model 
 The strength model has performed an admirable job in psychology: it has reinvigorated 
research interest in self-control, spawning a dominant paradigm and extending the understanding 
of various aspects of self-control failures. The model suggests that acts of self-control draw on 
some finite resource that can be depleted through use, such that successive acts of self-control 
become harder as availability of the resource decreases (the ego depletion effect). The effect has 
been robust across a large number of studies (although a number of recent findings question the 
robustness of the effect), and demonstrated across a large number of self-control domains and 
tasks. The use of the muscle metaphor has allowed the model to be extended, with various 
muscle functions having analogous counterparts in self-control (e.g., longitudinal improvement, 
conservation, replenishment). While a number of alternative explanations for the effect have 
been suggested (e.g., fatigue, affect, motivation, self-efficacy), none have achieved the same 
degree of popularity or apparent explanatory power as the strength model.  
 Despite the model's popularity, however, a number of research findings have proven 
problematic for the model, and may be indicative of underlying problems. The ability of various 
factors to ameliorate the depletion effect, for example, although subsumed under the umbrella of 
the strength model (mostly through claims that they cause deeper drawing on the hypothesised 
resource), appear to be motivational in nature, meaning that motivation cannot be ruled out as an 
alternative explanation. Likewise, the effects of implicit beliefs about self-control and the effect 
of perceived (rather than actual) effort on the depletion effect are inconsistent with the strength 
model as it stands. The unlikelihood of glucose to be the resource underlying self-control has left 
researchers without a plausible account of how, exactly, the resource functions (i.e., they have 
been unable to provide a likely alternative). The numerous experimental findings that are 
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difficult for the strength model to accommodate suggests that a resource-based account of self-
control may be inappropriate – or, at least, in need of modification. On the basis of this, as well 
as theoretical concerns, there have recently been a number of attempts to provide an alternative 
account of the depletion effect – accounts which do not rely on a hard-to-find resource. Two of 
the most well-developed of these are the Opportunity Cost Model proposed by Kurzban, 
Duckworth, Kable, and Myers (2013a), and the process model, developed by Inzlicht and 
Schmeichel (2012), and Inzlicht, Schmeichel, and Macrae (2014). 
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Chapter 2: Challenges to the Strength Model 
 
2.1 The Opportunity Cost Model 
The Opportunity Cost Model (OCM), suggested by Kurzban et al. (2013a), has its roots 
in computational and evolutionary psychology. While the authors do not disagree with the 
findings of the strength model (i.e., ego depletion effects), they disagree with the cause of those 
effects, claiming that there is no putative resource underlying the ego depletion effect, but rather 
that the effect is due to mental representations of costs and benefits associated with task 
performance. Essentially, they argue, certain computational mechanisms in the brain associated 
with executive function are available for only a limited number of tasks at a time, and thus 
deploying them on one task precludes their being used for another task (representing an 
"opportunity cost"). As they state: 
 
Choosing to do one thing with such a mental process necessarily requires choosing not to 
do another, and making such trade-offs optimally entails prioritizing options of greatest 
net value. We propose that the conscious experience of mental effort indexes opportunity 
costs, motivating the reallocation of computational processes toward the best alternative. 
(Kurzban et al., 2013a, p. 663) 
 
And, on the conscious experience of mental effort: 
 
Subjective effort, on this view, is the conscious, experienced measurement of the costs – 
especially the opportunity cost – of continuing the task. The subjective experience of 
mental effort, which is generally aversive, in turn motivates reallocation of computational 
processes to relatively more valuable tasks. (Kurzban et al., 2013a, p. 662) 
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 Thus, they argue, persisting at the types of tasks typically considered to be "self-control" 
tasks engenders an opportunity cost (through recruitment of mental processes); when this cost 
becomes too much to bear (i.e., when other behavioural alternatives become perceived as 
providing greater value to the individual), performance at the task ceases or is diminished in 
some way (e.g., some of the computational processes are diverted towards other 
tasks/behaviours). That is, motivation to persist at a task whose opportunity cost is too high 
diminishes, and therefore causes the reallocation of computational resources. Relating this to the 
ego depletion effect, they claim that: 
 
Sequential effects can be explained by our account if there is some link between the 
expected utility of the second task and the costs and benefits of having performed the first 
task – perhaps because the two tasks are similar in some way, or maybe just by the virtue 
of both tasks being part of the same social interaction. (p. 669) 
 
That is to say that in the traditional dual-task paradigm, where tasks are presented one after the 
other, there may be a greater perceived opportunity cost for the second task (particularly for 
experimental participants, who have presumably engaged more computational mechanisms than 
have control participants) as a result of it being either similar in some way to the first, or simply 
as a result of their being part of the same interaction, leading to the observed decrement in 
second-task performance (i.e., a depletion effect).  
The benefits of this model over the strength model (or any limited resource account of 
self-control), the authors argue, are that there is no need to identify any underlying "resource" 
(which has, thus far, proved problematic for the strength model); that it specifically locates the 
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costs of behaviour (i.e., in opportunity costs and computational mechanisms in the brain), and 
therefore explains and incorporates the phenomenology of mental effort; and that it is more able 
to account for the numerous findings which have presented as troublesome for the strength 
model. For example, in explaining the various factors which appear capable of ameliorating the 
depletion effect (small gifts, positive feedback, mindfulness meditation, etc.), the OCM suggests 
that they increase the perceived value of the experimental tasks, reducing their opportunity cost, 
and thereby reducing or eliminating the depletion effect. 
The OCM presents an attempt to explain the depletion effect in an ostensibly 
mechanistic, purely deterministic manner – individuals' engagement in a behaviour is dependent 
upon their expectations of the value that that behaviour holds for them, which in turn are based 
on their prior experiences, mental state, beliefs, fatigue, etc. In doing so, it moves away from a 
resource-based account of self-control, presenting self-control not as relying on a depletable 
resource, but instead as relying on finite but dynamically allocated computational processes 
which are simply reallocated according to perceived benefits and costs. Indeed, the authors 
should be applauded for their attempts to go beyond a resource account and provide a coherent 
explanation for the phenomenology of mental effort when engaging in self-control (a topic 
largely unexplored in strength model research, and treated more often as a signal of successful 
self-control manipulation than a unique area, worthy of investigation/explanation).  
Despite the laudable attempt at explaining strength model findings in a non-resource 
manner, however, the OCM suffers a number of flaws – some minor, some less so – which 
render it, if not completely untenable, then at least in need of further conceptual work before it is 
capable of explaining self-control. For example, as pointed out by Navon (2013), it is difficult to 
see how people can (even implicitly) rank the costs/benefits of available alternatives in sufficient 
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detail to be able to work out opportunity costs, and thereby direct behaviour. Or, as pointed out 
by Bruyneel and Dewitte (2013), there must be some degree of processing involved in 
computing costs/benefits as per the OCM. Should such computations rely on the same executive 
function-related processes that engender opportunity costs when engaged, the question is begged 
as to how the individual prioritises their processing between the task at hand, and the 
computation of costs/benefits. Finally, Hagger (2013) notes that in the absence of "next-best" 
tasks, task persistence (according to the OCM) would persist indefinitely, which appears 
unlikely. Kurzban et al. (2013b) counter this claim by noting that there are examples of 
individuals persisting at a task for hours on end (citing so-call "idiot savants" as an example), but 
also noting that such cases are rare. Rather, they suggest, there are likely to be very few cases 
where there is not some alternative activity that becomes more valuable to the individual over 
time; and the majority of the time mental tasks will have diminishing returns, reducing the task's 
relative value. 
More serious than these, however, are a number of further problems which call into 
question the conceptual soundness of the model as a whole. One of these is touched upon by 
Zayas, Günaydin, and Pandey (2013), who correctly note that Kurzban et al. (2013a) fail to 
identify the mechanisms which cause an individual to value one response over another. Using an 
example of two friends studying for a math test, one of whom prefers to text on his phone, they 
ask: "The important question is why does one student value texting more than studying" (p. 707, 
emphasis added). This is an important question to ask, particularly of a model which positions 
itself as a "motivational model" (Kurzban et al., 2013b, p. 710), and yet which fails to deal with 
the underlying structures that affect the attractiveness of one behavioural choice over another. 
The central claim of the OCM is that engaging in certain behaviours engenders an opportunity 
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cost by virtue of the fact that the processes required for one motivated behaviour cannot 
simultaneously be used for another motivated behaviour. On the basis of the perceived value of 
the various behavioural options, some part of the computational system (which Kurzban et al. 
tenatively locate in the anterior cingulate cortex) allocates computational processes in 
accordance with some set of values.  
However, there is no account of what makes one behavioural option more "valuable" than 
another. That is, although the authors claim that they are "...committed to the idea that the 
'motivation' to devote computational processes or attention to a task depends on the history of 
costs and benefits of executing the task" (p. 669), such a definition entirely fails to speak to what 
makes a task beneficial or costly (i.e., what need of the individual it meets). Furthermore, if a 
certain behaviour has been consistently experienced to have positive value for the individual, it is 
not clear why engagement in that behaviour would ever cease (i.e., why the person would switch 
to another behaviour which had provided less benefit in the past). Kurzban et al. appear to 
differentiate themselves from other "motivational" accounts, implicitly treating a motivation-
only account as unsatisfactory. For example, their statement "We believe that motivation has a 
role to play in explaining mental effort" (p. 669) suggests that motivation is only a small part of 
their model, making their claim to be a motivational (rather than, say, a computational) model 
somewhat questionable.  
More troubling still, however, is the lack of attention given to the mechanism supposedly 
responsible for the allocation of resources. The OCM relies on the notion that some part of the 
mind is responsible for computations regarding opportunity costs, behaviour values, etc. Several 
problems are immediately inherent in such a view. For one, the motivations which guide such 
computations themselves, although implicit, are never speculated upon – whatever mechanism of 
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the mind is responsible for the calculations of costs and benefits must possess its own 
motivations (in order to allocate resources according to them). This point, however, is 
unacknowledged by the researchers. There is much talk of disembodied processes, such as when 
Kurzban et al. (2013) make the claim that "...solving the problem of prioritization, very 
generally, requires the assignment of costs and benefits to candidate options" (p. 664), but no 
discussion regarding the criteria by which such assignments are made. It is not clear, then, how 
the mechanism that directs computational resources is motivated, whether its motivations differ 
from those of the individual, or, indeed, what its nature is. 
The last of these points, too, is troubling for the model. Although it would likely be 
explicitly denied by the researchers, there is inclusion, however implicit, of an agential self (i.e., 
the mechanism which allocates resources). Part of the reason for this claim is that the authors 
commit themselves to a computational theory of mind, with its concomitant assumption of 
representationalism (see Maze, 1983, for a review of the problems inherent in such a view), and 
all that that entails. For example, rather than describing hunger as activation of a hunger centre in 
the brain (presumably as sensory nerves throughout the body register fluctuations in blood 
glucose/insulin/etc.), Kurzban et al. (2013a) describe it as: "...a mental representation of the 
body’s current caloric needs, integrating signals from organs in the periphery and the stomach, 
and, in virtue of those needs, the present marginal value of eating" (p. 663). Elements of their 
definition are uncontroversial (e.g., the fact that multiple signals within the body combine to 
signal hunger), but referring to the experience of hunger as "awareness of a mental 
representation" begs the question of who, or what, is perceiving the representation. This also 
speaks to the motivations of the allocation mechanism – by what criteria is the "mental 
representation of hunger" judged, and at what point does it become important to allocate 
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resources to it? Furthermore, the authors consistently refer to the individual "choosing" between 
two or more behavioural options, suggesting a chooser. It is difficult to see what the authors 
could intend to fill that spot except some inner entity, capable of taking multiple inputs (or 
representations), and, on the basis of some set of criteria, choosing the most appropriate course 
of action from available alternatives.  
Overall, then, the OCM represents a laudable attempt to provide an alternative 
explanation for the findings of the strength model, and in refusing to entertain the need for some 
inner resource it bypasses a number of problems inherent in the strength model. However, it is 
not without serious flaws of its own, and while it pays lip service to the notion of motivation, it 
fails to devote significant attention to the role which motivation appears to play in self-controlled 
behaviour (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). One model which 
attempts to provide a more motivational-centric alternative explanation of the strength model is 
that of Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012), and Inzlicht, Schmeichel, and Macrae (2014) – the 
process model. 
2.2 The Process Model 
The process model was developed by Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) and Inzlicht et al. 
(2014) in an attempt to broaden our understanding of self-control failures, and to explain the 
findings of the strength model in a way that did not require reliance upon some inner resource. 
While, the authors claim, the strength model has performed admirably as a generative heuristic, 
and has inspired significant renewed interest in self-control, the "...time is now ripe...not only to 
broaden the scope of the model but also to start gaining a precise, mechanistic account of it" 
(Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012, p. 451). Although not stated explicitly, the message is clear: the 
strength model's account of self-control is insufficient, and skirts dangerously close to relying on 
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free-will/volitional action. Furthermore, in light of the problems encountered by strength model 
researchers in identifying a plausible resource, the authors claim:  
 
...it is reasonable to wonder about both the sufficiency and the necessity of the resource 
metaphor for explaining self-control. We think a more detailed, more specific model is 
needed before the resource metaphor is stretched too thin. (p. 453) 
 
At the core of the process model is the notion that engaging in an initial self-control task 
sets in motion two parallel processes that result in poorer self-control on subsequent tasks. 
Specifically, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) suggest that engaging in an initial self-control task 
causes shifts in both motivation (towards gratification and away from exerting control), and 
attention (towards cues signaling gratification and away from those signaling control). That is, 
following an initial act of self-control, individuals experience a shift in attentional processes such 
that they become "...less attentive to cognitive and affective signals indicating a conflict or 
discrepancy between desired and current states" (p. 452). Together, it is suggested, these parallel 
processes combine to cause undermined self-control on subsequent tasks - that is, the observed 
ego depletion effect. 
The shifts in motivation, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) suggest, come about because 
self-control tasks, by definition, involve effort, attention, and control. Indeed, it is their effortful 
nature that supposedly causes the depletion effect (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Wallace & 
Baumeister, 2002) – although mere effort alone is apparently not enough to induce the depletion 
effect, as supposedly "effortful but not depleting" tasks have previously been used as control 
tasks in strength model research (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). Inzlich and Schmeichel do not go in 
to depth on this, which is one area in which Kurzban et al.'s (2013a) OCM may provide some 
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enlightenment. Presumably, some feature of typical self-control tasks reduces their perceived 
value to individuals (when compared to, for example, the difficult-but-solvable math tasks used 
by Muraven et al.), increasing the perceived effort, and leading to the subsequent depletion 
effect. Thus, according to Inzlicht and Schmeichel, having engaged in an initial self-control task 
and expended some special effort, individuals feel less motivated to expend further effort on 
subsequent tasks – rather, having worked hard, they may feel that they have earned a respite. The 
suggestion that people tend to feel like they deserve a reward for having worked hard is not new, 
and has been supported by previous self-control research (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Kivetz & 
Zheng, 2006), as well as research into moral/self-licensing (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De 
Ridder, 2012; Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012; Monin & Miller, 2002). This suggests that at least 
part of the decrement in self-control performance between the first and second self-control tasks 
in ego depletion research could be due to a decline in motivation to continue exerting effort – as 
Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) suggest, “...it is not that they cannot regulate, but that they 
choose not to regulate.” (p. 454). 
According to the process model, however, the decrement in self-control performance 
observed in ego depletion is not purely due to a decrease in motivation to continue exerting 
control, but also to a corresponding increase in approach motivation towards rewarding impulses 
(Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). As they correctly note,  
 
Self-control can be construed as a competition between two opposing forces: the force 
that motivates the expression of an impulse (i.e., impulse strength) versus the 
countervailing force that overrides the impulse (i.e., self-control strength). (p. 455) 
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Thus, motivational shifts caused by prior self-control exertion are not merely away from self-
control, but concurrently toward gratification (i.e., the strength of the impulse is increased; the 
strength of self-control, decreased). Inzlicht et al. (2014) illustrate this by means of a metaphor of 
a set of scales – as motivation for self-controlled behaviour decreases (i.e., one side of the scales 
gets lighter), motivation for rewarding/indulgent behaviour increases (the other side of the scales 
gets simultaneously heavier).  
Research by Schmeichel, Harmon-Jones, and Harmon-Jones (2010) provided initial 
experimental support for this notion via behavioural and self-report means. For example, 
participants required to suppress (rather than express) emotions, a supposedly depleting task, 
scored higher on an incentive sensitivity scale, indicating an increased tendency to desire and 
seek out reward. In another experiment, participants required to write a story while following 
certain rules (e.g., not being allowed to use the letters a or n in their story) showed greater 
sensitivity towards reward-related symbols (dollar signs) than neutral symbols (percentage signs) 
than did participants who wrote a story without any such rules (Schmeichel et al., 2010). Further 
support has since been provided by functional neuroimaging studies which show greater 
activation of areas of the brain associated with reward cues in ego-depleted individuals when 
compared with non-depleted individuals (and a corresponding drop in functional connectivity 
between those areas and others associated with self-control) (Wagner, Altman, Boswell, Kelley, 
& Heatherton, 2013). Thus, as the process model suggests, motivational shifts away from self-
control and concurrently toward gratification may play a major role in explaining the ego 
depletion effect. 
As noted, the process model also suggests that at the same time that these motivational 
shifts are occurring there is a corresponding shift in attention away from cues related to control 
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and towards those related to gratification (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). As Inzlicht et al. (2014) 
state: 
 
When we propose that depletion leads to shifts in motivation, this suggests that it alters 
the salience of (and attention to) competing goals and the intensity of experienced 
emotions associated with these goals. (p. 131) 
 
That is, the shift in motivation priorities caused by initial self-control exertion causes a 
concurrent shift in attention, such that cues signaling a discrepancy between self-control goals 
and present state are less salient; cues signaling rewards are more salient. 
While the dual shifts in motivation and attention form the core of the process model, 
Inzlicht et al. (2014) claim that the model provides an explanation for self-control failures at 
multiple levels of analysis: proximate, ultimate, and intermediate. At the ultimate level, the 
authors claim that the process model explains self-control as a function of “…evolutionary 
considerations that lead organisms to prefer an optimal trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration, whereby the value of exploiting established sources of reward is pitted against the 
utility of exploring the environment for new opportunities” (p. 129). At the intermediate level, 
this balancing act between exploitation and exploration leads to “…a general tendency to prefer 
balance between cognitive labor and cognitive leisure, or between mental work and mental rest” 
(p. 129). Inzlicht et al. expand on this by claiming that people “…prefer some optimal balance 
between externally rewarded labor and inherently rewarding leisure” (p. 129); and that, while 
mental work may be engaged in to acquire some external reward, its “…inherent 
disutility…accumulates the more one has worked…This means that people will tend to avoid 
cognitive work, even cognitive work on a different task, after initial bouts of effort” (p. 129). 
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There is an undeniable similarity between this view, and that of the OCM (Kurzban et al., 2013), 
which makes an almost identical claim (i.e., that mental effort accumulates as a result of there 
being more attractive behavioural alternatives available; behaviour at the effortful task will 
decline or cease entirely as the opportunity costs become too great). In both of these models, 
motivation to persist at effortful behaviour (i.e., self-control) can be maintained through the use 
of rewards – offsetting the "inherent disutility" in the case of the process model, or reducing the 
opportunity cost in the case of the OCM. 
The final level of analysis is the proximate, which forms the majority of the focus of 
Inzlicht and Schmeichel's (2012) and Inzlicht et al.'s (2014) process model (i.e., concerning 
parallel shifts in motivation and attention). In particular, they claim that the shifts in motivation 
that occur after an initial act of self-control are away from "have-to" goals – those carrying with 
them a sense of duty or contractual obligation, typically externally rewarded – and towards 
"want-to" goals – those that are personally enjoyable and meaningful, regarded as being 
intrinsically rewarding. Inzlicht et al. sum up this view as follows: 
 
Thus, it is not that people cannot control themselves on some externally mandated task 
(e.g., name colors, do not read words); it is that they do not feel like controlling 
themselves, preferring to indulge instead in more inherently enjoyable and easier pursuits 
(e.g., read words). Similar to fatigue, the effect is driven by reluctance and not 
incapability. (pp. 130-131) 
 
The process model is not perfect – as Inzlicht et al. (2014) themselves note, there are a 
number of questions it leaves unanswered, particularly those relating to the associations between 
the various levels of explanation (ultimate, intermediate, and proximate). In addition to this, 
Inzlicht et al. present what may be a false dichotomy – when they talk of "have-to" and "want-to" 
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goals, they suggest that "want-to" goals are those which are personally enjoyable and 
meaningful, which in turn implies that "have-to" goals cannot be. However, it seems likely that 
goals which are "...carried out through a sense of duty or contractual obligation..." (p. 13) can 
nonetheless carry with them personal meaning and enjoyment. Thus, it is not clear that they have 
adequately differentiated between the types of tasks that may cause the depletion effect and those 
that do not. And, while it is kept to a minimum, there is still the hint of a disembodied 
"controller" choosing between behavioural alternatives – evident when they say that "“...it is not 
that they cannot regulate, but that they choose not to regulate.” (p. 454, emphasis added).  
Despite these problems, the model stands as one of the best current alternatives to the 
strength model – its reliance on the disembodied controller is less obvious than in either the 
strength model or the OCM, and it consequently does a better job of describing self-control in 
purely mechanistic terms (as the conflict between two opposing impulses). The result of this 
emphasis on a mechanistic explanation is that it preserves, and indeed elevates, the role of 
motivation in self-control to a degree not seen in other models. Its weakness lies primarily in its 
non-exploration of  "have-to" and "want-to" goals as an explanation of mental conflict. In 
addition, while the model's emphasis on motivation is laudable (as it is clear, even in strength 
model research, that motivation has a key role to play in self-control), there is little exploration 
of what motivation really is – some mention is given to the concepts of external and intrinsic 
forms of motivation, but no sufficiently detailed account of motivation is put forward to allow 
for an in-depth unraveling of such concepts. 
Both the OCM and the process model represent an attempt to explain the findings of the 
strength model without a need to rely on a difficult-to-find, increasingly implausible resource. 
While the authors of both models take issue with the explanation for the results, they, for the 
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most part, accept as genuine the depletion effect itself. Indeed, the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. 
(2010) supports this position, claiming that: 
 
The significant overall effect for the ego-depletion effect provides confirmatory evidence 
for the acute decrements in self-control task performance observed in experiments 
adopting the strength model and the dual-task paradigm. (p. 515) 
 
However, recent research by Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014), and Carter, Kofler, Forster, 
and McCullough (2015), as well as a recent multilab replication attempt of the ego depletion 
effect (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2016) casts doubt on this claim, and suggests instead that the 
depletion effect may be nothing more than a result of publication bias. 
2.3 Carter and McCullough's Claim of Publication Bias 
Claims of publication bias within psychology are not new – numerous researchers have 
claimed that psychology as a whole devotes itself heavily to the pursuit of significant results at 
the expense of methodological and conceptual rigour (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; 
Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). 
Some of the forms that this takes, according to researchers, include researchers deciding on 
"appropriate" statistical measures after data-collection (Wagenmakers et al., 2012), the 
suppression of null results (Bakker et al., 2012; Ferguson & Heene, 2012), and a variety of other 
self-serving activities designed to achieve a significant result (Masciampo & Lalande, 2012). 
While these claims are aimed at the broader science of psychology, some researchers have turned 
their attention more specifically towards areas of research where the evidence appears 
overwhelmingly in favour of a dominant model – for example, the strength model. 
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Carter and McCullough (2013) derived their claim that the ego depletion effect was 
overstated as a result of publication bias from Schimmack's (2012) "Incredibility Index" (IC-
Index). The IC is an estimate of the probability that a set of studies contains fewer non-positive 
results than would be expected from a non-biased sample – that is, how "incredible" it is that a 
sample of studies has the proportion of significant results that it does. The IC-Index is calculated 
on the observed results of the set of studies and the average statistical power of the studies, and 
ranges in value from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher incredibility. Using the set of 
studies included in Hagger et al.'s (2010) meta-analysis, Carter and McCullough calculated the 
IC-Index of the strength model to be .999. As they state, this means that "...the probability of 
drawing a set of 198 experiments in which only 47 or fewer were non-significant is roughly 3.7 
in one billion" (2013, p. 683).  
Carter and McCullough (2013) also applied two regression analyses, whereby effect sizes 
were regressed on SE, and SE-squared. In the absence of publication bias, they claim, effect size 
and SE should be unrelated in such a regression. In both regression models, the regression 
coefficient for the predictor was significant, "...which is consistent with the presence of 
publication bias" (p. 684). They concluded that 
 
...ego depletion could be a small effect – less than half the size of that estimated by 
Hagger et al.; but it could also be a non-existent effect for which belief has been kept 
alive through the neglect of null findings. (p. 684) 
 
Carter and McCullough (2014) provided further support for this claim via a series of 
more rigorous and in-depth analyses than those employed in the 2013 study (e.g., using trim-and-
fill method, funnel-plots, and the study of subsets of the data). Despite the more rigorous 
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methods used, their conclusion remained the same: "...the published literature on the depletion 
effect is clearly influenced by small-study effects, and as a result, overestimates the strength of 
the phenomenon" (p.7). 
Although not disagreeing with the results of the analyses used by Carter and McCullough 
(2013, 2014), Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014) suggest that they can be interpreted differently – 
that the results may not indicate publication bias after all. While they recognise that publication 
bias is one potential explanation, it is possible, they argue, that "...the findings may also be due to 
methodological inadequacies or true heterogeneity in the effect" (p. 1). One way to resolve this 
would be for authors of meta-analyses to pursue, as they put it, "fugitive literature": unpublished 
studies reporting either null or contradictory findings. While this might indeed provide an answer 
to the question of publication bias, it is unlikely to be a feasible approach: over 60% of articles 
with null findings in the social sciences remain not only unpublished, but unwritten (Mervis, 
2014). Thus, it would be extremely difficult to accurately identify unpublished studies and 
include them in any analysis. 
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014) also expressed concern at the results of the regression 
analyses, citing the fact that if the effect size for the depletion effect truly were zero, as claimed 
by Carter and McCullough (2013), then "...one would expect the effect sizes in the literature to 
be randomly distributed in both positive and negative directions about zero" (p. 1). The lack of 
negative effect sizes (i.e., those showing an improvement in self-control performance at the 
second task), they argue, creates a problem for the claim that the true depletion effect size may 
be zero. This argument, however, faces two difficulties: in the first place, it presupposes no 
systematic bias in publications, and in the second, it ignores the fact that negative findings have 
been published and subsequently taken as support for the strength model (e.g., Converse & 
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DeShon, 2009). While they identified these concerns, they nevertheless claim that negative 
findings "...would likely have seen the light of day in journals because they contradict the 
strength model and support alternative hypotheses consistent with other theories" (p. 2). The 
findings of Mervis (2014), however, suggest that this is unlikely – studies which achieve mixed 
significance (i.e., not null results, but not strongly supportive) are likely to be published only 
50% of the time. 
As pointed out by Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014), one way of determining the extent 
to which publication bias plays a role in strength model research is to include as many 
unpublished results in a meta-analysis as possible. Carter et al. (2015) attempted to do exactly 
this, performing a series of meta-analyses using more recent studies than those included in 
Hagger et al. (2010), including as many unpublished studies as they could find, and employing 
greater theoretical rigour when determining whether a study actually tested the strength model 
and used an appropriate set of tasks to do so. As with their previous studies, they maintained that 
"...our results were inconsistent with the predictions of the limited strength model...[and] 
strongly suggests that self-control in general does not decrease as a function of previous use" (p. 
18). Crucially, the set of studies used in the meta-analyses included 48 unpublished papers, 
which indicated, on average, smaller effect sizes than for published studies. 
There is evidence, then, that the depletion effect as commonly imagined does not exist, or 
else is so weak as to be largely meaningless. Further support for such a claim can be found in the 
research of Xu et al. (2014), who attempted to replicate the depletion effect over four 
experiments (two using undergraduate students, two using community samples). Utilising 
frequently used depletion measures (crossing out letters as the depleting task; either handgrip 
persistence or Stroop tasks as the dependent tasks), they found no evidence for significant 
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depletion effects in any of the four experiments. They concluded that "...depletion has more 
limited effects than implied by prior publications" (p. 1). In addition to this, a recent, multilab, 
preregistered replication attempt of the depletion effect involving 23 experiments and over 2000 
participants was conducted in an attempt to determine whether the claims of Carter and 
McCullough are plausible (Hagger et al., 2016). All studies utilised the "crossing out es" task as 
the depletion manipulation, and the Multi-source interference task (MSIT), a task requiring 
response inhibition, as the dependent task. Meta-analysis of the results indicated small effect 
sizes, with a 95% confidence interval that encompassed zero. As the authors state, "The results 
are consistent with a null effect for ego depletion for the current paradigm" (p. 556). While this 
replication attempt focused on only a single paradigm (i.e., the same independent and dependent 
tasks were used in all labs), it strengthens the claim of Carter and McCullough (2013) that the 
ego depletion effect may be zero and a result of publication bias.  
However, it cannot be ignored that self-control does fail – and, even if the claims of 
Carter and McCullough are correct, and the depletion effect has been overstated in the literature, 
it is still worthwhile determining why and under what conditions self-control fails. However, in 
order to do this, there must be a thorough understanding of the underlying conceptual 
assumptions regarding self-control and motivation – an understanding which, it could be argued, 
has been largely neglected in the literature to date. The following chapter will outline and 
provide a conceptual critique of the view of self (and the resultant view of self-control) held by 
the strength model, and largely shared (or at least accepted as coherent) even by alternative 
models. 
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PART TWO: THEORETICAL CRITIQUE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
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Chapter 3: The Concept of "Self" and its Role in Self-Control 
 
Having reviewed the extant literature and concluded that there are challenges to the 
strength model as it is popularly conceptualized, it might be expected that this would be followed 
by a series of experiments testing between the models so far discussed. However, doing so would 
be premature, as it would be guilty of ignoring an often-overlooked, yet primary, component of 
the scientific method, and one which has not yet been satisfactorily applied to the strength model 
– conceptual (or critical) analysis (Machado & Silva, 2007; Petocz & Newbery, 2010). 
Conceptual analysis, according to Petocz and Newbery, involves “…conducting theoretical 
research and applying logical tests. We examine logical structures, including assumptions and 
implications, and apply tests of clarity, intelligibility, coherence, and so on to our concepts, 
questions, hypotheses, and theories.” (p. 130). It is primary in the sense that such examination 
must occur before empirical tests of a theory for, should a theory fail to pass such conceptual 
tests, it makes no sense to test it empirically (and even if it is tested, the results can have no 
meaningful bearing on a theory which fails to be conceptually acceptable). This is highlighted by 
Petocz and Newbery when they state: 
 
If the logical tests are failed, if our conceptual analysis reveals confusions, ambiguities, 
contradictions, implicit assumptions, and so forth, then we know without going any 
further (i.e., without taking the next step into any specific observational analysis) that the 
situation as envisaged is either not yet clear enough or could not possibly be the case. We 
are then constrained, in accordance with the requirements of scientific investigation, to 
reconsider the question, reformulate it, clarify it, adjust it, or abandon it. (2010, p. 130) 
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While there have been, to some degree, limited attempts to examine the logical precepts 
of the strength model (e.g., Kurzban, 2010), there has not yet been a thorough, systematic 
attempt to truly analyse the range of assumptions, ambiguities, confusions, and contradictions in 
the strength model. The logical primacy of such an analysis (i.e., before even considering the 
empirical findings) means that it is long overdue. Thus, it is the aim of what follows to subject 
the strength model and the concept of self-control endorsed by it to the requisite logical testing, 
by closely and critically examining the core assumptions of claims of the strength model and 
assessing them for conceptual clarity and soundness.    
3.1 Introduction 
Self-control, by its very nature, is popularly conceptualised as involving some higher, 
controlling part of the individual exercising its power over the lower, base impulses with which it 
is confronted. As Baumeister (2002) puts it: 
 
Nearly all living things have the capacity to respond to their environments...Human 
beings differ from most other species, however, in that they have an extraordinary 
capacity to override their responses and change how they act. This capacity involves 
altering their internal states and processes, and it is responsible for the unprecedented 
scope and diversity of human behavior. The terms self-regulation and self-control 
refer to this capacity to alter or override one’s responses, including thoughts, 
emotions, and actions. (p. 129) 
 
While such a definition is superficially satisfying, it says little about the qualities possessed by 
the erstwhile "self" hinted at in the above definition that is supposedly responsible for the 
overriding or inhibiting of behaviour. Given the importance of having a coherent understanding 
of a model's underlying tenets or concepts (see, e.g., Machado & Silva, 2007; Petocz & 
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Newbery, 2010), it is imperative that there be a clear understanding of the intertwined concepts 
of "self" upon which the notion of self-control rests, the resultant view of self-control that 
models such as the strength model strive to explain, and, perhaps most crucially, the notion of 
"control" espoused by such models. For there to be control, there must, of necessity, be a 
controller; given the central place of such an entity in a theory of self-control, it must be drawn 
out and assessed for coherency.  
It is rare, however, that research relating to self-control (at least that based on the strength 
model, although not limited to such) makes an effort to explicitly detail the researchers' views of 
the self – instead, such views must be inferred from implied assumptions about the self's 
mechanisms of action, and from the views researchers express regarding self-control. One reason 
for this may be that researchers assume that the concept of self needs no explanation, treating it 
as an assumed value. As Boag (2005) states: 
 
The belief that within each individual resides a single unified knower or 'self' is generally 
taken for granted. (p. 747) 
 
On the other hand, one of the most influential strength model researchers, Baumeister (1998) 
himself, has made the comment that: 
 
...the thousands of journal articles dealing with the self have seemed to make the answer 
to that fundamental question ['What is the self?'] more elusive rather than clearer... (p. 
680) 
and 
If one could understand all the ways that...aspects of the self are interrelated, one would 
attain to a deep and full understanding of the nature of selfhood, but that is at least several 
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decades away...This sounds as if a full understanding of the self is a long way off, and it 
is... (p. 681) 
 
Thus, it could be that researchers avoid giving an explicit description of their version of the self 
because it is too difficult to give a satisfactory answer. Or, the true reason may be a combination 
of the two – researchers may have some acquired notions of the self (that are taken for granted, 
as per Boag's claim), which are nonetheless not critically thought through, and are thus too 
difficult to make explicit. The result of this is that a core concept relating to self-control becomes 
a largely uncritically assumed tenet underpinning the phenomenon, potentially leaving any 
understanding of self-control blurred by conceptual unclarity. Whether or not this is the case 
depends on whether the view of self held by self-control researchers is adequately coherent and 
whether the authors have done an adequate job drawing out the implications of a controller, the 
discovery of which is of crucial importance in analysing the concept of self-control in general, 
and the strength model in particular.  
3.2 Unpacking the Strength Model’s “Self” 
The clearest and most explicit passages relating to the self come from the seminal 
strength model studies and from Baumeister himself, suggesting that the views espoused by them 
became the de facto view held by strength model researchers. According to Baumeister (1998), 
the self is constituted by three key patterns of experience: the experience of reflexive 
consciousness (being aware of oneself); the interpersonal aspect of selfhood, whereby people 
come to know themselves through their interactions with others; and executive function – the 
agential aspect of self by which the person "...exerts control over its environment (including the 
social environment of other people), makes decisions and choices, and also regulates itself." 
(Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007, p. 8). Defining the self like this, in terms of its effects 
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and relations rather than its properties, tells us little about the nature of the self itself – as Pryor 
(1985) asks, "...what is it about the doer that gives rise to what is done?" (p. 157). In an effort to 
uncover something of the nature of the self, particularly that aspect of it related to control and 
volition, researchers' views of it must be unpacked and thoroughly examined. In doing so, it 
becomes possible to discern whether "the self" is possessed of any properties possible to describe 
in terms separate from their function, or whether the concept of self held by the strength model is 
confused. 
One of the key attributions that the strength model makes of the executive function 
component of the self is the capacity for volitional action. For example, Muraven et al. (1998) 
make the claim that: 
 
The capacity of the human organism to override, interrupt, and otherwise alter its own 
responses is one of the most dramatic and impressive functions of human selfhood... (p. 
774) 
 
This clearly implies that at least one aspect of the self, according to the strength model, is the 
capacity for volitional action. That is, some element of the self apparently possesses the ability to 
take an automatic behavioural impulse or response and replace it with some other, more 
desirable (from the self's point of view) response. Crucially, the word "interrupt" in the above 
definition carries with it two important implications regarding the concept of self that is used to 
explain self-control in the strength model. Firstly, it implies that without the intervention of a 
controlling self, behavioural impulses, once initiated, will run until completion (excepting 
external interference, such as being physically restrained/compelled). This point is largely 
echoed by Baumeister (1998), who claims that without the ability to be active and controlling, 
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the self would be nothing more than "...a passive spectator, aware of itself and related to others, 
but unable to do anything except perceive and interpret the flow of events..." (p. 712). Only the 
intervention of the self prevents this untethered running of automatic behavioural programs.  
 Secondly, in order to interrupt a response, some part of the self must presumably be 
separate from it, in order to make behavioural substitutions that are not part of the response’s 
causal chain. Thus, the strength model ends up with a controlling part of the self that is separate 
from (and unaffected by) the behavioural impulses of the other, apparently automatic part of the 
self – suggesting a non-unitary self. This implication is made clear by a number of strength 
model researchers. For example, Martijn et al. (2002) state: 
 
The ability to control thoughts, emotions, impulses, and behavior is considered a crucial 
human feature. The capacity to override and alter dominant responses is essential to 
pursue distant goals. (pp. 441-442, emphasis added) 
 
Webb and Sheeran (2003) make a similar claim: 
 
The ability to regulate impulses, emotions, and desires is one of the core features of the 
self. Exerting self-control allows us to behave flexibly, to override undesirable 
responses, and to avoid temptation
1
. (p. 279, emphasis added) 
 
Again, these claims clearly demonstrate that the strength model holds a view of an agential self 
that acts as an overseer, decision-maker, and controller. The "undesirable impulses" referred to 
                                                             
1
 Presumably the authors here actually mean that self-control allows us to override temptation, or avoid situations in 
which we feel we will be likely to succumb to temptation. Avoiding temptation would mean to be in a state in which 
there is no temptation, in which case no self-control is required. In overriding it, however, the individual would need 
to be aware of the tempting behaviour, be tempted by it, and, through self-control, perform a behaviour other than 
the tempting one.  
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by Webb and Sheeran presumably stem from outside the controlling self, despite Muraven et al. 
(1998) assigning ownership of such impulses to the self. It is clear then that this “self” is 
somehow separate from and unaffected by the so-called “automatic processes” over which it 
exercises its dominion. This separation, however, remains unacknowledged in the strength 
model, which leads to conceptual confusion when considering that a unitary self is implied to be 
responsible for both self-control, and for the impulses which the self is tasked with overcoming 
(e.g., "...and otherwise alter its own responses..."). There is a clear effort on the part of strength 
model researchers to present the self as a unitary entity, but such a position is critically 
undermined by the fact that the controller cannot at the same time be what is being controlled. 
Typically, when we refer to self-reflexive actions (e.g., “I hit myself”), it is strictly speaking one 
part of me that is doing the hitting, and another part that is being hit. A fist cannot punch itself, 
nor (pace Monty Python’s famous Horace) can a mouth eat itself. 
 This conceptual confusion, however, is unacknowledged, and possibly unrecognised, by 
the model. The one nod towards acknowledgement of the issue comes from Baumeister, 
Schmeichel, and Vohs (2007), when they say: 
 
Technically speaking, a self does not regulate itself directly, but it may control 
behaviors, feelings, and thoughts that comprise it. In this sense, self-regulation refers to 
the regulation of processes by the self. Regulation of the self also falls under the rubric 
of self-regulation, but note that this may mean the regulating is done by something (or 
someone) else. (p. 6) 
 
Thus, according to the authors, the self does not, in fact, control itself – merely the parts that 
constitute it. There are two possible interpretations of this, neither of which adequately explains 
the confusion. One is to accept that, in controlling elements that constitute it, the self is indeed 
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controlling itself, contrary to the claim of Baumeister et al. However, this hardly sheds any more 
light on the incoherency than before – the self is not controlling itself, but it is controlling 
elements that comprise it, which would appear to be merely a more fine-grained approach to 
controlling itself. The other interpretation (consistent with the views expressed by other strength 
model researchers) is to view the controlling element of the self as somehow separate from those 
elements which it controls. Once again, then, there is confusion when defining the self – on the 
one hand, it would appear to be the entire individual, comprised of behaviours, thoughts, and 
feelings; on the other, it appears to be an element of the individual which is separate from those 
things and capable of exerting control over them (in which case it is not clear what it is 
comprised of, as to be separate from those elements means that it cannot be comprised of them).  
  As a result of researchers' lack of recognition of this incoherence, it is rife throughout 
strength model definitions.  For example, in their explanation of the importance of self-control, 
Baumeister et al. (1998) espouse an almost identical (though elaborated) view to Muraven et al. 
(1998): 
 
Many crucial functions of the self involve volition: making choices and decisions, taking 
responsibility, initiating and inhibiting behaviour, and making plans of action and 
carrying out those plans. The self exerts control over itself and over the external 
world...some portion [of human behaviour] involves deliberate, conscious, controlled 
responses by the self... (p. 1252, emphasis added) 
 
Or, from Baumeister, Schmeichel, and Vohs (2007): 
 
Self-regulation refers to the self altering its own responses or inner states. (p. 5) 
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As the above quotes indicate, a key element of the strength model's self is its ability to control 
itself – that is, to be both the controller and the controlled. Commensurate with the idea that the 
self "alters its own responses", the Baumeister et al. (1998) definition suggests that the self is 
responsible for both the inhibition and initiation of behaviour, which, if it were to include the 
initiation of impulsive behaviour (i.e., that which must be controlled in self-control), would 
present a superficial resolution to the "non-unitary self" problem (as both the impulsive 
behaviour and the controlling behaviour would stem from the same source). However, such a 
resolution is illogical, as it still suffers from the problem of the controller also being what is 
being controlled, as well as new problems – for example, why would a unitary self initiate a 
behaviour which it then had to inhibit? And how could the motivation to do both of these come 
from the same, unitary self? Thus, it is unable to truly escape the non-unitary self problem.   
 However, it is unlikely that Baumeister et al. do intend that their definition be read as 
claiming that the self initiates impulsive behaviour. For example, when Baumeister and 
Heatherton (1996) make the claim that 
  
...one of the most elusive, important, and distinctively human traits is the capacity of 
human beings to alter their own responses and thus remove them from the direct effects of 
immediate, situational stimuli. (p. 1, emphasis added) 
 
...it is clear that the "direct effects of immediate, situational stimuli" do not require the input of 
the self to be realised. What Baumeister and Heatherton appear to mean, rather, are that 
environmental stimuli have the ability to provoke in an individual certain basic responses 
(presumably hunger, thirst, sexual desire, etc.), which, without the intervention of the self or 
external compulsions, would run off in the individual until their goal was achieved. Thus, the 
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responses which the self is tasked with controlling arise without the need for an agential self to 
initiate them.
2
 However, this claim is confused, as these responses cannot occur in the absence of 
cognition. As will be argued later, drive theory, far from positing the drives as blind, biological, 
non-cognitive urges, identifies that such impulses are result of motivational structures (drives) 
which include evolved perceptual structures (the hunger drive cognises the presence of food, 
etc.) 
 This idea that impulses appear to arise without the need for cognition or a controlling 
self, however, is further supported by Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) when they elaborate the 
nature of self-control. As they state: 
 
...a great many instances of self-regulation involve a response that is initiated by a 
combination of latent motivations and activating stimuli...For example, a beer 
commercial (an activating stimulus) may bring to the fore one's liking for alcohol (a 
latent motivation) and create an impulse to consume alcohol...(p. 2) 
 
At no point in the above description is there any suggestion that the self is required to initiate 
these impulses (although they are, confusingly, still considered to belong to the self) – the 
individual possesses latent motivations which are activated by environmental stimuli, leading to 
behavioural impulses (which the self is then required to inhibit). In a similar vein, Muraven et al. 
(1998) make the claim that: 
 
Self-regulation involves altering one’s own responses (e.g., cognitive processes, feelings, 
and behaviors)…self-regulation liberates human behavior from being driven solely by 
                                                             
2 The Strength Model is not clear, however, what is guiding the individual towards these automatic behaviours if not 
the self: there must still be cognition in order to recognise stimuli in order to react to them, move the individual to 
acquire them, etc. Presumably this is some function of the self separate from the executive function portion; if so, 
however, it is not made clear. 
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external stimuli and automatic, reflexive, or instinctual responses…(p. 446, emphasis 
added) 
 
And, more recently, Baumeister (2014) discussed a general theory of motivation, making a 
distinction between two types of motivation, which he likened to traits and states. Trait 
motivation, in his estimation, refers to "...broad, dispositional tendencies." (p. 2), while state 
motivations are more specific derivations of these trait motivations, and refer "...to a particular 
desire to perform a particular behavior on a particular occasion." (p. 2). Consistent with the 
claims of Baumeister and Heatherton (1996), Baumeister (2014) views these state motivations to 
be derivations of trait motivations in combination with environmental factors. As he states: 
 
In a sense, the impulse derives from the drive, but whereas the drive may be considered a 
property of the person that is largely independent of the specific situation, the impulse is 
typically the product of an interaction between the person and the situation. Something in 
the immediate situation often activates the drive to create an impulse. (p. 2) 
 
 Some elements of the above descriptions are relatively unproblematic. However, overall 
they leave the strength model in a confusing conceptual situation. On the one hand, it is clear that 
sometimes when referring to the self, researchers are referring to the organism as a whole (i.e., 
that which owns both the impulses, and the ability to control them, as denoted by reference to the 
self controlling itself, altering its own responses, etc.). On the other, there are times when the 
"self" refers to only a part of the organism, one which is separate from basic impulses, contains 
its own set of motivations, requires a separate power source in order to realise these motivations, 
and is apparently largely free of environmental causation (as noted by its claimed ability to make 
choices and decisions, to take responsibility, and to override environmentally-rooted impulses). 
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3.2.1 The notion of control, and the controller. 
 The root cause of this incoherence appears to be the notion of control held by most self-
control researchers. As a noun, control evinces the notion of influencing or directing peoples' 
behaviour; as a verb, it is the act of determining behaviour, or maintaining influence or authority 
over something or someone. Regardless of whether it is used as a noun (e.g., to have self-control) 
or as a verb (e.g., to exercise self-control), the word "control" carries with it the unavoidable 
notion of a controller – there can be no control without something doing the controlling. In many 
cases, this is unobjectionable – take, as an example, an air-traffic controller. Such a job requires 
that the controller direct, influence, and control air-traffic as part of the larger system (that of the 
airport). Yet, while they are a part of the larger system, they are undeniably separate from it – 
they are a separate agent, with their own motivations, beliefs, etc. On a much smaller scale, the 
driver of an automobile (a metaphor that has been previously employed by strength model 
researchers) is also a controller – they direct and influence the car through their actions, and 
together act as a unified system. Again, however, the driver is separate from the system – the 
forces that act on the car are not necessarily those that act on the driver (tire pressure, fuel levels, 
oil, etc.), although a number of the same forces will operate on both (inertia, gravity, etc.).  
 This notion (of a controller who is separate from the thing being controlled) gets carried 
over into the strength model by virtue of necessity – any theory subscribing to control must 
accept the notion of a controller. Thus, the model is forced to posit some element of the 
individual which is separate from (yet part of) the individual, which is thus capable of standing 
in for the "controller" element of self-control. In positing such an entity, the strength model is not 
alone. As Wegner (2006) states: 
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The human and the robot inside each person have traditionally been characterized as two 
different personalities in the person…This unconscious netherself carries out automatic 
behaviors…and performs simple-minded actions. Contrasted with this, of course, is the 
conscious self, capable of all the fine and intelligent thoughts and actions that any human 
or homunculus could desire. (p. 21) 
 
This entity's motivations (i.e., those of the conscious self, or the "executive function" portion of 
it) must be different from those of the organism as a whole (or the unconscious netherself), as 
there would otherwise be no need for control. This can be glimpsed in, for example, Webb and 
Sheeran's (2003) claim that self-control allows us to "...override undesirable responses..." (p. 
279). Although they are claiming, in a pseudo-objective manner, that such responses are 
undesirable, what they mean is that such responses are undesirable to some element of the 
individual; however, the desires cannot be inherently undesirable. If they were inherently 
undesirable, then every part of the organism would "not desire" them, and so there would be no 
response by the individual toward them. That there is such a response reveals that they must be 
desirable (i.e., desired) on some level; to some part of the individual (i.e., the unconscious 
netherself). Thus, it is clear that the controller's motivations/desires differ from those of the 
organism as a whole, which must be accounted for. A full and coherent account of the 
controller's motivations for exerting control must be given by strength model researchers.  
 In addition to an examination of the controller's motivations, it is necessary to examine 
the means by which it realises such motivations. Strength model researchers treat the controller 
(i.e., the self) as separate from the causal antecedents which it is tasked with controlling. 
However, in order to stand as a coherent model, it must be demonstrated that the controller in 
self-control acts deterministically – if it cannot be shown to be the case, then not only is the 
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model which rests upon it incoherent, but it precludes any legitimate scientific study of the 
phenomenon. There is cause for concern on this topic, as Baumeister et al. (2000) state: 
 
The self is the controller of controlled processes, and so the self must expend resources to 
exert control…Exercise of free will or conscious, deliberate choice exacts a toll on the 
self… (p. 131, emphasis added) 
 
Whether Baumeister et al. intend it as read (i.e. that the self is truly free), or whether they intend 
it as a lexically convenient shorthand for "causally-determined but perceived-as-free actions" is 
crucial to the conceptual coherency of the strength model.  
 The strength model's uncritical acceptance of the "control" element of self-control leaves 
it on unstable theoretical ground. Many of the descriptions of what self-control entails are 
superficially logical, but exhibit a lack of critical thinking in assessing their implications or 
implicit assumptions. The self, as it has been described by key strength model researchers, is 
described primarily in terms of its supposed actions and relations; very little is said about what it 
actually is. While this does not imply that there is no such thing as a self, it does suggest that 
greater care needs to be taken when offering it as a causal explanation for behaviour. In 
particular, the self's motivations and the mechanisms of action by which it accomplishes its 
motivations must be critically examined to determine whether they are coherent, and capable of 
forming a sound basis of the strength model (or any other model) of self-control. 
3.3 The Motivation of the Self 
Having established that the strength model's conception of self is unbound, at least to 
some degree, by basic biological impulses and urges, it becomes necessary to determine by what 
mechanism it is motivated to perform the actions it does. On the one hand, Baumeister and Vohs 
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(2007) make the claim that "Human agency or the self’s executive function, which includes 
active initiative, choice, and self-regulation, is...probably an adaptation to facilitate motivated 
behavior." (p. 116, emphasis added), which would imply that the self has no explicit motivations 
of its own and exists merely to facilitate existing motivations. On the other, however, researchers 
make a clear distinction between reflexive, instinctual reactions which do not require an active 
self (i.e., those impulses which the self is tasked with overcoming/inhibiting) and those 
intentional behaviours that belong to the self. If one is to accept that the self only acts to facilitate 
some motivations, not all, it becomes clear that the self must possess a set of motivations of its 
own which account for such distinctions. 
3.3.1 The motive for control. 
One key motivation of the active self is the desire for control, according to Baumeister 
(1998), who claims that "... the motive for control is one of the most fundamental and pervasive 
features of human selfhood." (p. 712), and "...it seems clear that desire for control is one of the 
main motivations of the self." (p. 713). This motive, presumably, is what leads the self to 
"...make decisions, initiate actions, and in other ways exert control over both self and 
environment." (p. 712). Such a motivation, if it exists, could provide a superficial explanation for 
elements of the self's behaviour – for example, it is easy to argue that humans seek to modify 
their environment in order to best meet basic needs; it makes sense, therefore, to suggest that 
they possess a motivation for control, as that would prompt them to act in ways which contribute 
to their control over the environment and their ability to meet needs. However, for a number of 
reasons, "superficial" is the most generous attribution that can be made of a "motive for control" 
as an explanatory mechanism. 
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To begin with, positing a "motive for control" as a motivating force lacks focus as an 
explanation for behaviour. To elaborate: when discussing basic biological drives (e.g., hunger, 
thirst, etc.), it is possible to imagine those behaviours which will produce satiation of the drive 
(e.g., consumption of food, water, etc.). However, when considering a "motive for control", it is 
difficult to imagine what situation or object might produce satisfaction of the motivation – or 
rather, it is difficult to imagine any one behaviour which would do so. This is because "control" 
is such a nebulous concept that it could apply to almost any situation – Baumeister (1998) has 
yet to offer objective criteria by which to judge whether a behaviour satisfies this "motive for 
control". In theory, then, any controlled behaviour could satisfy this motive for control, and there 
is no a priori reason that the behaviour should be one of those typically associated by strength 
model researchers with the controlling self (e.g., resisting the urge to eat cookies, avoiding using 
offensive language around one's boss, etc.). Instead, if the motive is simply one of control, then 
in any case of motivational conflict either behavioural option should be equally likely to be 
controlled. That is, if it is mere control that satisfies the "motive for control", there should be no 
difference in the satisfaction of the motivation between eating and not-eating cookies (from the 
above example); or in swearing profusely in front of one's boss versus not-swearing – in either 
case, one motivated behaviour has been controlled in favour of another. The "motive for 
control", thus-posited, does nothing to explain the self's apparent choice between various 
behavioural options. 
It is unlikely, however, that this is what Baumeister intends when putting forward the 
motive for control as a driver of the self's behaviour. Rather, it appears to be intended that the 
"motive for control" be understood as being a motivation towards controlled, purposive – that is, 
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intentional – behaviour, as opposed to reflexive, instinctive behaviour. Evidence for this 
interpretation comes from Baumeister (1998) himself, who states: 
 
...one of the differences between action and mere behavior involves the unity of self. An 
eyeblink, a drool, or a wiggle of toes may qualify as behavior, and no self is required to 
initiate such responses. Action, however, refers to behavior that is done by the person 
acting as a unity. (p. 712) 
 
The above definition illustrates the point that, to Baumeister, the difference between "action" and 
"behaviour" is intention – in other words, that action is intentional behaviour. Thus, the motive 
for control can be restated as a general motivation to be "in control" of our behaviours (i.e., 
responsible for them); that our behaviours belong to us and be intentional (as opposed to 
instinctive, reflexive, or random). In this light, it is entirely possible that eating cookies or 
swearing in front of one's boss be a controlled behaviour (and, therefore, a result of the "motive 
for control"), provided they were intentional. This motive (and ability) for control is presumably 
what allows selves to "...do more than interpret and belong." (Baumeister, 1998, p. 712), turning 
them instead into goal-directed, active participants in the world. 
However, reframing the motive for control in this way does nothing to elucidate its 
nature, nor explain why it is directed towards some behaviours rather than others. Claiming that 
humans possess a motive for control is tantamount to claiming that we have a "motivation to 
perform actions"; an empty claim, which does not explain why some actions are chosen over 
others. If Baumeister (1998) intends that “motive for control” simply stands in for various 
“intentions to do X”, then it is an empty teleological formulation, ostensibly offering an 
explanation of behaviour by appealing to its apparent purpose or goal. Furthermore, if it is 
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standing for “intention to do X”, and that intention is claimed to be the sole cause of the 
behaviour, then it falls prey to the fallacy of intrinsic relatedness, whereby the antecedent cause 
is defined solely in terms of its relatedness to X. As Maze (1983) states, “…‘intentional states’ as 
conceived have not, and could not have, any intrinsic properties to which one could point 
without having to make reference to direction-towards-an-object.” (p. 26). This is a problem 
because, as he points out, “Anything that can stand in a causal relation, or in any relation at all, 
must have at least some intrinsic properties.” (p. 24). Thus, if “motive for control” is really an 
umbrella term for all intentional behaviour, and simply stands for “intention to perform X 
behaviour”, then it is an incoherent notion, and offers no true explanation. 
The alternative, that Baumeister (1998) truly intends that “motive/desire for control” be 
taken as read, is equally illogical. As with “intention to do X”, it is an empty teleological 
formulation that aims to explain the self’s behaviour in terms of its apparent purpose (i.e., to act 
in a controlled manner). Furthermore, as pointed out, the motive lacks a coherent focus, with no 
clear explanation from Baumeister as to what the motive or desire truly consists of (i.e., what the 
object of the desire/motivation is, and why it is directed towards some behaviours rather than 
others). Thus, neither interpretation of the claimed motive/desire for control proves satisfactory, 
leaving the self still requiring an acceptable account of its motivations. 
A third alternative is that Baumeister (1998) intends that motive for control be 
understood as facilitating other motivations. That is, that a person is motivated to perform some 
behaviour and the motive for control causes them to act in an intentional, purposive manner in 
order to achieve that goal. Such an interpretation is nonsensical, however, as it essentially 
requires the "doubling-up" of motivations in order to explain why the motive for control 
facilitates some behaviours but not others (i.e., there must be another set of motivations causing 
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the motive for control to engage with some behaviours, but not all). While Baumeister (1998) 
presents a number of claims to support the idea that the motive for control is one of the central 
motivations of human beings (including the fact that deprivation of control can lead to either 
learned helplessness or the formation of illusions of control), it is clear that none of the presented 
interpretations of the claimed "motive for control" are satisfactory – there is no explicit 
explanation for why the self would direct such a drive towards one behaviour rather than another.  
None of this, however, is intended to deny the important role that control has in 
motivated behaviour. It is undeniable that, in seeking to meet the demands of various 
motivations, humans exert control over their environment, and that their actions are controlled 
(in the sense that they are cognitively guided, rather than being random flailing). However, this 
control is always in the service of other motivations – that is, it is control that is caused by some 
other motivation seeking to achieve its aim, rather than an unfocused general motive/desire for 
control. Control is not, therefore, a motivation in and of itself, but a tool. To suggest that there is 
a general motivation for control is to reify its function and turn it into a non-explanatory, 
teleological account of behaviour. 
3.3.2 Enlightened self-interest. 
With the motive for control proving incoherent, and, thus, incapable of standing as a 
motivation for the self, it is necessary to consider other motivations put forward by strength 
model researchers as explanations for the self's behaviour. One such motivation is the pursuit of 
enlightened self-interest. For example, Baumeister and Vohs (2007) claim that: 
 
... much of self-regulation is used for the purpose of restraining selfish motivations in 
order to serve the goal of being accepted by others (Heatherton & Vohs, 1998). In an 
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important sense, this is a matter of pursuing enlightened self-interest over immediate or 
myopic self-interest (p. 120, emphasis added) 
 
And, from Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs (2008): 
 
It is hard to see how consumers would benefit from developing a capacity to make 
random, meaningless choices, but they would benefit hugely from being able to make 
relatively free choices that pursue enlightened self-interest. (p. 6, emphasis added) 
 
Although the definition of enlightened self-interest is not explicitly provided by the authors, it is 
clear that it is intended to be synonymous with long-term, socially-acceptable goals. For 
example, Baumeister and Vohs (2007) state that: 
 
... the more one wants to achieve the second (more enlightened or long-term) goal, the 
easier it may be to make sacrifices for it. (p. 120, emphasis added). 
 
And, regarding the social acceptability of such goals:  
 
"Perhaps the most important motivational conflict arises from the clashing 
 demands of nature and culture." (p. 119) 
 
 It appears, however, that rather than "enlightened self-interest" being a singular 
motivation in itself, the authors intend it as an umbrella term encompassing all long-term, 
acquired, socially-desirable motivations. Nowhere is this made more clear than by Baumeister 
(2014), who states: 
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Some motivations are ‘higher’ than others in the sense that they benefit the individual in 
longer time frames or embody societal values. In this view, the ‘lower’ motivations 
typically focus on immediate pleasures, which can be costly in the long run…In addition 
to the time frame, the higher and lower motivations differ according to cultural values 
and enlightened self-interest, with the lower desires reflecting simple, animalistic 
motivations whereas the higher ones are linked to traits that set humans apart from other 
animals, including moral principles and rational calculation. (p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
While the differentiation between higher and lower motivations offers a convenient taxonomy by 
which to distinguish between those motivations that belong to the executive function portion of 
the self and those which are instinctual, it is not clear whether such differentiation is justified. 
The question must be asked whether "newer" motivations (i.e., those that are claimed to arise 
from culture, and set humans apart from other animals) are genuinely separate from basic drives. 
If they are not, then there is no justification in claiming that the self has a set of motivations that 
are separate (and qualitatively different) from those lower, instinctual motivations of the 
individual. Furthermore, in the case of higher motivations which cannot be shown to be clearly 
derived from lower motivations, it is necessary to show that they could stand as coherent causal 
explanations of behaviour. 
3.3.3 The drive for a meaningful life. 
In order to distinguish whether the split between "higher" and "lower" motivations is a 
genuine one, or just one of anthropocentric convenience, it is necessary to examine those 
motivations that Baumeister (2014) considers representative of enlightened self-interest. For 
example, he claims that: 
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The view of humans as having invented new forms of social life raises the question of 
whether there are forms of motivation that are quite new. One leading candidate is the 
motivation to find meaning. The recent upsurge in research on finding life meaningful 
has been accompanied by frequent assertions that humans have such a drive…[I have] 
proposed that people have four needs for meaning, which can be considered as 
components of a basic drive to achieve a meaningful life. (Baumeister, 2014, p. 5, 
emphasis added) 
 
Such a drive, if it exists, undoubtedly appeals to the noble side of human nature – what, after all, 
could be further from our "lower" motivations than an innate drive to achieve a meaningful life? 
Furthermore, it is easy to understand why a drive to achieve a meaningful life should appear so 
acceptable as a basic driver of human behaviour: when basic needs are met, humans appear to 
engage in myriad behaviours that apparently have little to do with basic biological needs, and far 
more to do with existential/higher concerns. It appears unlikely, however, that a drive for a 
meaningful life is any more capable of providing a coherent causal explanation for human 
behaviour than is the previously posited motive for control. According to Baumeister, Vohs, 
Aaker, and Garbinsky (2013): 
 
Meaningfulness is presumably both a cognitive and an emotional assessment of whether 
one’s life has purpose and value. People may feel that life is meaningful if they find it 
consistently rewarding in some way, even if they cannot articulate just what it all means. 
(p. 506) 
 
 Thus, one interpretation of Baumeister’s (2014) drive for a meaningful life is that 
individuals have a basic drive to find their life rewarding in some way. However, such a 
definition has shortcomings – many activities, including those that strength model researchers 
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typically consider as needing to be controlled by the self (e.g., excessive food consumption, 
promiscuous sexual activity, etc.), are technically "rewarding", in that they satisfy some basic 
drive and are thereby pleasurable. Given that such activities appear to be exactly what 
Baumeister et al. (2013) are arguing do not constitute a meaningful life, it is clear that a 
consistently rewarding life (even if an individual "...cannot articulate what it all means") must 
consist of some other set of activities. According to Baumeister et al., that set of activities is 
"...linked to doing things that express and reflect the self and in particular to doing positive 
things for others." (p. 515). Such an elaboration hardly clarifies the matter, however, as the 
constellation of activities that "express and reflect the self", according to Baumeister et al., 
actually includes a number of activities associated with basic biological needs (e.g., sex, 
snoozing). In addition, a number of other activities listed by the authors as reflecting the self 
seem hardly consistent with the intended interpretation of a meaningful life, such as "watching 
TV", "sex", "worrying", and "arguing".  
Such definitional inconsistency is problematic when claiming that the drive for a 
meaningful life is a basic human drive, as it hints at inconsistencies underlying the basic concept. 
This problem could, perhaps, be overcome through careful and precise consideration of what 
activities constitute "meaningfully rewarding", and by avoiding inadvertently contradictory 
claims. Overcoming such problems, however, would do little to resolve the deeper and more 
critical issues with which the "basic drive for a meaningful life" is beset, including its 
questionable status as a basic drive, and its inherent teleology.   
Speaking to the first of these, a significant logical leap is required in order to go from the 
assertion that some people appear to strive towards achieving meaning in their life, to asserting 
that such striving is indicative of a basic drive. To begin with, such a position can be critiqued on 
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the grounds that the meaning of any perceived object, behaviour, situation, etc., is not inherent in 
that thing, but a relation between the individual and the object (or behaviour, situation, etc.). The 
meaning of such a relation must be learned, yet it is unlikely that learning that a certain 
behaviour or way of acting is "meaningful" can occur in the absence of social input. That is, 
while an individual in isolation could presumably learn what various things "meant" to them 
(e.g., food means reduced hunger; this plant means uncomfortable stings, etc.), it appears 
impossible that they would learn that certain actions were "meaningful" in the sense that 
Baumeister et al. (2013) intend it. 
This point does not appear to be lost on Baumeister (2014), who discusses the drive to 
achieve a meaningful life in the context of it having developed as a result of "...humans... having 
invented new forms of social life..." (p. 5). It is clear that he recognises that meaningful actions 
must involve some degree of social input, but there is no attempt to draw out the implication of 
this. That is, if "meaningful actions" are not inherently meaningful, but only become so through 
social interaction, the drive to perform such actions cannot be innate to an individual in the same 
way that basic drives (e.g., hunger, thirst, etc.) are. An individual raised in social isolation would 
possess those basic drives necessary for survival (and, presumably, reproduction, even if they 
had no way of achieving that), but it would be impossible for them to develop a "drive to achieve 
a meaningful life" in the absence of information about what constituted a meaningful life. And, 
although it could be argued that such an individual, even if not striving to achieve a meaningful 
life, would develop a sense of what various things "meant", it cannot be argued that they had a 
drive to do so. Such learning would occur as a result of associations between various stimuli and 
their effects, but such a process would be incidental to the individual attempting to satisfy their 
basic drives – not as a result of a drive to find meaning. As with the posited motive for control, 
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finding meaning in various things is a tool that better allows the individual to meet the needs of 
drives, but is not a drive in and of itself. The claim, then, that there is a basic drive to achieve a 
meaningful life is problematic on the grounds that such a drive cannot be basic – if it exists, it 
must necessarily be an acquired drive. Baumeister himself appears willing to consider this, as he 
himself is not sure "Whether this drive is evolutionarily new and distinct from other motivations, 
or is simply a cultural refinement of simpler drives (e.g., curiosity)..." (p. 5). 
Modifying Baumeister's (2014) claim, however, from the drive being basic to being 
acquired does nothing to rescue it from more troubling theoretical problems. One such problem 
is that, in naming the drive after its apparent object (i.e., to achieve a meaningful life), 
Baumeister opens himself to the criticism that he is engaging in "drive naming" – taking the fact 
that individuals engage in a behaviour and positing a drive to explain it. This, in turn, leads to the 
(erroneous) impression that some explanatory, primary motivating drive has been discovered. As 
has been shown, this cannot be the case with the drive to achieve a meaningful life. Furthermore, 
and as raised by McMullen (1982) in his critique of self-actualisation, in positing a purposive 
drive (for there can be no other way of describing a drive to achieve a meaningful life than as a 
purposive account of behaviour), one is left with the question: "Is it possible to specify in an 
objective, non-arbitrary way what is the end or goal of any piece of behaviour?" (p. 225). As he 
states: 
 
At a simple level it might sound plausible to be told that “the man’s crossing the street 
had the end goal of buying food to satisfy hunger” if we see him cross the street, go into a 
food shop opposite and come out eating some item of food. But if he is knocked down by 
a car on the road would we want to say that that was the end of the act, the actualizing of 
his “walking capacities”? (p. 225) 
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Although McMullen's critique is targeted specifically at the Humanist concept of self-
actualization, the point he raises is relevant for the drive to achieve a meaningful life. The drive, 
specifying as it does the final goal of "a meaningful life", is capable of subsuming any number of 
behaviours beneath its umbrella. As such, the drive is superficially capable of explaining any 
behaviour, but in doing so it explains none. An individual may well engage in a behaviour which 
they believe to be meaningful, but if they fail, can it be said that the attempt (rather than the 
outcome) was, nonetheless, meaningful? And, therefore, satisfies the drive? Such a purposive 
account appears incapable of differentiating, and is therefore suspect as a causal explanation of 
behaviour. 
A final critique of the drive to achieve a meaningful life is its inherent teleology. The 
ultimate goal of the drive is the achievement of a meaningful life, which can only be a future 
goal. Thus, the drive is suggesting "...that a goal existing in the future somehow causes present 
behaviour to come about." (McMullen, 1982, p. 225, original emphasis). Even if Baumeister 
(2014) is subscribing to some form of the definition of psychological need as posited by Ryan 
and Deci (2000), it is not clear that this rescues the drive for a meaningful life from its 
conceptual grave. According to Ryan and Deci's definition,  
 
...a basic need, whether it be a physiological need (Hull, 1943) or a psychological need, is 
an energizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward health and well-being but, if not 
satisfied, contributes towards pathology and ill-being. (2000, p. 74) 
 
It could be, then, that Baumeister follows the above definition in assuming that a meaningful life 
(the goal event of the drive) is necessary for health and well-being. This would seem to locate the 
energising event in the present, avoiding the teleological conundrum. However, in doing so it 
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still falls prey to fallacy of constituent relations – it is not possible to characterise the state of 
need independently of the activity which it supposedly energises. Take, for example, the hunger 
drive: the state of need which energises it may be a state of low blood glucose levels; the need-
satisfying activity which is energised will be the consumption of nutrients – which, crucially, can 
be characterised independently of the state of need. In the case of the drive to achieve a 
meaningful life, however, it appears that the state of need which energises behaviour can only be 
characterised in terms of its relation to meaningful behaviour. To quote Maze (1983) again, such 
a need "...could not have any intrinsic properties to which one could point without having to 
make reference to direction-towards-an-object.” (p. 26). 
3.3.4 Self-actualization and flourishing. 
The "basic drive to achieve a meaningful life", then, is conceptually incoherent, and as 
with the motive for control incapable of standing as a motivation of the self. A lack of 
recognition of its deficiencies as an explanatory mechanism, however, leads Baumeister (2014) 
to include it, along with other "higher" motivations, in a new class of motivational drives by 
which human behaviour is supposedly animated. For example: 
 
...it seems likely that human motivation has moved beyond mere survival and 
reproduction. Comfort, ease, and perhaps some loftier goals such as flourishing and even 
self-actualization can be counted among the important varieties of human motivation. 
(Baumeister, 2014, p. 5) 
 
Thematically, these goals are of the same family as the drive to achieve a meaningful life, and as 
a result they are subject to similar criticisms. It is unclear what differentiation is made between 
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"flourishing" and "self-actualization", but it appears reasonable to treat them as synonymous, as 
their goal appears to be similar. According to Goldstein (1978),  
 
...one very basic human motivation is directed to unity and wholeness...embodying a 
search for...‘self-actualization’ ...a process wherein individuals attempt to realize some of 
their unfulfilled potential, to be something more than they presently are, and in so doing 
become more complete. (pp. 12-13). 
 
Self-actualization, as a motive force, has already been thoroughly critiqued by McMullen 
(1982), and several of the points he makes regarding the traditional Humanistic view of self-
actualization can be levelled at Baumeister's concept of the same. For example, as with the drive 
to achieve a meaningful life, self-actualization as a drive suffers from being, by its nature, a 
purposive drive. As a result, it is difficult (if not impossible) to specify in an objective, non-
arbitrary manner the end or goal of any behaviour. Furthermore, McMullen critiques self-
actualization on the grounds of the circularity inherent in it as a motivational principle. As he 
states:  
 
Certain behaviour is explained in terms of the operation (or frustration) of self-
actualization but then the evidence for (or against) self-actualization consists simply of 
that piece of behaviour itself...There is no logical difference between this kind of account 
and the old-time ad hoc instinct theory. (p. 225) 
 
Thus, as with the drive to achieve a meaningful life, it is possible to level the "drive naming" 
criticism at self-actualization. The last of the applicable critical points raised by McMullen is the 
claim that self-actualization is a form of "insidious teleology". Here, McMullen suggests that 
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self-actualization commits to a "soft" teleology – rather than allowing that a goal in the future 
compels behaviour in the present (i.e., "hard" teleology"), it resolves the temporal paradox by 
compelling present behaviour via current potentialities, dispositions, or capacities. This is 
problematic, according to McMullen, because: 
 
...they are not states or entities which exist independently of behaviour, they are not the 
kinds of things which can do anything at all; they have no qualities or “stuff” which 
would allow us to identify them as precursors of behaviour. (p. 225) 
 
It is unclear whether Baumeister (2014), when suggesting self-actualization as a human 
motivation, is subscribing fully to the Humanistic version at which McMullen levels his 
critiques. However, regardless of whether he believes that the "lofty goal" of self-actualization 
actually relies on potentialities, dispositions, or capacities, the fact remains that as a purposive 
motivation, self-actualization commits to teleology rather than being an efficient causal 
explanation of behaviour. Thus, this point of McMullen's, if not applicable in every detail, is still 
broadly applicable to self-actualization as proposed by Baumeister.  
 A further point raised by McMullen in opposition of self-actualization is that it is a 
monistic theory of motivation – that despite lower basic needs, there is still only one ultimate 
motivation. In this, Baumeister's suggestion of self-actualization cannot be included, as it is clear 
that Baumeister allows for a multitude of motivations within individuals, and makes no claim 
that they must all, ultimately, resolve into one "ultimate". As Baumeister (2014) notes,  
 
...the diverse multiplicity of motivations greatly complicates the theoretical task when 
they do not remain isolated from each other—because different motivations may conflict. 
(p. 8) 
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And, when specifically referring to Humanism and Maslow's (1968) hierarchy of needs, 
Baumeister makes the point that "The wide appeal of Maslow’s hierarchy was not matched 
by supportive data..." (p. 8). The final point of McMullen's critique of self-actualization is a more 
general one leveled at Humanism as a whole, and the issue of "Self-determinism" – "...the 
doctrine that at some point it is in principle possible for an organism to cut across, to suspend, 
whatever mechanical forces might be operating (inside or outside it) to bring about its 
behaviour." (1982, pp. 226-227). There are grounds for believing that this critique can justifiably 
be leveled at the strength model as well, to be discussed in the next section. 
It is clear that self-actualization, as with the drive to achieve a meaningful life and the 
motive for control, is inadequate as an explanation for the self's behaviour. All three motivations 
are beset by conceptual flaws that mean they cannot be retained as drivers of the self. As 
McMullen (1982) states: 
 
It is fair to say that generally the accounts are shot through with teleology, that 
metaphysics is never far away, and that they tell an unintelligible story about 
determinism. (p. 225) 
 
This is not to say categorically that the self cannot have such higher motivations; merely that 
none of those posited thus far are acceptably coherent enough to be so.  
 A final example of the lack of plausible motivations posited for the strength model's self 
is Baumeister's (2014) claim that: 
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For humans, subjective experience became a target of motivation rather than merely a set 
of signals to facilitate motivational processes…Human hunger is more than a craving for 
life-sustaining nutrients: It is for the pleasure of fine eating…The subjective experience 
has become a goal in itself. (Baumeister, 2014, p. 5) 
 
While many people seek to engage in fine dining experiences, to claim that they do so because of 
anticipation of a future subjective experience is, as with the other motivations posited for the 
self, teleological – Baumeister is claiming that an anticipated future event can drive present 
behaviour. What would make more sense as a coherent account of such behaviour, is to 
explicitly recognise that such behaviour represents a confluence of factors, at their heart driven 
by a biological need for food (i.e., a hunger drive). This, in combination with the availability of 
highly palatable food and the cognisance of such availability, the expected outcomes of eating it 
(e.g., pleasure), and the means of acquiring it, lead to the pursuit of fine dining. However, as 
noted, at its heart such pursuit would be driven ultimately by a hunger drive, not pulled by an 
anticipation of future experience. Such a reframing allows for an efficiently causal, rather than 
teleological, explanation of the behaviour, without the need to refer to any kind of "higher" 
motivations. 
 As it stands, none of the motivations put forward to explain why the self pursues some 
courses of action over others, particularly those that would be considered self-controlled, are 
conceptually coherent. On the contrary, upon examination a number of them suffer from basic 
conceptual flaws that prevent them from being retained in any way as explanations for the 
erstwhile self's behaviour. Although, as noted, this does not mean that there are no such higher 
motivations that can conceivably explain behaviour, the failure of any of those so far posited to 
withstand conceptual scrutiny bodes poorly for such a possibility. The strength model, then, is 
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left without a plausible accounting for the self's pursuit of some courses of action over others, 
which, in combination with the inadequate description of what the self truly is (rather than what 
it does) leaves the strength model in a precarious position. If researchers can coherently describe 
the self (by more than simply describing what it does), and can posit a set of coherent 
motivations for it (i.e., those that do not fall foul of teleology or drive-naming), then the strength 
model can possibly be salvaged from the conceptual quagmire in which it finds itself. Even 
should such hurdles be overcome, however, it must be shown that the model does not subscribe 
to the non-deterministic "self-determinism" criticised by McMullen (1982), which there are 
grounds for believing may be the case.   
3.4 The Strength Model's "Self" and Free-Will 
 A lack of coherently defined motivations for the strength model's self poses problems for 
the model, but can potentially be resolved through carefully identifying plausible, causally 
coherent motivational forces which drive the self's behaviour. More troubling for the strength 
model's self is the apparent acceptance of (or even insistence upon) a self which is self-
determined – that is, one which relies on the incoherent notion of free will. However, while a 
number of factors appear to point to this conclusion, it is possible that when referring to free will, 
strength model researchers intend only to refer to those actions which are experienced as free to 
an individual – that is, those that are apparently the result of choice, as opposed to those for 
which there is an obvious (whether internal or external) compulsion. Determining whether the 
strength model truly subscribes to a non-deterministic view of the self's capabilities (rendering 
any scientific study of it and its actions impossible), or whether "free will" is intended merely as 
convenient lexical shorthand denoting phenomenological experience is a crucial point 
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underpinning the conceptual clarity of the strength model's view of self, and of the view of self-
control upon which that rests. 
 It is made clear by a number of sources that strength model researchers do not support a 
view of free will that explicitly asserts that the self is free of all causation
3
. For example, 
Baumeister et al. (2008) explicitly state that: 
 
We are much less interested in the quest for the extreme case of total freedom (i.e., 
behavior independent of all external causes and prior events) than in differences along the 
continuum. People experience some of their actions as freer than others, and they make 
similar distinctions while perceiving the actions of others. (p. 6) 
 
How could one prove that people have free will? One approach would be to show that an 
action is not shaped by any external cause or prior event. In essence, this would be a 
random action. But random actions are not valued or popular in human social life. What 
is valued—and what can furnish a very different idea of free will—includes self-control, 
following rules, and making intelligent, rational decisions (and carrying them out). If 
something resembling free will had actually evolved in human psychology...then it would 
have more likely involved capacities for self-control, following rules, and smart choices 
than for acting randomly. (p. 4) 
 
From Baumeister (2008): 
 
                                                             
3 In this respect they are no different for any other supporter of free will. Throughout the history of free will 
advocacy, nobody ever claims that the will is always and everywhere free, that it is completely unconstrained. If it 
were, then “my” free will would be indistinguishable from “yours” (or anyone else’s), and so could not properly be 
held to belong to me. This, of course, is fatal for a free will supporter; it is not what he/she wishes to maintain. So, 
the will is only sometimes and under certain conditions free. But, as McMullen (1996) points out, the merest hint of 
any condition being free from the causal network shatters the whole causal network, rendering it a case of “X is 
produced by the necessary and sufficient conditions Y but only if the will doesn’t intercede” (which is to say that 
those conditions are not, after all, sufficient!). 
122 
 
Free will should be understood not as the starter or motor of action but rather as a 
passenger who occasionally grabs the steering wheel or even as just a navigator who says 
to turn left up ahead. (p. 14) 
 
And, from Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist (2011): 
 
Our work has sought to establish an understanding of free will that is scientifically viable 
and amenable to study. It does not depend on the assumption of random action or of 
violations of causality. Rather, it involves an evolved capacity to free oneself from 
natural and habitual patterns of response so as to be able to pursue enlightened self-
interest in the complex context of human social life and culture. (p. 9) 
 
Our view is that random action is the bugaboo of the free will debate. We regard it as an 
unfortunate and misleading case, though we cannot deny that it does correspond to some 
widely held perceptions of what a free action might be. (p. 4) 
 
The authors are correct to distance themselves from such a view of free will, which is explicitly 
indeterminist and antithetical to the scientific study of behaviour. The other end of the spectrum 
from such a view of free will would be a fully determinist position – a "hard" determinism, as 
James (1884) and McMullen (1996) put it. Such a determinist position is the ontological view 
that all events have causal antecedents; that there can be no compatibilism between determinism 
and free will; and that moral responsibility and choice are illusions (McMullen, 1996). It is 
important to note, however, that a hard determinism says nothing about an individual's 
experience of free will or choice – it is entirely consistent with the position that an individual 
experience themselves as willing their actions – but their actions and behaviour will always be 
the result of antecedent causes. 
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 In hard determinism, terms such as "free will" or "choice" make sense as convenient 
lexical shortcuts denoting behaviour which is not obviously compelled, or for which the causal 
antecedents are not obvious, but they do not make sense as genuine concepts of freedom. Thus, 
when Baumeister et al. (2008) state that "People experience some of their actions as freer than 
others, and they make similar distinctions while perceiving the actions of others." (p. 6, emphasis 
added), their claim is consistent with hard determinism. The strength model, however, seems 
equally reluctant to commit to a hard determinist position as it does to that of completely free 
will. This is illustrated by Baumeister, Schmeichel, et al. (2007), who state: 
 
All around us, every day, we see people facing choices in which multiple options are 
really viable and possible, and they exercise some sort of strength or power to make 
themselves select among them. Yet, in order to be good scientists, many psychologists 
think they must believe that every event is caused and that the apparent exercise of choice 
cannot be real. And so psychologists reject the evidence of our senses and our personal 
experience in order to insist that people are not really choosing. The outcome of each 
decision must have been the only outcome that was ever really possible. (p. 9) 
 
Baumeister (2008) is similarly critical of the notion that all psychologists should be held to the 
standard of hard determinism: 
 
To require scientists to believe in determinism seems unwarranted. After all, the 
deterministic hypothesis – that every event is fully and inevitably caused by prior events 
and nothing else than what happened was ever possible – is itself unproven and even 
unprovable, so it requires a big leap of faith. Determinism is also contrary to everyday 
experience (in which people do make choices, and they believe subjectively that more 
than one outcome is possible). (p. 14) 
And: 
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A further objection to determinism is the observation that freedom and choice are woven 
deeply into the fabric of human relations and activities. If freedom and choice are 
completely illusions – if the outcome of every choice was inevitable all along – why must 
people agonize so over decisions
4
? (p. 14) 
 
Such arguments are not a convincing justification for a rejection of determinism, relying as they 
do on subjective experience rather than careful conceptual analysis of the implications of such a 
position. As Wegner (2005) says: 
 
The personal experience of agency is not a good foundation for a science of mind, 
however, and we must be careful as scientists to appreciate the basis of this feeling rather 
than to incorporate the feeling in our theories. (p. 23) 
 
Thus, while the arguments against a fully deterministic position are not convincing, they at least 
serve to indicate the strength model's position – neither explicitly indeterminist, nor fully 
committed to determinism. 
 This leaves only one possible interpretation for the strength model's view of free will, that 
of compatibilism/self-determination – that is, the belief that both determinism and free will are 
compatible concepts (McMullen, 1996). This conclusion is supported by a number of claims 
from strength model researchers: 
 
...we suggest that conscious decision and free will are more useful for logical decision 
making than for random or meaningless action. (Baumeister et al., 2008, p. 6, emphasis 
added) 
                                                             
4 In asking this question, Baumeister has conflated determinism (the thesis that every event is caused, and is itself a 
cause of further events) with fatalism (the thesis that "Whatever will be will be", the belief that the future is set in 
stone), a position which typically denies the causal efficacy of cognitions (e.g., agonising over choices can itself be a 
determinant of future behaviour, if it gives rise to awareness of various behavioural options). 
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The executive function of the self refers to its active, intentional aspects and may be 
thought of as that part of the self which is ultimately responsible for the actions of the 
individual. The other major executive function of the self is choice. Not only may a self 
initiate behavior or control it, but a self also is responsible for deliberating and making 
choices from among the universe of possible options. (Baumeister et al., 2007, pp. 5-6, 
emphasis added) 
 
Self-control refers to the ability to override urges, thoughts, and habitual tendencies in 
order to behave in accordance with personal or societal standards for acceptable behavior. 
(DeWall et al., 2011, p. 73, emphasis added). 
 
“The self is the controller of controlled processes, and so the self must expend resources 
to exert control…Exercise of free will or conscious, deliberate choice exacts a toll on the 
self…” (Baumeister et al., 2000, p. 131, emphasis added) 
 
The strength model, then, while clearly rejecting a notion of free will as "random action", accepts 
that the self is capable of free action in the sense that it can freely choose (from available, 
presumably causally determined, options), override causally determined urges and thoughts, and 
causal antecedents notwithstanding, initiate actions. 
 This position is not unique – even William James suggested that, should "...the powers 
governing the universe annihilate ten minutes of time with all that it contained..." (1884, p. 30), 
he could potentially choose to walk down a different street on the way home. That is, that he 
"could have done otherwise" – he retained a basic freedom to choose his actions, just as the 
strength model suggests individuals have in their ability to engage in "conscious, deliberate 
choice". And, indeed, such a position seems to accord with our daily experience – as Baumeister, 
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Schmeichel et al. (2007) lament above, "...psychologists reject the evidence of our senses and our 
personal experience in order to insist that people are not really choosing." (p. 9). However, 
despite self-determinism seeming to accord with everyday experience, on examination it suffers 
from serious conceptual flaws. Drawing out the implication of self-determinism/compatibilism 
reveals the basic conceptual confusion inherent in the position: the problem of the interaction 
between free-will and determined action. For example, when Baumeister et al. (2000) state that 
"The self is the controller of controlled processes, and so the self must expend resources to exert 
control…" (p. 131), it is equivalent to stating that the self is both subject and not subject to 
causal factors. It is subject to them inasmuch as it requires resources in order to enact its will, 
and the scarcity of such resources is responsible for the depletion effect – undeniably a causal 
constraint. However, at the same time, the self is clearly free of such forces – while it has access 
to causally determined behavioural options, it is supposedly free to choose from amongst them 
according to its desires. Thus, it is not clear how, in a compatibilist position, free-will and 
casually determined actions interact. 
  Such a position could be freed of this conceptual quagmire if researchers were to 
explicitly state that the experience of choice was simply the awareness of available behavioural 
alternatives whilst still acknowledging that the "choice" that was made was the result of 
antecedent causes (i.e., differentiating between ontology and epistemology). However, the 
model's insistence that there is a genuine entity (the self, or the executive function) that somehow 
"chooses" from between available options is an incoherence. As Wegner (2005) notes: 
 
Whenever we explain a behavior by saying that some personlike agent inside the person 
simply caused it, we have imagined a homunculus and have thereby committed a classic 
error of psychological explanation. The issue here, of course, is that a homunculus must 
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itself be explained...[a] way to explain a homunculus is simply to say that it has free will 
and can determine its own behavior...There cannot be a science of this. (p. 20) 
 
The strength model, with its appeals to the self as an active controller, initiator, and decision-
maker, appears to be guilty of just such an error. Possibly in an attempt to pre-empt such a 
criticism, Baumeister et al. (1998) claimed: 
 
The term agency has been used by various writers to refer to the self's exertion of 
volition, but this term has misleading connotations: An agent is quintessentially someone 
who acts on behalf of someone else, whereas the phenomenon under discussion involves 
the self acting autonomously on its own behalf. The term executive function...may be 
preferable. (p. 1252, original emphasis) 
  
While this differentiation attempts to unify the controller and controlled, and thereby dispel any 
claim that the strength model has invoked a separate agent by which to explain behaviour, it is 
not clear that doing so resolves the problem. Given that acting autonomously means to act 
without external rule or control, the executive function appears to be simply a renamed 
"personlike agent" within the individual. 
 While such a position would undoubtedly be explicitly denied by researchers, the 
insistence that an element of the self (the executive function) is separate from basic biological 
urges (or habitual responses, or automatic behaviours, or any of the class of behaviours it is 
tasked with overcoming) and is somehow responsible for the initiation, control, and directing of 
so-called "higher" behaviours leaves the strength model with no clear alternative. Wegner 
(2005), for example, explicitly mentions the strength model when he says: 
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The homunculus in controlled processing is usually implicit rather than explicit. No 
theorist has actually said "and therefore, the little person in the head is responsible for the 
nonautomatic processes we have observed." Baumeister (2000, p. 25) has come very 
close to this by saying "the self is the controller of controlled processes," and it is not 
clear what this could mean other than that there is a homunculus to be found controlling 
things. (p. 21) 
 
The definitional consistency in strength model research relating to the self being a controller 
provides strong support for the claim that it is invoking a homunculus. Clearly, supposing such 
an entity causes problems for the field of psychology, and for the strength model in particular. 
This crypto-Cartesianism
5
 is not endemic to the strength model, however, taking the form of the 
“self” in concepts such as self-deception (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011) and self-affirmation 
(Steele, 1988); or of “willpower” (Carver & Scheier, 1996; Henden, 2008); or any other 
mechanism or agency by which controlled (as opposed to automatic) behaviour might be 
explained. The implicit acceptance of the controlling agent allows psychology to ostensibly work 
within a deterministic framework, while at the same time imbuing individuals with the properties 
that we intuitively associate with (and occasionally exclusively attribute to) humans – such as 
free-will, control, and volition. 
3.5 Summary 
 The strength model, then, is left in uncertain theoretical waters. A key concept underlying 
it (the self) has been inadequately explained in terms of what it is, being "explained" instead in 
terms of what it does. Furthermore, researchers insist that this element of the individual 
possesses some set of motivations that are unrelated to basic biological urges, yet, upon closer 
                                                             
5 See Bennett & Hacker (2003) for an extensive and trenchant exposé of the hidden elements of dualism in much of 
current cognitive neuroscience. 
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examination, the key motivations they put forward for the self are found to be incoherent 
teleological accounts of behaviour. Lastly, it is clear that there is implicit acceptance that the self 
relies on free will to accomplish its aims and to engage in self control, making the scientific 
study of it impossible. 
 The issues faced by the strength model arise because of the failure to critically evaluate 
the "control" element of self-control, resulting in the need to fall back upon a personlike agent 
who must be imbued with some degree of free will in order to direct behaviour. Such issues are 
likely to plague any model of self-control that similarly takes the concept of "control" in self-
control too literally, and fails to adequately consider the implications of such a position.  Given 
that the Strength model is just such a model, and that the concept of a unitary, agential self is so 
entrenched within the model as to make it impossible to disentangle it from the model, it follows 
that the Strength model must be discarded as conceptually unsound. It is necessary, therefore, to 
propose an alternative view of the self, and consequently an alternative view of self-control. 
 Any alternative model of self-control must, in order to avoid the pitfalls which beset the 
strength model and in order to satisfy the rigours of science, demonstrate conceptual clarity and 
coherence throughout. There are a number of prerequisites for any such model: 
 
1. In order for an alternative model of self-control to be considered truly scientific, it 
must be committed to a fully determinist position – there can be no acceptance (implicit 
or otherwise) of free-will. Models of self-control which rely on a self-determined, 
actively choosing, controlling self are guilty of just such acceptance, and must be rejected 
as being unscientific. In order to be fully determinist, then, such notions must be done 
away with.  
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2. Therefore, any alternative model of self-control must do away with the notion of 
control in the literal sense, as that leads invariably to needing a controller, which in turn 
leads to the theoretical quagmire discussed. An acceptable alternative model must be able 
to explain how some behavioural options are realised over others without the need to 
refer to one being the result of control. The process model (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2011) 
offers a promising starting point for such a model, as it largely does away with a 
controller. 
 
3. The concept of a unitary self is inadequate when explaining self-control, as, in order to 
explain conflicting motivations the self must be separated into higher and lower selves – 
at which point it ceases to be a unitary self. Attempts to resolve this, by claiming that 
automatic behaviours do not require the input of a self to initiate, and that the higher 
"self" (or executive function) is responsible only for the controlled, conscious behaviours, 
fall prey to the criticism that they have invoked an homunculus. Thus, any alternative 
model of self-control must eschew the unitary self and instead propose a view of selfhood 
capable of explaining motivational conflicts (a point anticipated by Baumeister, 2014) 
without necessarily referring to one, controlling, self. A strongly partitive account of 
mind (Boag, 2005; Maze, 1983) may provide such a path. 
 
4. Any alternative model of self-control must be able to provide an account of the 
motivations that give rise to such a conflict in non-teleological terms – that is, the 
motivations must be capable of being explained within an efficient causal framework. 
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The work of Maze (1983) provides the framework for a coherent account of behaviour 
that includes motivational conflicts and so-called "higher" motivations without falling 
prey to teleology. 
 
The concept of self-control which the strength model attempts to explain is rendered 
conceptually suspect by the problems inherent in the model itself – problems so severe that the 
model cannot be retained as an explanatory tool. Concerns of this nature have previously been 
raised by researchers (e.g., Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Murtagh & Todd, 2004; Xu et al., 
2014). The time is ripe, therefore, to recast self-control in a more deterministic light. The 
following chapter will provide an alternative account of motivation and self-control that 
accomplishes just that, providing a fully-determined, mechanistic model of self-control. 
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Chapter 4: Drive Theory: A Coherent Account of Motivation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 It was argued in the previous chapter that the strength model fails to adequately explain 
the posited force underpinning the model (the self), as well as failing to provide a coherent 
account of the self's motivations and a plausibly deterministic account of its actions. In 
attempting to provide a conceptually sound, coherent account of self-control to replace the 
strength model, care must be taken to avoid similar theoretical pitfalls. Of central importance, 
therefore, is the provision of an account of motivation which can explain the causal efficacy of 
cognitions without needing to resort to an "uncaused causer" (i.e., the self), as well as adequately 
accounting for the existence of motivational conflict.  
 The second of these points was anticipated by Baumeister (2014), who correctly notes 
that in any account of motivation, "Mechanisms for resolving conflicts among motivations must 
be explained." (p. 2). However, Baumeister (and the strength model as a whole) fail to address 
the first of these points – in following an orthodox view of cognitive motivation and its 
concomitant assumptions of human choice and agency (Newbery, 2011) they are forced to rely 
on the agential self (or at least the self's "executive function") in order to realise such 
assumptions.  
 The aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to present a case for the modern version of 
Freudian drive theory, developed primarily by Maze (1954, 1983), and since elaborated by Boag 
(2005, 2014), Michell (1988), and Newbery (2005, 2011). It will be argued that drive theory, 
properly understood, is capable of providing a coherent, deterministic, realist view of cognition 
and motivation, including motivational conflict.  
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4.2 The Need for Modern Drive Theory 
 The strength model's view of motivation (i.e., the overall theory of motivation to which 
the model subscribes, rather than the individual motivations that are ascribed to the self), as with 
its explicit views of the self, is not explicitly stated. However, the very fact that researchers fail 
to make their views explicit suggests that the view that the model holds to is a relatively 
orthodox one, consistent with the views expressed by White (1959), and further developed by 
theorists such as Gagné and Deci (2005), and Deci and Ryan (1985, 2000). Such a view holds 
that although basic physiological drives undeniably play a role in some behaviours, the primary 
motivations of individuals are psychological needs. As Deci and Ryan (2000) state: 
 
We, like drive theorists, consider needs to be innate rather than learned and therefore to 
give motivational content to life. However, although we acknowledge physiological 
drives, we give primacy to the core psychological needs in our exploration of issues such 
as human learning, interpersonal relations, and the general mastery and management of 
people’s physical and social environments. (p. 230, emphasis added) 
 
These needs have a different causal influence on individuals than do basic physiological needs – 
rather than providing mechanistic "pushes", behaviour is pulled by anticipated future goals. As 
Deci and Ryan go on to say: 
 
...rather than viewing people as passively waiting for a disequilibrium, we view them as 
naturally inclined to act on their inner and outer environments, engage activities that 
interest them, and move toward personal and interpersonal coherence. Thus, they do not 
have to be pushed or prodded to act. (p. 230) 
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The upshot of this is a rejection of drive theory on the grounds that it fails to accommodate those 
characteristics that are felt to be uniquely human – as Newbery (2011) claims, cognitive 
theorists: 
 
...state that drive theory, being mechanistic, cannot accommodate mental processes – 
notably cognition – and that, a fortiori, drive theory excludes concepts such as reason, 
forethought, intention, and choice...psychological needs (e.g., the need for competence 
and self-determination, the need for relatedness)...provide the energy which enables the 
organism to "choose" to act (see Deci, 1975, p. 100; Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 4). (p. 840, 
original emphasis) 
 
 The strength model, with its similar insistence on volition, choice, and agency, can thus 
be seen to have views entirely consistent with the account of motivation presented by cognitive 
motivation theorists. Compare, for example, Deci and Ryan's (1985) claim that "...organismic 
theories tend to view the organism as active, that is, as being volitional and initiating behaviors." 
(p. 3) with Muraven et al.'s (1998) statement that "Many crucial functions of the self involve 
volition: making choices and decisions, taking responsibility, initiating and inhibiting behaviour, 
and making plans of action and carrying out those plans." (p. 1252). There is good reason, prima 
facie, for supposing that the strength model subscribes to orthodox cognitive motivation theory, 
and rejects drive theory for similar reasons. 
 The one counterpoint to this claim is Baumeister's (2014) proposed "general theory of 
motivation", in which he appears entirely comfortable discussing motivations as "drives", and, 
unlike Deci and Ryan, makes little effort to explicitly separate physiological drives from 
psychological needs. Furthermore, he (correctly, as shall be discussed) makes the claim that 
cognition works in the service of motivation. As he states, "The primacy of motivation entails 
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that cognition, emotion, and social interaction emerged largely to serve motivation." (p. 3). On 
the face of it, then, he appears to be putting forward a theory of basic motivation (as opposed to 
psychological needs) that, if not quite as mechanistic as standard drive theory, is at least 
sympathetic to it. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that a number of the posited 
drives (e.g., the drive for a meaningful life) are in no way related to basic physiological drives, 
and do not differ significantly from self-determination theorists' concept of psychological needs. 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, these proposed "higher" motivations are purposive, 
teleological formulations requiring a striving, agential self in order to be realised. Thus, while 
Baumeister's general theory of motivation is less overtly hostile towards drive theory than is 
standard cognitive motivation theory, it nonetheless implicitly rejects drive theory on the same 
grounds. These objections, Newbery (2011) argues, arise because: 
 
Cognitive theorists maintain that attributing real existence, and thus causal efficacy, to 
mentality "necessitates an active-organisms, teleological perspective" (Deci and Ryan 
1985, p. 19), according to which a person can "choose" to pursue his/her cognised goals. 
The "choosing", however, is done by the "self" – that mysterious, uncharacterised agent, 
which is capable of exerting causal force, but is itself exempt from causal forces. (p. 844) 
 
 The claim that causally efficacious mentality necessitates a choosing, active agent, 
however, is based on a misunderstanding of a properly formulated, coherent account of drive 
theory, such as that developed by Maze (1983). The misunderstanding arises because of 
 
...the claim that certain psychological needs are independent of the primary drives, a 
claim which is based on nothing more than the unexamined observation that they appear 
to be independent, combined with the false assumption that drive theory takes the drives 
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to be incapable of cognition, i.e., to be disconnected from the organism's cognitive and 
perceptual apparatus. (Newbery, 2011, p. 870) 
 
The strength model appears to endorse a view of motivation that makes just such a false 
assumption, and the view which it endorses suffers from critical conceptual flaws (teleology and 
the incoherent notion of an uncaused causal agent). It is necessary, therefore, to provide an 
explanation of Maze's (1983) account of drive theory – a reconceptualisation of drive theory 
which demonstrates that the critiques leveled against it do not hold, and that is capable of 
explaining the causally efficacious mentality which cognitive motivation theorists hold as 
necessitating the agential, active organism (and, therefore, the incoherent uncaused self). As 
Maze himself states in developing his theory, "...a working model is necessarily a deterministic 
model and would show that the apparent purposefulness of behaviour can be explained 
deterministically." (1983, p. 149). 
4.3 Maze's Direct Realism and Drive Theory 
 In detailing Maze's drive theory, it is important to make clear the ontological and 
epistemological positions to which he adheres, which are at odds with those that many would 
consider typical orthodoxy. Maze (1983) adopts a form of direct realism colloquially known as 
Andersonian Realism, after its main proponent, Scottish-Australian philosopher John Anderson. 
This realism has been more recently developed and spelled out in a collection of old and new 
essays (see Mackay & Petocz, 2011) and its basic principles and implications for unifying 
psychology have been briefly summarised (see Petocz & Mackay, 2013). According to Medlow 
(2004): 
 
The basic premise of Anderson’s realism is that reality consists in what exists in space 
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and time, and that such existence is mind-independent. Accordingly, realism asserts that 
the objects of knowledge are real world situations that exist prior to, and independently 
of, being known. Furthermore, realism denies that there are different realms of 
existence...(p. 120) 
 
The crucial point to be taken from this is that such a position explicitly denies the possible 
existence of a separate realm of "mentality" or "mind stuff", such as is implicitly held to be the 
case by representationist theories (e.g., the OCM: Kurzban et al., 2013) or any theory invoking 
the agential self (Maze, 1983; Michell, 1988). Maze (1983) differentiates between causal and 
teleological explanations of behaviour on the grounds that the latter commit to just such an 
assumption of organismic agency, which, he argues, "...is a concept that is simply unintelligible, 
one that cannot offer any useful information” (p.12). Thus, the position to which Maze commits 
is a fully materialist one, consistent with his insistence on a fully deterministic account of 
cognition and behaviour. 
 In keeping with the realist materialism to which he subscribes, Maze's (1983) position on 
cognition involves adopting a relational view of mind. Such a position represents a "middle 
ground" between behaviourism's explicit rejection of cognition, and the implicit dualism of 
representationism or purposivist approaches. As Leahey (2004) states: 
 
...while this theory is epistemological in aim – asserting the knowability of a real external 
physical world – it carries interesting implications for psychology. For in this realist 
view, consciousness is not a special, inner world to be reported on by introspection. 
Rather, consciousness is a relationship between self and world, the relationship of 
knowing. (p. 356) 
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Although a relational theory of mind rejects the dualistic mentality of cognitive motivation 
theorists, it nonetheless attributes "...real existence, and thus causal efficacy, to mentality." 
(Newbery, 2005, p. 126). That is, it does not, in rejecting dualistic mentality, at the same time 
commit to the behaviourist position of rejecting mentality entirely. It is still necessary, however, 
to detail the position that it does take in its explanation of cognition. 
4.3.1 The relational view of mind. 
 The relational view of mind holds that cognition and mental phenomena, rather than 
being internal bodily states, are external relational situations (Medlow, 2004; but see also 
Chemero, 2009, and Hutto & Myin, 2013). As Michell (1988) says, "The direct realist view 
denies that cognition is inner. It cannot be, for the object of cognition is always an event external 
to the subject's nervous system." (p. 234). Thus, the relational view holds that cognition is a type 
of relational situation which requires at least two terms (the knower, or subject, and the known, 
or object), which have an existence and nature that are independent of the relationship itself. As 
Newbery (2005) puts it when referring to the two terms, they "...neither constitute, nor are 
constituted by, that relationship." (p. 126). Similarly, Medlow (2004) claims that "...these terms 
are taken to exist independently of each other, and independently of any relational situations, 
including cognitive relational situations, into which they enter." (p. 139). An important feature of 
the relational view of mind is that both terms of the mental relation – the subject, or knower; and 
the object, or what is known – exist and have a nature that is independent of the mental 
relationship in which they may stand.  
 Having established that the terms of the mental relationship have an existence 
independent of the relationship into which they enter, it is important to note that the relationship 
itself, as well as the event of the terms coming to be in a relationship (whatever it might be), is 
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just as real as the subject and object terms themselves. That is "...the way the subject and object 
are with respect to each other is a real state of affairs..." (Newbery, 2005, p. 127, original 
emphasis). For example, the spatial relationship whereby a coffee mug is next to the kettle is just 
as real as both the mug and kettle are separately. Critically, neither the mug nor the kettle 
constitute or are constituted by the relationship of "being next to" – both can be characterised 
independently of the relationship. Although cognitive relations may be of a different type to 
spatial relations, they are, nonetheless, still of the general class "relations". As Maze (1983) puts 
it: 
 
By cognitive processes I mean believing, perceiving, knowing that, being conscious of, 
remembering, and so on; these can coherently be thought of only as relations into which 
the organism enters, or more specifically as relations between certain specific kinds of 
bodily process (primarily, brain-plus-sense-organ processes) and things external to those 
processes. (p. 83) 
 
...psychological processes are...typified by a kind of relation not to be found in merely 
physical interactions, and that is the relation of knowing about or referring to. (p. 83, 
original emphasis) 
 
Thus, cognition in the relational view of mind is the act of some brain-process coming to be in a 
certain relation (knowing, believing, remembering, etc.) with something external to that process 
(an object, an event, a sensation, etc.). Because these brain processes are independent of the 
relations in which they stand, they must be non-intentional – they do not contain inherent 
meaning or represent anything about the world. Rather, as Maze (1983) says: 
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Any such specific brain state would simply be whatever it physiologically is...whatever it 
may physiologically be, it would in principle be describable in purely physiological terms 
without any reference to the cognitive relationship it underlies. (p.86). 
 
This relation between the brain processes is on the same level of reality as are the subject and 
object terms – that is, they are all part of the spatio-temporal realm – and is an objective fact of 
the world as much as is the existence of the terms of the relation. Thus, the relational view of 
mind extricates itself from any need to posit a separate realm of mentality such as is required by 
representationist theories. Thus, the relational view of mind extricates itself from any need to 
posit a separate realm of mentality such as is required by representationist theories and, as such, 
it closes the supposed ontological divide between the mental and the physical 
 Dismissal of the notion that cognition is an activity internal to the organism is an 
understandably difficult position to accept – cognition is experienced as private, and it thus 
seems reasonable to view it as an internal activity to which an individual alone has privileged 
access. Cognition, however, is an activity which an organism does – engaging in the act of 
cognising. It is an action, rather than a thing possessed by the organism (i.e., having cognition), 
in much the same way as are activities like running, eating, or sleeping – none of which can be 
said to be internal to the organism, or to be things that the organism has, or that make up the 
organism. To return to the example of the coffee mug and the kettle, being next to the kettle is 
something that the coffee mug does, but it does not in any way constitute what the coffee mug is. 
As Medlow (2004) says: 
 
...a cognising organism, such as a human being, is composed of various properties, some 
of which include mass, extension, chemical composition and so forth. In addition to these 
properties that dictate what humans are, there are things that humans do, run, sleep, eat 
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and joke, to name but a few. One of the things that humans can do is think. Thinking, 
therefore, is an activity that an organism engages in, it is not a state of its body. (p. 145) 
 
Furthermore, being relational, cognition must be external to the cognising organism. Given 
Maze's (1983) premise that: 
 
...each term of the relation must be able in principle to be described without the need to 
include any reference to its relation to the other. Further, a thing's relations are not to be 
found in it; they cannot be found just by examining its own nature. Nothing can have its 
relations intrinsic or internal to itself. (p. 24) 
 
...it follows that no amount of examination of a person's brain state or brain processes could give 
any information whatsoever about the relations in which they might, on occasion, stand; or 
indeed about the objects of those relations. Thus, cognitions (i.e., the relations in which brain 
processes enter into) must be found external to those brain processes. A comment must be made, 
however, regarding the externality of the object term in cognitive relations. Maze (1983) views 
such objects as being external to the central nervous system, but not necessarily to the organism's 
body. As he notes: 
 
To say that behaviour is produced by environmental stimulation does not exclude 
stimulation arising from within the subject's own body; such proprioceptive stimulation 
will always have originated in bodily events other than or external to the central 
processes giving rise to the behaviour one is seeking to explain, and thus can be called 
parts of its environment. (p. 76) 
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 Drive theory, and its direct realist relational view of mind, can be seen to differ 
significantly from more traditional cognitive theories that accept cognition as something internal 
to the cognising organism, and implicitly accept a separate realm of "mind stuff". Rather than 
accepting that relevant brain states "...are something more than bodily states, something, more 
specifically, that provides reference to or represents the relata which supply the second term of 
the relation..." (Medlow, 2004, p. 142), the relational view of mind accepts that brain states are 
simply one component of the full cognitive relation. That is, "...it is...impossible to discover by 
examination of [the] brain state what it is in relationship with, or, as it is usually termed, what the 
content of the cognitive relational situation is." (Medlow, 2004, p. 142). In taking this position,  
it avoids the problem suffered by representationist views of mind (including the view held by 
Kurzban et al.'s (2013) OCM) which are forced to implicitly accept the existence of a 
homunculus (Maze, 1983; Michell, 1988). Nonetheless, some account must be given of the 
"knower" term of the relationship if the Direct Realist view of cognition is to hold. Thus far the 
knower has been discussed in terms of brain processes; Maze (1983), however, understands the 
knower to be the drive structures of the individual. He writes:  
 
If mental processes are relations into which brain processes enter, as central state 
materialism proposes, then on the instinctual drive theory it is specifically the drive 
structures which, through their connections with the perceptual system, enter into those 
cognitive relations. (p.162) 
 
In order to understand this position, it is necessary to detail Maze's drive theory and explain how 
the drive structures could be accepted as the "knowers" in the cognitive relation. 
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4.3.2 Drive theory. 
 Maze's (1983) deterministic account of behaviour (both bodily and mental) has, at its 
roots, Freud's instinct theory – Maze regards Freud's metapsychology as "...the one great 
systematic attempt in modern psychology to outline a deterministic, physiologically based theory 
of motivation and extend it to embrace all of human behaviour, bodily and mental." (pp. 142-
143). The goal of Maze's drive theory is to provide an account of the apparent goal-directedness 
of organismic behaviour in a deterministic fashion, without resorting to the types of teleological 
explanations favoured by cognitive motivation theorists, and implicitly endorsed by the strength 
model – in Maze's own words, to provide a "...cognitive-determinist, instinctual drive-based 
psychology..." (1983, p. 164). At the heart of the theory lies Maze's postulation that all thought 
and behaviour is controlled by an as-yet-unknown number of feedback-controlled primary drives 
that act as "biological engines" which drive behaviour. According to Maze (1983): 
 
The conception of primary drives or 'biological engines'...is not to be confused with the 
notion of  disembodied forces or energies, nor is it merely an 'intervening variable'...It is 
as literally the concept of an engine as the concept of a car engine is. (p. 136) 
 
 As for a car engine, Maze does not view the instinctual drives as being a source of 
energy, nor as engaging in any type of causal relations other than those constrained by realism 
and determinism (i.e., they do not involve, require, or bring into being an agential self). Rather, 
they are psychobiological structures which, on the basis of various inputs, are activated and 
caused to respond in ways that typically (though not always) involve bodily movement. Maze's 
explanation of this is that: 
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To call something an engine does not imply that it has some superior sort of causality, or 
that it is a source of driving energy. An engine is simply an entity that converts one kind 
of energy into another and applies it to a particular use...instinctual drives...are 
mechanisms that are caused to work by sensory and biochemical input, and, through their 
innate structure, give rise to specific bodily behaviours... (p. 153) 
 
 For each drive, Maze (1983) claims that there must be "...an excitation centre and a 
satiation centre." (p. 153). The excitation centre for each drive is activated by a combination of 
endogenous and exogenous stimuli – as Maze puts it, "The excitation centre becomes 'on' as a 
consequence of deprivation or noxious stimulation or some sensory process..." (p. 153). The 
activation of the excitation centre will cause some form of behaviour which "...in an evolution-
shaped organism can  be expected eventually to give rise to a sequence of events that will turn 
the satiation centre to 'on', and this will somehow disconnect the excitation centre from the motor 
channel." (p. 153). Thus, in Maze's view, the basic drives are motivational brain structures with 
connections to the perceptual and cognitive apparatus of the individual, activated by certain 
conditions, which results in some consummatory behaviour which will (ideally) produce 
satiation of the drive. For example, Medlow (2004) suggests that: 
 
...certain chemical and somatosensory events can lead to the activation of the biological 
engine that is a component of what is known as the hunger drive, causing an infant to 
make sucking and swallowing movements. If these movements result in the intake of 
sufficient quantities of food, then the initial conditions that activated the engine will no 
longer persist, the activity of the engine will cease, and the sucking and swallowing 
movements will stop too. (p. 134) 
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 Initially, the motor output of the drives will be extremely basic, genetically provided 
consummatory actions – those that are provided at birth and will be sufficient for basic 
gratification of the drive, assuming environmental conditions allow. Thus, according to Maze 
(1983), the concept of a drive: 
 
...must include not only that of an internal mechanism which when activated impels the 
organism to action, but also that of the innately provided specific actions which it impels, 
and whose performance is a necessary condition of the termination of the drive state. (p. 
142, original emphasis) 
 
The most basic consummatory actions, available from birth, serve to gain drive satisfaction only 
in the most rudimentary way – the sucking and swallowing movements of the infant will not be 
sufficient to procure food (and thereby satiate the hunger drive) in the absence of a caregiver to 
directly provide that food. Thus, as Maze suggests, there must be a gradual elaboration of the 
drive's motor outputs as the organism matures. As he states: 
 
One very early elaboration of the eating program is for the baby to turn its head so as to 
bring its mouth to the nipple. Later comes the grasping of objects and transporting them 
to the mouth, and then progressively the various forms of bodily locomotion – shuffling, 
crawling, or walking to the food, before grasping it and putting it into the mouth. (p. 69) 
 
Such an example serves to illustrate the very basic elaboration of certain motor skills in the 
service of the hunger drive. An extended "everyday example" of the eventual results of such 
elaborations is given by Maze, again relating to the hunger drive: 
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I am sitting in my room at the university and gradually become hungry. I know that the 
nearest source of accessible foodstuffs is the cafeteria in the Students Union building. I 
know the geographical relatedness of my room and the cafeteria – the passage outside my 
door, the stairs, the exit from this building, the path beneath the plane tree, the door of the 
Union. Because of that information, because of my state of drive, because there are no 
other programs running off in me at the moment that prevail over the eating program, the 
sight of the door of my room causes me to get up and walk through it, the familiar 
passage outside is responded to as path-to-stairs-and-food rather than, say, path-to-
lecture-room, and so on, until I come to the food. Each succeeding part of that path is 
seen by me in its relation to food (though this is not to deny that I also had the conception 
of the whole path before I started), and so keeps my extended eating program running. 
(pp. 69-70) 
 
At no point does Maze allow that such elaborations of behavioural outputs are purposive or goal-
driven. Instead, he insists that such developments are deterministically caused by the interaction 
between the innate structures of the organism, the environment, and the urging of the drives.  
 Newbery (2011) suggests, however, that it is not merely the basic motor outputs that are 
innate to the organism, but also the various forms of attachment behaviour, "...themselves 
heavily dependent on primitive aspects of the motor system (e.g., the so-called "mirror-neuronal 
system", with its subtle mechanisms subserving "affect atunement" between infant and mother)." 
(p. 868). These, he claims, would have developed as a result of the general importance of the 
mother in an infant's survival, providing as she does many forms of gratification and protection. 
It is to be expected that such behavioural patterns and abilities (i.e., infant attachment and affect 
attunement) would come to be present in infants due to their ability to promote survival. 
However, as Newbery notes, "...these evolved action patterns would be innate, but 
phylogenetically secondary." (p. 868). This preserves, to some degree, the notion of 
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"psychological need" posited by the cognitive motivational theorists, as it explains why certain 
behaviours that appear to have their basis in psychological (rather than physiological) deficits 
occur (e.g., attachment occurring as a response to a psychological need for affection). However, 
as Newbery notes, such behaviours ultimately occur in the service of the primary drives, and 
cannot be separated from such – the behaviours have, at their root, the basic physiological drives, 
and no further class of "need" is required to explain them. 
 Elaboration of the output aspect of the drives alone, however, is not sufficient to explain 
the complexity of apparently purposive behaviour. Maze claims that it is also the input aspect of 
the drive which is elaborated by cognition. According to Maze, the various drives, via their 
connections to the organism's perceptual and cognitive apparatus, continually gather information 
relevant to their satiation, and are thereby elaborated. As he says, "Each instinctual drive 
accumulates information and misinformation about the location and means of acquisition of the 
objects necessary for its specific actions to be performed." (p. 162). It is not merely information 
about where and how to acquire satiating objects that will become assimilated by the drive 
structures, however, but also information about what objects will provide satiation (i.e., 
information relevant to the drive's satiation). The hunger drive, for example: 
 
...becomes elaborated as the young organism discovers various facts about food – most 
importantly, where it is and what needs to be done to get it. As this happens, those other 
types of object which are discovered to be regularly and understandably related to food 
come to act, in a sense, as surrogates for food when the baby is hungry and actual food is 
not present...they cause the eating program to begin running off, whereas in the first place 
it was only food itself that would do so...it would be better to say that the associated 
objects stand as signs of where food is, or perhaps that the stimulus 'food' has become a 
148 
 
complex that includes the associated objects, since the young organism knows them 
propositionally as related to food. (1983, p. 69) 
 
The organism's discovery of various facts relevant to drive satiation, and the sort of behaviour 
that accompanies such discovery, can possibly stand in for Baumeister's (2014) suggestion that 
individuals possess a drive for curiosity. As argued, curiosity is a tool in the service of the drives. 
An infant, crawling about the room and putting various objects into its mouth, might be thought 
to be acting under the guidance of a curiosity drive, but it would be more accurate to say that the 
eating program or hunger drive was running off in the infant, causing it to attempt to acquire 
gratification. This “running off” includes collecting information relevant to satisfying the hunger 
drive even when the organism (infant) is in a state of hunger satiation. Such behaviour results in 
the acquisition of information relevant to the drive's gratification (i.e., increased motor 
locomotion skills, knowledge about the taste and texture of various objects and whether they 
provided gratification, etc.), but would not be purposive. 
 As can be seen from Maze's examples, while behaviour is always a response to 
environmental stimuli (keeping in mind that environmental stimuli can be endogenous to the 
organism), he maintains that cognition plays a vital role in both what stimuli are responded to, 
and how that response is expressed. Furthermore, he does not at any point allow his account to 
fall back into the language of purposivism. This is illustrated when he says: 
 
...what I can most informatively be said to be doing, even as I take the first steps towards 
the food, is engaging in eating. That is to make the point that it is still the same eating 
program which in its germinal form I acquired genetically that is running off in me, and it 
shows also that the language of purposivism, which would say that I am walking in order 
to get the food, is not inescapable. It is possible to express in a deterministic way the 
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relationship between the instrumental activity and the consummatory activity that 
motivates it by saying that the former has become incorporated as a part of the latter in 
an extended and elaborated version of the same basic program… Thus, the eating 
programme for most adults in industrial communities must include exchanging money for 
the food, so that the occupations one takes up for the receipt of money also count as part 
of the eating program, although of course they will serve as part of other programs as 
well (1983, p.70) 
 
This elaboration, including as it does the types of behaviours that typically seem far removed 
from the basic consummatory actions required by the drives (the occupation that one has is not 
typically considered merely an extension of the hunger drive, for example), demonstrates Maze's 
belief that all behaviour, no matter how apparently goal-directed or purposive, can be explained 
by appeal to the basic drives. As he says: 
 
...everything one does throughout one's life, however obviously acquired, sophisticated or 
culture-bound it is, is some modified form or instrumental elaboration of one of the 
innate consummatory actions. To put it more radically still, nothing is ever done but a 
consummatory action in some guise. This basic nature of learned behaviours is often 
heavily disguised by many layers of increasingly refined rationalisations...but the more 
one subjects such rationalisations to dispassionate logical scrutiny, the more the shape of 
the basic consummatory action underlying the surface behaviour reveals itself. (p. 152, 
original emphasis) 
  
 While such a claim seems shocking, Maze stands by his assertion that only through the 
action of basic drives (however elaborated and refined their expression becomes) can behaviour 
be explained in a realist, deterministic manner. However, he is equally steadfast that such drives 
are physiological in nature, rather than, as hypothesised by Deci and Ryan (1985, 2000) and 
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Baumeister (2014), psychological (e.g., the drive for a meaningful life). Speaking to the notion 
of psychological needs, Maze (1983) notes that the problem with any such drive is that "...the 
drive in question is not actually being specified through the identification of its somatic source." 
(p. 159, original emphasis), which for him is to be the final criterion by which a drive is 
identified. He elaborates: 
 
The fully developed concept of somatic source includes not only the anatomical location 
of 'off' and 'on' centres for the behaviour, but also the specific physiological character of 
the excitation process and of the satiation process...it is at present impossible to identify 
these physiological events for the 'psychological' drives whose excitation and satiation 
events are cognitive happenings. (p. 159) 
 
This inability to specify the physiological events underlying psychological drives, Maze 
contends, makes such drives incompatible with a deterministic account of behaviour. In 
discussing the categories of behaviour often touted as uniquely human, and therefore evidence 
for the existence of more than the simple basic drives (e.g., ethical behaviour, aesthetic pursuits, 
etc.), Maze has the following to say: 
 
One way in which a deterministic psychology will not attempt to incorporate aesthetic 
and ethical behaviour is by postulating an 'aesthetic drive' and an 'ethical drive'. Such 
constructs face all the disabilities of drives specified solely by their aims...To try to 
convert their satiating events into the neurological processes underlying the beliefs 'I 
have done something aesthetically good' and 'I have done something ethically good' is 
only a verbal pretence of converting them into drives specified by somatic source...On 
such a basis one could postulate a drive to do every kind of action that an organism could 
think of itself as doing, but such a theory of 'motivation' would be vacuous beyond 
reclaim. (p. 164) 
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As noted, organisms are possessed of not merely the basic physiological drives, but also the 
innate behaviours and dispositions which serve to allow for gratification of those drives. Given 
that this includes attachment behaviour (Newbery, 2011) as well as motor skills, and given that 
such behaviours are elaborated through maturation and learning, the behaviours taken as 
evidence for psychological needs can be argued to be merely elaborated and refined versions of 
consummatory actions of the basic drives, rather than a response to a separate class of need. 
Thus, drives such as those posited by Baumeister (2014b) (e.g., a drive for curiosity, a drive to 
achieve a meaningful life, etc.) can be explained under the umbrella of drive theory as 
elaborations of more basic drives. This does not mean that they become separate drives in their 
own right, but that they are behavioural elaborations of the innate biological drives. 
 In dismissing the notion of psychological drives, however, the question is raised as to 
how many and what physiologically based drives there are, and how to identify them. Maze 
(1983) offers a provisional list, including those drives for which there is "...a reasonably well 
attested physiological basis including some knowledge of the innately determined consummatory 
behaviours necessary for their satiation..." (p. 165). These include, unsurprisingly, sexuality, 
hunger (or several specific hungers), thirst, respiration, pain avoidance (specified by reference to 
activation of pain nerves), and a temperature control drive. Newbery (2011), however, notes that 
the criterion provided by Maze (1983), that such drives be identified by their distinctive somatic 
sources, is problematic. Claiming that it is likely that a number of the primary drives will share 
certain mechanisms and processes at birth, and that some of that sharing will be maintained 
throughout life, Newbery suggests that: 
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...although there remains the logical possibility that each of the primary drives may still 
be identifiable via distinctive mechanisms which endure throughout life, it is not at all 
clear that, with respect to explaining observable behaviour, exclusive focus on those 
distinctive mechanisms would do the job. (2011, p. 866) 
 
Newbery claims, however, that an alternative method for identifying plausible basic drives is 
suggested by Freud. As he says: 
 
...the set of phylogenetically primary drives can reliably be identified in terms of those 
behaviours which are necessary either for the survival of the individual, or for the 
survival of the species to which the individual belongs...only those individuals who 
behave so as to gratify basic needs would pass on their genes to subsequent generations. 
(p. 867) 
 
According to this criterion then, the final list of basic drives, while by no means guaranteed, is 
likely to be very similar to the provisional list offered by Maze (1983).  
 However, there are undoubtedly behaviours which, at first glance, do not appear to be 
closely related to any of the basic primary drives (e.g., skydiving, which seems to serve no basic 
need). However, as Newbery (2011) notes, "...certain behaviours (such as various forms of 
"excitement-seeking" activity) may come to serve as disguised forms of drive-
satisfaction...owing to obstacles brought about by social prohibition and perhaps subsequent 
repression." (p. 861). Thus, drives whose primary path to satisfaction is blocked for some reason 
(as Newbery notes, a prime candidate for this is the sexual drive with its associated social mores 
and prohibitions) may seek partial gratification via another route. 
 Having provided a provisional list of basic drives, however, any drive-based account of 
behaviour must be able to explain why, having achieved satiation, organisms nonetheless 
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continue to engage in activity. If, after all, behaviour is driven by the activity of the drives, and 
the satiation centres for those drives are switched 'on', then it could be argued that the organism 
should cease to engage in any sort of activity until the excitation centres are again activated (see, 
e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000). Newbery, however, argues that a drive being satiated does not entail 
that the drive becomes inoperative, and that such a misconception rests on the "...mistaken 
assumption that the drives are purely physiological, and have nothing to do with non-
physiological cognitive processes." (2011, p. 857). That is, because the drives are constantly 
connected to the cognitive/perceptual apparatus of the organism, and being capable of cognising, 
can anticipate and remember, information relevant to the drives' future gratification will still 
cause behavioural responses. This is illustrated by Newbery when he gives an example of a man: 
 
...who has just consumed a satisfying three-course meal, and so is no longer hungry. If he 
were now to be informed of an imminent food shortage due, perhaps, to some industrial 
dispute, he would not suddenly become hungry, but he may well hurry anxiously to the 
supermarket to acquire a stockpile of supplies. Granting this, the satisfied drive must be 
operational, for the cognitions per se, being policy-neutral, would not be sufficient to 
produce the behaviour... (2011, p. 858) 
 
4.3.3 The drives as cognisers. 
 Claims that the drives, through their connections to the organism's cognitive and 
perceptual apparatus, are capable of anticipating and remembering and can thereby be caused to 
drive behaviour even when satiated, rely on the drives being capable of engaging in cognising. 
Such a claim can be justified by returning to the notion of cognition as a relation. Having 
provided an account of the basic drives as innately provided physiological brain mechanisms 
(with their concomitant motor programs and connections to perceptual and cognitive apparatus), 
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it is possible to substitute the drives into the "knower" term of the relation. That is, the "knower" 
in any cognitive relationship (knowing that, believing, remembering, etc.) will be one of the 
organism's drives, standing in relation to what-is-known. As Boag (2005) says: 
 
 "...the smallest units comprising the 'knowers' in the cognitive relation are the 
psychobiological drive structures. Each drive is a bearer of full propositional attitude 
(desires, beliefs, fears) relevant to their somatic source component and subsequent 
policy." (p. 762) 
 
While this sounds very much like the postulating of multiple internal homunculi, it is not actually 
the case. Rather, it is the person-as-motivated-by-specific-drives that does the cognizing; 
identifying the drives as knowers simply fine-tunes the subject term of the cognitive relation 
(after all, the person does not need arms or legs or hair or various other features in order to be 
able to cognize). 
 Problems with Maze's (1983) explanation of how cognition causes behaviour, however, 
have been noted by Michell (1988) and Medlow (2004). Maze is consistent in his assertion that 
cognition is a relation, stating that "In allowing for the causal role of cognitive processes in a 
deterministic account of behaviour, they are to be conceived of as state variables (but in the form 
of relational properties...) of the organism..." (pp. 75-76). However, he also makes the claim 
that, concerning mental causation, "...it is non-intentional brain processes which are at work" (p. 
5). According to Medlow (2004), this "...gives rise to the puzzle that when cognitive relational 
situations cause behaviour, they do so not as cognitive relational situations in their entirety, but 
by means of just one of their terms, the brain states." (p. 151). This confusion, Medlow suggests, 
arises because Maze's theory: 
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...appears to be aimed at allowing an efficient causation account of behaviour production 
that recognises at once the relational character of cognition and the need for intrinsic 
physical, rather than mental, properties, as the efficacious causal element. (p. 152) 
 
Thus, despite Maze's insistence that cognition is a relationship between a "knower" (one of the 
basic drives) and what-is-known, he appears to assume that it is an "...object’s possession of 
intrinsic states, properties and processes, and not its standing in relations to other things, that 
makes it causally efficacious." (Medlow, 2004, p. 156). This, Medlow argues, renders cognitions 
"epiphenomenal". 
 Michell (1988), who recognises this inconsistency in Maze's thesis, argues that the 
relational view of cognition can be used to explain mental causation if the knower's coming to 
stand in relation to the known is viewed, correctly, as an event or situation. According to 
Michell: 
 
The entities which enter into causal relations are, strictly speaking, neither properties nor 
relations. Properly speaking they are events or situations. Maze admits as much when he 
defines determinism as the thesis that "every event has a cause and is a cause of further 
events" (1983, p. 8). A's coming to cognize that p is just as much an event as any other, 
even though it is the event of two entities coming to stand in a particular relation. Hence, 
granting determinism, it is both caused and a cause of further events. There is no logical 
difficulty at all in taking cognitive events to be causes of behavioural events. In fact, it is 
the opposite view that encounters a logically unacceptable dualism of events. (1988, p. 
241) 
 
Medlow (2011) developed this view further, stating that if: 
156 
 
 
…it becomes evident that it is in no sense possible to distinguish situations whereby 
‘objects possess properties’ from situations whereby ‘objects stand in relations’ in terms 
of localness, because both are spatially and temporally extended units. Accordingly, if, as 
was argued in Medlow (2008), it is the case that the referents of causation are events, then 
it must be recognised that even when properties are causally efficacious, they are not so 
as isolated properties per se, but as components of complex situations that are involved in 
the event of impinging upon a causal field. This being the case, rather than deny 
relational situations eligibility as causes because of their spatio-temporal extensions, one 
must recognise that all causes are extended in this manner, because all events involve 
spatio-temporally extended situations. 
 ...One implication might be that, in granting the need for spatio-temporal 
contiguity between causes and effects, one must recognise simultaneously that only parts 
of these situations ever actually contact. Perhaps this is not so difficult to come to terms 
with when we consider everyday examples of causation, such as when a thrown brick 
smashes a window. Here, just one surface of the brick actually comes into contact with 
one part of the window, but one would not want to conclude from this that only the 
properties located on that surface of the brick were responsible for the breaking of the 
window. Rather, an entire complex situation involving the brick’s having a certain mass, 
inflexibility, rate of movement and, indeed, relations to the window (such as impacting 
upon it) is the cause, and, of course, it would be false to claim that this situation is located 
on the surface of the brick that contacts the window (pp. 814-815) 
 
When recast in this light, the relational view of mind and cognition appears to be a plausible 
account of mental causality, and there is no reason, as Newbery says, to "...assume that a 
deterministic theory of the role of cognition in behaviour must ultimately attribute causal 
efficacy to brain states rather than to cognitive relational situations in their entirety" (2011, pp. 
854-855).  
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 Drive theory, then, suggests that each individual is comprised of a number of basic 
psychobiological drives, each of which maintains constant connections to the individual's 
cognitive and perceptual apparatus. Environmental input (which can include endogenous 
stimuli), in combination with the individual's cognitions, cause the drives to produce behaviour 
that will, ideally, result in some consummatory output which temporarily satiates the drive 
(although this does not render the drive fully quiescent). Although each drive seeks only its own 
fulfillment (e.g., the hunger drive will not be activated by a lack of water or sex), the activities in 
which the drives will engage will become increasingly refined over the course of an individual's 
life, accounting for the diverse range of human activities. Furthermore, there is no reason, a 
priori, that a single more refined activity cannot serve several drives at once (e.g., working a 
prestigious job affords more opportunities to easily satiate the hunger drive, as well as likely 
making one a more attractive potential mate). Newbery (2011) notes, however, that such 
refinements will not result from every basic drive – the development of such will depend on 
environmental contingencies. The respiration drive, for example, can be readily satisfied without 
the need to develop complex motor skills such as walking, grasping, etc., as air is typically 
readily available. In contrast, the hunger drive would prompt a more elaborate development of 
capacities due to the variability of food supply and availability.  
 Such an account of the mind, whereby each individual possesses multiple "knowers", 
according to Boag (2005), is a "strongly partitive" one  – that is, an account which proposes that 
individuals are inhabited by a multiplicity of knowing subjects, rather than the single unified 
"self" so commonly taken for granted. Given the relational view of mind, in which cognition is 
the relationship between a knower and what is known; and given drive theory's claim that the 
"knower" in any cognitive relation will be one of the drives, such an assertion is not without 
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merit. This position, however, seems to be undermined by the phenomenological sense of a 
single unified self. If individuals are truly inhabited by a multiplicity of knowers, none of which 
know the other drives directly (as they are underlying brain structures they cannot know 
themselves or the other drives), then prima facie it would seem as if phenomenological 
experience should be a disjointed, disconnected series of experiences/cognitions. Given that, 
pathological cases of multiple personality disorder notwithstanding, this appears not to be the 
case, a partitive account of mind such as Maze's drive theory must be able to reconcile the 
multiplicity of knowers with the unity of experience.  
 This reconciliation can be achieved, Boag (2014) suggests, by recognising that although 
the drives have no direct awareness of themselves or one another, "...the expressions of the 
drives are knowable, and such expressions are realized through the body and its various activities 
(including cognition)." (p. 7). The body is a single entity, and awareness of the body: 
 
...is the same as awareness of objects in the world generally. The body in this sense is 
something known (including fantasized about), and so a sense of unity rather than 
division is what is apparent. (p. 7) 
 
This sense of unity is a result of the drives only knowing the expressions of one another, through 
the same set of perceptual apparatus to which they are all connected. As Boag (2005) says: 
 
...if a plurality is constrained within a singular perceptual apparatus and body, then it 
might only be natural to perceive mental unity whilst remaining unaware of the 
multiplicity. Such an account is not implausible, since from infancy onwards the 
developing sense of ‘self’ is conveyed through proprioception of a single body (Mahler & 
McDevitt, 1982; cf. Freud, 1923/1961, p. 26). Consequently, when the organism engages 
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in ‘self-reflection’ or (self-)consciousness, the ‘whole’ organism (and its relations) is 
taken as the object of cognition. The resulting belief of a unified self is as prima facie 
plausible as the belief that the sun revolves around the earth. (p. 753) 
  
The experience of unity, then, is an illusion – as it must be, given that Maze's drive theory is a 
strongly partitive account of mind. As an illusion, however, it is a convincing one, and leads to 
the sense of a single unified "self" which oversees and controls. 
4.3.4 Drive conflict. 
 Despite the illusion that an individual possesses a unified self, individuals' possession of 
a multiplicity of drives results in (and explains) the fact of motivational conflict. Indeed, the 
existence of mental conflict implies a partitive account of mind such as that suggested by Maze's 
drive theory, as "...mental partitioning appears to be necessary for explaining mental conflict." 
(Boag, 2005, p. 748). Given that drive theory subscribes to a relational view of mind: 
  
...a desire must entail an object of desire, the psychological relation of desiring, and a 
desiring subject. In the case of conflicting desires, then the unity of the agent is 
compromised since the existence of competing desires would appear to entail competing 
desirers. (Boag, 2005, pp. 749-750) 
 
The competing desirers Boag refers to, of course, are the basic physiological drives suggested by 
Maze (1983). Because the drives are satisfied only by particular consummatory behaviour (e.g., 
the hunger drive's satiation centre will not be switched on by sexual activity), it is inevitable that 
there will be conflicts whenever (at least) two of the drives' excitation centres are activated and 
no single consummatory activity will satiate both, or when gratification of one drive will lead to 
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frustration of another. In fact, it is only when the gratification of one drive interferes with the 
gratification of another that conflict can occur. As Maze (1987) says in relation to the drives: 
 
...unlike the whole person each has, in effect, only one motive, never restrains itself from 
seeking satisfaction, knows only a portion of the aggregate body of information, and 
suffers no internal conflict. An instinctual drive can no more restrain itself from working 
than any motor can, once the switches are thrown. If its operation is to be arrested, then 
that must be through some influence external to itself – in the case of repression, from 
other instinctual drives. (p. 197, emphasis added) 
 
 In the event of drives coming into conflict, a number of factors are likely to influence 
which drive will engage in behaviour, including the relative strength of the drives' excitation, the 
environmental conditions, and the cognitions and beliefs relating to possible gratification. For 
example, an individual in whom both the thirst and hunger drives had been equally activated 
(through nutrient and water deprivation, say), who was then presented with a glass of water (an 
environmental stimulus), would recognise the glass of water, and in combination with the belief 
that drinking the water would lead to satiation of the thirst drive, would likely be caused to 
engage in the motor outputs required to drink the water, thus gratifying the thirst drive over the 
hunger drive. Of course, having now satisfied the thirst drive, the organism would likely engage 
in behaviour to then gratify the hunger drive, which might include moving to a different location 
and thereby changing the environmental conditions (e.g., to those which include nearby food), as 
in Maze's example of leaving his university room to go to the cafeteria.  
 In a simple case such as this, the degree to which conflict would be experienced would be 
minimal – while both the hunger and thirst drives are active, the lack of immediate 
environmental options for the satiation of the hunger drive (and the hunger drive's cognition of 
161 
 
such) mean that engaging in water-drinking behaviour does not at the same time engender 
frustration of the hunger drive. If, however, the scenario is modified so that the individual in 
whom both drives have been equally activated is presented with both a plate of food and a glass 
of water, the degree to which conflict will be experienced is likely to be higher. That is, because 
the engagement in one of the behavioural options (at least temporarily) negates the possibility of 
engaging in the other, one of the drives will necessarily experience frustration of immediate 
gratification, leading to the experience of conflict. Given equal activation of the drives, and equal 
environmental availability of gratifying options, the cognitions of the individual will be the 
deciding causal factor in the behaviour ultimately engaged in (e.g., believing that water is more 
essential for continued wellbeing than is food might lead to the engagement of drinking 
behaviour over eating). However, the reality principle, "...whereby an instinctual drive registers 
facts which are pertinent to its gratification..." (Newbery, 2011, p. 848) may also result in a 
behavioural compromise. If, for example, the presented food is recognised as one high in water 
content (e.g., watermelon), then the eating of it might serve to gratify both the hunger and thirst 
drives simultaneously, maximising drive satiation.  
 This is not to imply, however, that the drives act as homunculi, capable of rationally 
arriving at a compromise after reasoned evaluation (e.g., as suggested by the OCM's calculation 
of costs and benefits of various behaviours); only that cognition of relevant facts will influence 
the degree to which the drives will anticipate satiation/frustration, which is itself a causal factor 
influencing the behavioural outcome. As Boag (2005) puts it: 
 
Once activated, these drives are thoroughly ‘self’-serving in relation to their biologically 
wired interests and learnt sources of gratification and frustration. In this respect, their 
activity is explicable via psycho-mechanical principles, fully determined by their relevant 
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causal conditions. The behaviour of the ‘person’ results from both facilitating and 
inhibiting influences emerging from the interaction of these drives. (p. 762) 
  
This 'self'-serving nature of the drives, then, is what leads to the experience of motivational 
conflict. Because each individual is comprised of a multiplicity of drives, each of which seeks 
only its own gratification, conflict arises when the satisfaction of one drive leads to the 
frustration of another.  
 The possibility that satisfaction of one drive can frustrate another forms the basis by 
which children are socialised, according to Maze (1983), whereby one drive is set against 
another with the goal of suppressing a certain behaviour (often behaviours associated with the 
sexual drive, for example). This forms the basis for much drive-based motivational conflict 
throughout the life. As Maze says: 
 
A reward can only be the gratification of an instinctual drive, and a punishment can only 
be the frustration of one. So, then, [in socialisation] what is being put to the child is that if 
it gives expression to some particular one of its instinctual impulses, another will be 
frustrated...one subset of the instinctual drives becomes organised in competition with the 
remainder, and treats the blocking off of the remainder as an essential part of securing its 
own gratification. These acquisitions are of the same instrumental order as those gradual 
elaborations of the consummatory behaviour patterns that are brought about by everyday 
trial and error. (p. 171) 
 
In socialisation, this blocking off will occur as a result of one (or more) drive's expression 
resulting in either the direct frustration of another drive (or drives), or anticipated frustration as a 
result of the withdrawal of a caregiver or authority figure's affection or positive regard. Maze 
gives the following examples: 
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To take an implausible, though possible, case, a child could conceivably be told that if it 
went on with some pregenital sexual behaviour then it would not be given any more food. 
Hunger is being set against sexuality. If the threat is the more common one of the 
infliction of pain, then pain-avoidance is being set against sexuality. Withdrawal of 
affection is the derived or intermediary sanction...all those instinctual drives whose 
gratification is dependent on the parents' good will and which is employed as a reward by 
them are mobilised in opposition to the forbidden instinctual impulses. (p. 171) 
 
 The setting of drives against one another causes a "splitting off" of the drives – those that 
are allowed relatively free gratification, and those which are repressed by the first group 
(although they typically still find expression in some manner). This view of the developed 
structure of opposing groups of drives is very similar, according to Maze (1983), to Freud's 
conception of the id and the ego. As he says, "The actual principle of division, between the 
instinctual drives that are to constitute the ego and those which are to be repressed and constitute 
the id, would be that the former were those whose expression was not subject to moral 
disapproval..." (p. 172). Furthermore, he specifies that the ego drives do not oppose the id on the 
basis of reason or rationality, but function according to the reality principle "...only in so far as 
that is effective in securing its [the ego's] own gratification. Its policies are not dictated by 
Reason but by its own consummatory programs." (p. 172). Thus, on the basis of caregivers or 
authority figures withholding gratification or administering punishment, the group of ego drives 
acquire beliefs about what they must do in order to avoid frustration (including the repression of 
the id drives). These beliefs, "...together with the unconscious fear of punishment, constitute 
Freud's 'superego'." (p. 172), and form the basis for future moral conflict in the individual.  
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 Although the splitting of ego and id was couched by Maze (1983) in terms of the splitting 
of drives, strictly speaking, when the initial set of drives “divides” into ego (socially acceptable) 
and id (socially unacceptable), it’s not the drives tout court, but, rather, drive 
impulses/actions/behaviours. Some activities of the sexual drive (sexual instincts) are socially 
acceptable and so become part of the ego (e.g., cuddling, kissing), others are socially 
unacceptable (e.g., incestuous feelings, masturbating in public) and so become part of the id. All 
(or nearly all) activities/impulses of the hunger drive are socially acceptable (with the exception, 
perhaps, of behaviours such as gluttonous overeating, or similar), so it is reasonable to take that 
as almost completely part of the ego and not the id, and so on. 
 All conflict, according to drive theory, can be thus explained by appeal to the 
gratification and frustration of the various innate biological drives which make up every 
individual. The drives seek to maximise their gratification and minimise frustration, which often 
leads to conflict when the consummatory behaviours of one drive will cause frustration for 
another (e.g., through social sanctions, punishment, etc.). Moral conflicts can be explained as a 
result of socialisation and the drives' previous experience of punishments and rewards, and the 
internalised acquired beliefs relating to that. The partitive nature of drive theory thus provides a 
coherent and deterministic account of motivational conflict. 
4.4 Summary of Maze's Drive Theory 
 At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that a coherent theory of motivation must 
be able to adequately explain the existence of mental conflict, and also be capable of explaining 
the causal efficacy of cognitions without resorting to reliance on an uncaused causer – the "self", 
or "executive function", or any other agential term. As Newbery (2011) comments: 
 
165 
 
...the present drive theory...provides an account of (i) how the primary biological drives 
are perceptually and cognitively based structures, which have evolved in the service of 
basic and indisputable biological needs, and (ii) how the purportedly independent 
psychological needs, whose primitive forms are evident even at birth (i.e., they are 
innate), would be expected to have evolved in the service of the primary biological 
drives, and so not be disconnected from them. (p. 870) 
 
Maze's drive theory achieves both of these through a realist, determinist thesis that treats the 
drives as the most basic possible subjects in the cognitive relation, and by treating cognition as a 
relation that allows it to play a causal role in the determination of behaviour. Although the theory 
can be criticised for being imprecise in specifying the drives by the basic needs which they have 
evolved to meet, this approach is nonetheless superior (and more theoretically coherent) than the 
specification of drives by their apparent aim. As Maze (and Freud before him, referring to the 
specification of instincts) comments, such an approach is empty, as it is possible to posit a drive 
for every observed behaviour (i.e., to engage in the rightfully derided practice of "drive 
naming"). Maze's drive theory, then, follows a more realistic and defensible approach with 
regards to specification of the drives. While there is yet work to be done in finalising the list of 
innately provided instinctual drives (Boag (2014) for example, questions whether aggression 
should be granted drive status), Maze's drive theory provides a comprehensive and coherent 
framework from which to work in doing so.  
 Having provided a coherent determinist account of motivation in drive theory, attention 
must now be turned to explaining both self-control as a concept, and the accumulated weight of 
research supporting the strength model. The model, as has been shown, rests on unacceptable 
premises, and must be discarded as conceptually flawed. That does not mean, however, that the 
research findings generated by the model must also be discarded (although as Carter and 
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McCullough (2013, 2014) have noted, such findings may be suspect for other reasons). As 
Bennett and Hacker (2003) state: 
 
In some cases, the conceptual unclarity may affect neither the cogency of the questions 
nor the fruitfulness of the experiments, but only the understanding of the results of the 
experiments and their theoretical implications. (p. 5) 
 
Thus, while the theory behind the strength model may be logically unsound, it does not make the 
study of self-control any less valuable, and the results demonstrating the depletion effect may 
still be an example of a real empirical phenomenon, which must be reinterpreted in a more 
logically coherent light. That logically coherent alternative has been provided in the form of 
Maze's (1983) drive theory. It is appropriate, therefore, to re-examine the empirical findings of 
the strength model through the lens of Maze's drive theory, in order to explain them without the 
need for a controlling self, or a hard-to-find resource. 
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Chapter 5: Drive Theory: The Development of Self-Control in the Individual 
 
 
5.1 Reinterpreting Self-Control through Drive Theory 
 In offering drive theory as an alternative framework with which to understand 
motivation, it becomes necessary to reinterpret not only the research findings specific to the 
strength model (e.g., accounting for the effect of glucose on self-control, explaining longitudinal 
improvement and conservation, etc.), but also to re-examine the concept of self-control as a 
whole. When critiquing the strength model's concept of self, it was noted that a significant 
contributing factor to the conceptual confusions suffered by the model stemmed from the model's 
notion of control, and the associated need for a controller. Drive theory, with its focus on direct 
realism and a strongly partitive, relational view of mind, explicitly rejects the notion that there is 
a "controller" (by any name) possessed by individuals. Rather, behaviour is driven by innately 
provided instinctual drives in connection with the perceptual, sensory, and motor apparatus of 
the individual, in a thoroughly deterministic manner. Given this, however, the concept of "self-
control" becomes problematic – if behaviour is being driven by fully deterministic processes, it 
cannot be said that there is any "control" occurring. If there is no control, per se, then the term 
self-control must be re-interpreted as convenient nomenclature for a phenomenological 
experience for which there is, nonetheless, a deterministic explanation. Doing so allows the term 
to be divested of the conceptual confusions with which it is beset, and in turn drive new, more 
theoretically-informed research. 
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5.1.1 The paradigm case of self-control. 
 The paradigm case for self-control has usually been taken to be the conflict between a 
smaller, more immediate reward, and a larger, but more delayed one. The commonly cited 
examples of self-control failure (e.g., obesity, drug abuse, debt, etc.) all have in common a 
conflict of motivations: in the case of obesity, frequent occasions in which an immediately 
rewarding food is chosen over the delayed reward of greater health; drug abuse begins with the 
immediate reward of the drug's effects being chosen over the delayed reward of avoiding the 
problems that come with drug abuse; debt is the result of immediately rewarding purchases being 
chosen over the delayed reward of saving money and thereby increasing future purchasing 
power. Similarly, the adaptive outcomes of successful self-control also represent motivational 
conflicts – studying for the future reward of good grades versus immediately rewarding 
procrastination; maintaining a strict diet and training regimen for the delayed reward of 
becoming a sports star versus immediately rewarding unhealthy food choices and watching 
television, etc.  
 From the simplest point of view, then, any example of self-control is simply a case of 
drive-conflict. The gratification of one (or several) drives necessitates the frustration of another 
(or several others), resulting in the subjective experience of having forgone something desired – 
that is, the feeling of self-control. In illustrating this drive-conflict, the metaphor employed by 
Inzlicht et al. (2014) of a set of scales is entirely apt. To use their metaphor, any example of a 
"self-control" (i.e., drive) conflict would involve a drive (or collection of drives) on one side of 
the scales, with the opposing drive (or collection of drives) on the other. The "weight" of either 
side (i.e., the degree to which a certain behaviour is likely to occur) will be affected by a range of 
factors – the degree to which the drives are active/satiated, the environmental conditions 
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perceived by the individual, and the various cognitions into which the drives enter (which will 
include previous learning, awareness of affective responses dictating the attractiveness of a 
response, etc.). This metaphor benefits from the fact that it represents self-control in a 
mechanistic, determined manner, rather than requiring the implicit "controller" exercising the 
strength model's "muscle". 
 Such an account explains and illustrates self-control conflict in a basic way – with an 
understanding of drive theory, it is possible to understand basic drive conflict in a fairly 
straightforward manner. The paradigm cases of self-control, however, appear to possess a 
particular character that requires further explanation. This can be seen in Inzlicht et al.'s (2014) 
characterisation of "have-to" versus "want-to" goals; in the strength model's differentiation 
between "undesirable impulses" and "higher motivations/enlightened self-interest"; in Freud's id 
and ego instincts. In all of these, there is a splitting-off of behaviours that are deemed socially 
desirable (acceptable ego instincts behaviours, behaviours prompted by superego injunctions, 
have-to goals, enlightened self-interest), and those that are more selfish and less socially 
desirable (id instincts, want-to goals, "undesirable" impulses). Self-control conflicts, then, in the 
majority of cases, are between the immediate consummatory gratification of some drive, and the 
delayed or modified gratification of another (or set of others) on the basis of social pressures, 
necessarily resulting in the frustration of at least one of the drives.  
 It is possible, of course, to think of examples of self-control where the social pressure is 
minimal or even absent – the nature of drive conflict means that there are likely to be situations 
in which the satiation of one drive frustrates another without social input. For example, it could 
be a case that in some examples of self-control the inhibiting factor is a realistic appraisal of a 
hostile environment (e.g., resisting the urge to grab a cookie straight out of the oven because it 
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will burn you; controlling a panic response in an emergency to have a better chance of survival). 
Delay of gratification produced by the "ego" (the collection of acceptable drive 
impulses/behaviours) can therefore occur on either realistic (appraisal of environment) or 
moralistic (misguided promptings of superego injunctions/moral beliefs) grounds. However, the 
splitting of behaviours typical of conventional self-control research dictates that the majority of 
behaviours considered "self-controlled" will be based, to some degree, on social rules and rule-
following. 
5.2 The Development of Self-Control 
 If self-control represents conflict between the drives as a result of social pressures, then 
the development of self-control must necessarily begin with the infant and its experiences with 
socialisation. It has been noted that the drives continuously act to gather information relevant to 
their gratification; this information-gathering relates not only to those objects which provide 
satiation of the drive (e.g., an infant putting various objects in its mouth and in the process 
acquiring various facts relating to taste, texture, consistency, etc.), but also to those behaviours 
which are necessary for acquiring such objects. Socialisation, then, is the process of learning 
certain contingencies related to behaviour expression and drive-gratification. As Maze (1983) 
notes, "Social rules and contingencies are just a particular class of the contingencies of nature, 
which individuals discover and which then modify their consummatory behaviours." (p. 168).  
 Given the vast possibilities of human existence, it is impossible to provide a definitive list 
of the types of contingencies which will inform an individual's "self-control". However, the fact 
that it is often possible to recognise behaviours (both in others and ourselves) that would be 
called self-controlled suggests that the common identifiable features (e.g., delay or modification 
of gratification) may have their roots in shared developmental/socialisation experiences. It is 
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possible, therefore, to provide an account of several broad categories of developmental and 
socialisation experiences likely to prove instrumental in the expression of self-control-style 
behaviours throughout the individual's life.  
5.2.1 External regulation of the infant. 
 The individual's earliest experiences that can be related to self-control-style behaviour do 
not, strictly speaking, involve the necessary delay or modification of gratification, but are 
nonetheless essential for the development of future regulation abilities. At birth, the infant is 
helpless, and relies on its caregivers for the gratification of almost every drive (respiration and 
sleep, if they are primary drives, being possible exceptions). As Hopkins (2004) states: 
 
The infant...is dependent upon its mother’s will, and so must pursue its interests by 
psychological means...evolutionary theory leads us to expect that the infant’s emotions, 
and the neural systems which realise them, can be understood as selected initially to 
extract maternal investment. Speaking very roughly, it seems that the infant has two ways 
of securing what it needs: co-operatively, via the elicitation of affection and love; or 
coercively, via the infliction of anxiety and guilt. (p. 239) 
 
While Hopkins' account slips back into purposive language (i.e., suggesting that the infant's 
emotional expressions are goal-driven; that they occur with the goal of bringing about some state 
of affairs), the point he makes is a valid one: the drives, with their associated innate behavioural 
tools, cause the infant to react in a certain way in response to some form of internal 
disequilibrium, which (ideally) causes the caregiver to provide some form of external regulation. 
Thus, in the presence of discomfort caused by the excitation (and lack of satiation) of the drives, 
the infant will be caused to cry (an innate behaviour that, as Hopkins suggests, inflicts anxiety 
and guilt), which may in turn cause the acquisition of some satiating event. Affection and love, 
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as Newbery (2011) suggests, are likely strengthened by the innate affect attunement systems 
possessed by the infant, and are part of the behavioural tools which the drives utilise in their 
quest for gratification.  
 The use of affective cues by the infant, and the appropriate responding to them by the 
caregivers, is essential for the formation of secure attachment in the infant, according to Schore 
and Schore (2008). They suggest that: 
 
...the psychobiologically attuned sensitive caregiver appraises...expressions of the infant’s 
arousal and then regulates these affective states, both positive and negative. The 
attachment relationship mediates the dyadic regulation of emotion... (p. 11) 
 
In regulating the infant's needs, Schore and Schore argue, the caregiver also provides external 
regulation of its affective state. Furthermore, such regulation can occur on the basis of social 
cues (such as facial expressions), which provide relevant information to the infant regarding 
impending gratification. As Hopkins (2004) states: 
 
A newborn...can be provoked to rage simply by the sight of its mother’s immobile face. 
Indeed the young infant seems particularly prone to experience anger or fear whenever its 
mother is unresponsive or alien. (Few things are more objectively threatening to an infant 
than a mother who will not respond...) (p. 247) 
 
Thus, the earliest form of socialisation involves the external regulation of the infant's arousal, via 
both explicit drive satiation, and emotion regulation via anticipation of drive satiation (conveyed 
via social cues). In a parent-infant relationship in which the parent is sensitive to the infant's 
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needs, and responds appropriately, the infant will likely form a secure attachment (Schore & 
Schore, 2008).  
 The provision of regulation of the infant by the caregivers is instrumental in the infant 
developing awareness of two contingencies: one, that discomfort is often followed by pleasure 
(an essential feature of most self-controlled behaviours), and two, that such a relationship holds 
reliably (in the case of a sensitive caregiver, appropriate responses to distress, and the formation 
of a secure attachment bond). The reliability of the pleasure-following-discomfort contingency 
would appear to be a key foundation for later self-control, as an inconsistent relationship would 
likely be more consistently rewarded by immediate gratification where available, rather than 
delaying in the favour of a potentially unreliable future gratification. Provisional evidence for 
this can be found in a study by Drake, Belsky, and Fearon (2014), who found that attachment 
styles had a significant relationship with social self-control (with securely attached children 
demonstrating significantly better self-control, as reported by both teachers and performance in a 
continuous performance test). Thus, the drives' early experiences with gratification via the 
caregiver in the form of learned contingencies likely form an integral part of future self-control. 
5.2.2 Socialisation via rewards and punishments. 
 Socialisation occurs beyond the basic external regulation of the infant by the caregivers, 
however. As Calkins (1994) notes: 
 
As the child becomes older and more adept at managing her own responses, parents will 
use increasingly more explicit methods of modeling, of reinforcing desirable behaviors, 
and of disciplining the child for inappropriate behaviors. 
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In a drive-theory sense, the child managing their own responses can be seen as the gradual 
maturation of the cognitive apparatus (e.g., the ability for arousal to be internally regulated rather 
than requiring external intervention), in combination with the drives acquiring relevant 
information about appropriate responses and their likely outcomes. However, it is the explicit 
reference to reinforcement, modeling, and discipline that has particular bearing on the 
socialisation of the individual and the development of self control.  
 For the most part, such experiences represent the individual learning genuine social rules 
and contingencies which inform the development of self-control. For example, socially desirable 
behaviour (e.g., being polite, studying) may be explicitly rewarded by the parents in an effort to 
increase their frequency. Given that a reward can "...only be the gratification of an instinctual 
drive..." (Maze, 1983, p. 171), such a relationship between the behaviour and reward would 
become a fact cognised by the drive, and thus become a causal input into future behaviour. Of 
course, the reward need not be explicit – it is likely that in many instances the reinforcement 
offered for certain behaviours is the approval of the parent, either in the form of direct praise, or 
more subtly, in the form of facial expressions, body language, etc. This, while not providing 
direct satiation of the biological drives, is nonetheless rewarding as a symbol of drive 
gratification – because the parents are such an important source of drive gratification for the 
infant/young child, their approval and goodwill represents future gratification; their disapproval, 
likely drive frustration. Some of the contingencies which the individual learns, then, will relate to 
certain behaviours (particularly socially approved ones) and their relationship to parental 
approval and goodwill. Modeling can work similarly, either because the parent provides cues 
that such behaviour will result in approval and affection (e.g., smiling and clapping when the 
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child approximates the desired behaviour), or because the child identifies with the parent. As 
Hopkins (2004) notes: 
 
Identification effects 'the assimilations of one ego to another' (XXII, 63). In this it forms 
an image of the self as like an other who is worthy of emulation, so that self and other 
share desirable traits and perspectives. This process informs many kinds of socialization 
and learning...We can regard it as implemented by systems like the 'mirror neurons' 
which respond to observations of the behaviour of others... (p. 229) 
 
  Both the rewarding of behaviour and behavioural modeling provide the infant or child 
with information about the relationships between certain behaviours and their likely outcomes. 
Neither must necessarily involve the frustration of a drive, as the behaviours being rewarded or 
modeled are not guaranteed to be in opposition to any of the drives. For example, when the 
infant is learning to walk (a behaviour which directly assists in the gratification of many drives), 
they may be encouraged by a parent smiling, laughing, and demonstrating affection. Sometimes 
the behavioural expression of a drive will be modified on the basis of learned rewards (e.g., 
being rewarded for asking politely for food, rather than simply snatching it – both approaches 
lead to satisfaction of the hunger drive, but cognition of the benefits of the socially appropriate 
option lead to modification of the expressed behaviour). Even in the case that the parent rewards 
the child for the explicit frustration of another drive , the child is learning an environmental 
contingency that will have a causal effect on future interactions (in this case, all the drives reliant 
upon parental goodwill will be set against the drive being frustrated).  
 These relationships, between certain types of behaviours and their consequences, become 
part of the set of beliefs utilised by the drives in the quest for gratification. Given that many of 
the behaviours typically rewarded in socialisation are not necessarily ones that the individual 
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would perform otherwise (e.g., waiting politely for food, if not punished or rewarded, will be of 
no benefit to the individual over taking whatever food is available whenever it is so desired), the 
individual is likely to learn that certain types of effortful behaviours are typically rewarded (and 
indeed, this explains how and why a random neutral behaviour can be made "intrinsically" 
unattractive just by offering a reward for it – why would someone offer payment for me to do 
this; it must be aversive, etc). The cognising of this may be unconscious, but it will nonetheless 
have a causal input into subsequent behavioural conflicts where one of the behavioural options is 
of the type that has typically been so rewarded. As noted, however, the key to these relationships 
playing a positive role in subsequent self-control behaviour is their perceived reliability. Kidd, 
Palmeri, and Aslin (2013), for example, showed that the degree of environmental reliability 
significantly affected how long children would delay gratification in the marshmallow task 
(Mischel, 1974). Children who were primed with an "unreliable" view of the environment 
waited, on average, around three minutes before eating the marshmallow; children primed with 
reliability waited, on average, over 12 minutes. This demonstrates that unconscious perceptions 
as to the reliability of learned relationships act as causal variables in the ability to delay 
gratification; thus, individuals who have been inconsistently rewarded (or not rewarded) for 
various socially appropriate behaviours will likely demonstrate poorer self-control behaviours 
subsequently. 
 Thus far, the discussion has focused on the effects of rewards and modeling, and their 
effect on the development of self-control behaviour. Punishment, however, is also a commonly 
used tool in socialisation, and can lead to similar learning of contingencies. Just as rewards can 
only ever be the direct or indirect gratification of drives, so too can punishments only be the 
threatened or actual frustration of them. Punishments may, in fact, be the most common tool in 
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the socialisation of children – as Maze (1983) notes, "...social rules basically derive their 
prescriptive force from the application or threat of sanctions (i.e. of the frustration of primary 
drives)" (p. 168). In many cases, these can be relatively straightforward relationships between a 
behaviour and a punishment. For example, a social infraction might be punished with the child 
admonished to go to their room without dinner, directly frustrating the hunger drive. Or, 
commonly, an undesired behaviour is punished with a smack, directly frustrating the pain 
avoidance drive. These are, as noted, simple and easy-to-understand contingent relationships, in 
their nature identical to those occasioned by rewards, and the learning of them will exert a causal 
influence on subsequent self-control conflicts. There is, however, as Maze argues, a deeper and 
more insidious form of learning that occurs during socialisation, a "...disabling event in 
intellectual functioning..." (Maze, 1973, p. 183) that occurs as a result of both rewards and 
punishments: the development of moralistic beliefs. 
5.2.3 The development and function of moral beliefs. 
 Inherent in many descriptions of self-control and self-controlled behaviours are overtly 
moral overtones: socially acceptable behaviours (or "higher" motivations) are those which it is 
presumed a person ought to do, those behaviours that are considered good. Conversely, those 
behaviours which are regarded as being the result of self-control failures are those which it is 
presumed one ought not to do, behaviours that are inherently bad. Nowhere is this made more 
apparent than by the fact that the behaviours which are presumed bad are the result of self-
control failures; those which are presumed good are the result of successful self-control – words 
with obvious policy implications. In claiming that something is the result of self-control failure, 
the implication is that the behaviour or state-of-being resulting from such failure is bad; that it 
ought not to be done/desired. Conversely, if one succeeds at self-control, one has achieved 
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success, something that is to be desired. While the assigning of such properties to the resultant 
action or state-of-being is rarely questioned, Maze (1973, 1983) argues that such properties are 
illusory; that to say that something "...was done simply because it was right, was what one ought 
to do, then that is, of course, to deny most explicitly that it was merely an expression of material 
interests, merely an instance of drive gratification." (p. 169). 
 One might defend the assignation of such properties (ought to be done, ought not to be 
done, etc.) to actions or states-of-being by referring to the action's consequences; to say, for 
example, that obesity (a commonly-cited result of the failure of self-control) is not inherently 
bad, but that the health risks and problems associated with obesity are bad. This, however, serves 
only to transpose the claim of inherent badness a step away from the initial statement. As Maze 
(1973) notes: 
 
If a speaker is asked to give objective grounds for his unconditional ought-sentence, then 
he will usually try to do so by giving a piece of information about the behaviour in 
question, but this will not work unless he also includes another unconditional ought-
sentence, which will be just as much in need of justification as the first one, thus: 
'Why ought I to do X?' 
'Because it is a part of doing Y (which you ought to do).' 
 'Why ought I to do Y ?' (p. 178) 
 
This, then, results in a near-infinite regress, with each step presuming a further unconditional 
ought-statement to support the previous. If, instead, the claim is modified from "Obesity is bad", 
to "Obesity is bad if you wish to live a long and full life because of its negative health effects", 
then the nature of the statement has changed from being prescriptive in the first instance (in that 
such a claim implies both an inherent property of the state of being, as well as having clear 
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policy implications), to being simply a contingent statement of fact in the second. This is 
important because, as Maze (1983) notes: 
 
...it is still the case that facts never of themselves imply policies, still true as Hume 
pointed out we cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is', and that although behaviour is 
certainly guided by knowledge of facts, the question of what that behaviour will be, and 
of which way the facts direct our behaviour, is determined by the primary or instinctual 
drives. (p. 169) 
 
 The claiming or implying of inherent properties of good/bad/etc. of various actions or 
states-of-being is, thus, a problem for the reason that such properties really serve as disguised 
personal preferences, and not objective properties at all (Maze, 1973). Furthermore, to claim that 
any action or state-of-being contains the property good/bad within it is to commit the fallacy of 
constituent relations – claiming that a thing's relations are to be found intrinsic to the thing itself. 
Not only is this logically incoherent, but when it is used as a tool for socialisation (as moral 
values are), it requires, as Maze (1973) notes, that the child sacrifice their realism, as they are 
being asked to observe supposedly inherent properties in certain actions that do not exist. Maze 
continues: 
 
...if there are no moral properties to be discovered, then the child is being set a task of 
discrimination that cannot possibly be carried out; he is being asked to achieve a concept 
that in some important sense is not genuinely intelligible. (1973, p. 184) 
 
This, then, is the disabling event in intellectual functioning to which Maze refers. The child, in 
giving expression to its basic drives with behaviours typically proscribed by society, is enjoined 
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not to do so; to perform instead in a manner that is “good”, and to avoid those behaviours that are 
bad, wrong, or dirty. In particular, Maze (1983) claims, socialization of children via the 
instilment of moral attitudes aims: 
 
…to bring about the suppression of specific instinctual impulses, particularly, in our 
society, of the expression of sexuality in its pregenital forms which are all represented as 
being ‘dirty’…and of aggression, especially of aggression directed against ‘proper 
authorities’ (the parents themselves, in the first instance)…(p. 171) 
 
Because the young child (and his/her drives) rely so heavily on the parents for continued 
prosperity, then: 
 
…if the parents, as so many do, make the continuance of their affection conditional on 
the child’s being ‘good’, and on its being able to tell the right from the wrong, then that is 
a strong pressure on the child to believe that it can see the ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’ on 
which its parents lay so much stress. (Maze, 1983, pp. 170-171)   
 
 It is more than simple pressure to see the rightness and wrongness inherent in certain 
actions or states-of-being that makes moral attitudes so intellectually dishonest, however. 
According to Maze (1973, 1983), the child, when persuaded that certain actions are right or 
wrong (and are inherently so), is at the same time faced with the knowledge that their parents’ 
love and affection is conditional upon their being able to discern such properties. This, according 
to Maze (1973): 
 
…is a different situation from one in which he is simply told, however angrily, that if he 
goes on doing a certain thing he will be punished. That is an intelligible, if unpleasant, 
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contingency with which a child could cope in some realistic way. But in the case of 
moral pressure, it is precisely that the child is being required to sacrifice his realism, and 
to establish certain self-deceptions, if he is to avoid his parents’ rejection, since one of the 
conditions of being worthwhile is to be able to see that certain actions (and wishes) just 
are wrong. 
 
The discomfiting manner in which the child is forced to assume such values; the coercion by 
which this aspect of socialization occurs (unintended as it may be – it is not to suggest that 
parents consciously employ coercive techniques to impart moral values, but the implicit threat of 
their loss of affection nonetheless acts in such a manner) is an unpleasant situation for the child. 
To behave in a manner consistent with the moral injunctions with which he/she is presented is to 
accept the humiliating conclusion that one has been subject to coercion, that one’s parents' love 
is not unconditional, and that one’s personhood is suspect if one acts otherwise. The result of 
this, Maze (1983) suggests, is that fears of punishment become repressed and largely 
unconscious due to the discomforting nature of their acquisition: 
 
…moral beliefs are consciously held as objectively true, rather than as restrictions 
imposed on one by the threat of sanctions. The economic value of this is that it enables 
the person to believe that he is adopting certain inhibitions of his instinctual impulses as a 
matter of virtue, of principled renunciation, whereas if he retained in consciousness the 
realization that he had given in to the arbitrary demands of others, that would be 
humiliating and painful. (p. 171) 
 
 The result of this process of socialisation is the assumption by the child of various moral 
beliefs regarding certain actions (those that are believed to be inherently good or bad; this is why 
the superego is not a separate set of drives, but, instead, a collection of false beliefs acquired by 
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the ego); and, while the beliefs themselves may be conscious, the actual fear of punishment and 
the occasioning of such beliefs is likely not to be. Maze (1983) treats this as being a result of the 
instinctual drives whose gratification depends on the parents (i.e., the majority of self-
preservative instincts) acquiring the belief that their continued gratification depends on the 
blocking off of the drives responsible for the morally suspect behaviours. In his words: 
 
...one subset of the instinctual drives becomes organised in competition with the 
remainder, and treats the blocking off of the remainder as an essential part of securing its 
own gratification. These acquisitions are of the same instrumental order as those gradual 
elaborations of the consummatory behaviour patterns that are brought about by everyday 
trial and error. (1983, p. 171) 
 
This, he argues, results in subgroupings of the drives that resemble in their function Freud's 
conceptions of the id and ego, and that: 
 
"The actual principle of division, between the instinctual drives that are to constitute the 
ego and those which are to be repressed and constitute the id, would be that the former 
were those whose expression was not subject to moral disapproval... (p. 173) 
 
This does not, however, imbue the ego (being, as it is, merely a collection of particular drives 
grouped on the basis of the individual's experiences) with any new faculty for rationality, or 
choice, or agency. It is, as a collection of drives, driven only to achieve gratification – such 
gratification may, on the basis of learned facts and acquired beliefs, appear rational, but only 
inasmuch as such behaviour achieves drive gratification and avoids frustration. As Maze (1983) 
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puts it, "The ego functions in accordance with the reality principle, and opposes the tendencies of 
the id, only in so far as that is effective in securing its own gratification." (p. 172). 
 This element of socialisation, the acquisition of moral attitudes, is perhaps one of the 
most important in subsequent self-control behaviour expressions. Not only does the individual 
learn to act in more socially appropriate ways, but the beliefs about what must be done to achieve 
gratification and avoid frustration are not necessarily realistic, and are based on supposedly 
objective properties which do not, in fact, exist. Thus, many occasions of self-control behaviour, 
particularly those that result from beliefs regarding authority figures, or "the right" course of 
action, or any of a number of socially-related activities, may not result in direct or even indirect 
drive gratification, but instead be the result of unrealistic attitudes acquired in childhood. Maze 
(1983) states: 
 
...it is not always the case that moral behaviour actually enhances the person's welfare 
even in an indirect way. The ego's unconscious beliefs about what is necessary to ensure 
gratification are unrealistic ones, acquired in childhood and preserved behind the barrier 
of repression. Morality functions to persuade individuals to forego real-world 
gratifications in favour of the assurance of 'virtue'. Some of these renunciations may be 
necessary for the maintenance of the social fabric but many are not. There is no lack of 
surplus repression. (p. 172) 
 
5.3 Summary of Self-Control Development 
 Understood through the lens of drive theory, all self-control conflicts can be seen to be 
simple conflicts between the instinctual drives, or between groups of them, and their 
impulses/behaviours – as Maze (1983) suggests, drives may become grouped in opposition to 
other drives during socialisation. And, in the majority of cases, self-control conflicts will come 
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about as a result of contingencies learned through childhood and beyond, particularly during the 
socialisation of the child. Key experiences during this period may include the initial regulation of 
the infant's affect and drive satiation by the parents; the learning of general contingencies relating 
to various drive expressions and consequences (i.e., the individual's experience with rewards and 
punishments, which can only be drive gratifications and frustrations, or the promise/threat of 
such); and the instilling of moral attitudes and beliefs in the individual (and subsequent 
repression of the true cause for the assumption of such beliefs).  
 Self-control, then, is not some special class of behaviour as posited by many strength 
model researchers, necessitating an active, controlling agent with a limited resource of strength 
to draw upon in order to follow what it perceives to be the best course of action. It is, instead, 
simply the case that social rules and sanctions are part of the set of contingencies learned by 
individuals which may cause modification of drive gratification in a manner consistent with 
"being self-controlled". Self-control, therefore, is capable of being explained in a thoroughly 
deterministic manner. Naturally, the type of experiences an individual has throughout his/her life 
will affect the expression of self-controlled behaviour – if a person consistently gratified their 
drives immediately and suffered no frustrations in doing so (an implausible, but not impossible, 
scenario), then they would be unlikely to demonstrate any degree of "self-control" subsequently 
(assuming that they also did not observe others experiencing drive frustration when immediately 
gratifying other drives, because such an event would then become a causally efficacious 
cognised fact). Individual differences in expressed self-control behaviours, then, will not be due 
to any differences in self-control "strength" (an incoherent notion), but instead a result of the 
complex interplay between various factors, including drive activation/satiation, cognitions and 
beliefs, experiences with various contingencies, etc.  
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 If self-control is the result of drive conflict, then the typical case of "successful" self-
control is simply a behavioural occurrence wherein the expressed drive behaviour is one that 
accords more closely to socially desirable norms than do the other behavioural alternatives
6
. 
Likewise, a self-control failure is simply the outcome of a drive conflict where the expressed 
behaviour is one more associated with self-interest and immediate gratification, and less with 
social norms. The key point, then, is that regardless of whether the expressed behaviour is seen 
as being a self-control success or failure, it can ultimately be accounted for by the operation of 
the drives – self-control is simply a convenient label that denotes whether a behaviour is socially 
desirable or not.  
 The reframing of self-control from being a controlled, volitional activity allowing 
humans to pursue "higher" achievements, culture, etc., to a wholly mechanistic, innately driven 
occurrence, does not in any way detract from the importance of it as a topic of research (nor does 
it deny the existence of such human achievements; it seeks only to provide an efficient causal 
explanation for them). Rather, with a stronger conceptual understanding of the factors underlying 
self-controlled behaviour, research can be more theoretically informed and directed. This 
reframing also allows for the reinterpretation of existing self-control research results. In 
particular, the drive-theory account of self-controlled behaviour is capable of providing not only 
a deterministic account of the ego depletion effect, but also of the various modifications and 
troubling findings the strength model has been forced to adopt (including the effect of glucose, 
the various factors that appear to ameliorate the effect, and the effect where multiple depleting 
tasks appear to result in a reduced depletion effect). Given the increasing evidence that the ego 
depletion effect may have been overstated, it is important to notice that drive theory does not 
                                                             
6 It is possible, of course, to think of examples of behaviours that would not conform with socially desirable norms 
that would, nonetheless, involve conflict between the drives. Thus, this definition is intended to apply to the vast 
majority of ordinary self-control, and not to every case without exception. 
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necessarily predict that the ego depletion will occur. It is capable, however, of providing a 
deterministic account of factors which could conceivably cause the observed effect should it 
exist. 
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Chapter 6: Drive Theory: Reinterpreting Ego Depletion 
 
6.1 Strength Model Research Reinterpreted Through Drive Theory 
  Early papers on the strength model and the resource-based account of self-control (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996) made clear that self-control situations 
were, ultimately, a contest of strength between competing motivations. For example, Baumeister 
et al. (1994) made the claim that: 
 
...self-regulation involves a contest of strength: the power of the impulse and its resulting 
tendency to act, against the power of the self-regulatory mechanism to interrupt that 
response and prevent that action. (p. 17) 
 
Similarly, Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) stated that “…impulses and motivations vary 
according to strength, and the weaker ones are those that are easier to control and stifle” (p. 3). In 
a sense, these claims differ very little from the claims of drive theory (that all self-control is 
merely the result of drive conflict). Where they do differ, however, is in the strength model's 
assumption that impulses must be stifled or controlled by some external regulating force (i.e., the 
self) which requires an energy source to do so, rather than recognising that such conflicts must 
be between motivational constructs (i.e., the drives and their beliefs), requiring no external 
controller or energy source. Nonetheless, the similarities between the models provide a starting 
point for the reinterpretation of research findings through the lens of drive theory. The onus is on 
drive theory, therefore, to provide a comprehensive reinterpretation that accounts for the 
impressive body of research findings generated by the strength model and its critics. 
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  The main tenet of the strength model has always been that self-control relies on a finite 
resource which is temporarily depleted through use, rendering subsequent acts of self-control 
more likely to fail: the ego depletion effect. Thus, explaining the ego depletion effect is of prime 
importance for any alternative model to the strength model (e.g., the process model, the OCM, or 
drive theory). In explaining the ego depletion effect, drive theory must be capable of explaining 
the mechanisms by which the effect occurs, as well as the various additions and modifications 
that have been made to the effect since its inception. These include the apparent longitudinal 
improvement of self-control (Muraven et al., 1999), conservation of the self-control "resource" 
(Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Muraven et al., 2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009), the various factors 
that ameliorate the effect or "replenish" self-control (Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Tice et al., 2007; 
Tyler & Burns, 2008), the effect of glucose on self-control (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Gailliot et al., 
2007; Kurzban, 2010), and the effect that beliefs about self-control and perceived effort 
expenditure have on subsequent self-control performance (Clarkson et al., 2010; Job et al., 2010; 
Martijn et al., 2002; Miller et al., 2012). 
6.2 The Ego Depletion Effect 
 In explaining the basic ego depletion effect (i.e., the reduction in self-controlled 
behaviour following initial self-control), drive theory's account is broadly consistent with that of 
the process model – indeed, the two models should be viewed as complementary, with the 
process model providing a broad-strokes account of what is occurring during ego depletion, and 
drive theory explaining the mechanism behind the process. Simply put, drive theory is in 
agreement with the process model's claim that ego depletion, rather than being the result of any 
limited resource, is actually due to shifts in motivation that occur as a result of an initial self-
control task, both away from the "controlled" behaviour (i.e., the one deemed more socially 
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appropriate but less immediately gratifying) and at the same time towards the "impulse" 
behaviour (i.e., that which promises more immediate gratification of a drive).  
 The process model suggests that the cause of this shift (which is termed "have-to goals" 
to "want-to goals") lies in an inherent desire to balance mental work and rest, and that self-
control's requirement of mental work will result in a subsequent shift in motivation towards 
mental rest. Drive theory, while agreeing with the essential process (shifting motivation), 
suggests that the cause of this shift lies with the drives, their activation, and the cognitive 
relations into which they enter during "self-controlled" behaviour, particularly the beliefs 
regarding effort and gratification. So, for example, engaging in self-controlled behaviour, which 
typically involves the concurrent frustration of at least one other drive and results in the feeling 
that something has been foregone (as, indeed, it has), may cause the individual to believe that 
they then deserve recompense, and cause them to seek it. Importantly, however, in neither 
account would the experience of self-control be the result of some agential self actively 
suppressing an impulse (growing tired as a result), but rather be the conscious awareness of drive 
frustration resulting from another drive/s' actions, and a subsequent shift in motivational focus.  
 The actual causes of the shift in motivations that occur during ego depletion are, 
however, more complex than the simple example given. Having engaged in self-controlled 
behaviour, there are a number of processes at work which might then combine to cause such 
shifts. As Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) suggest, there are two motivational shifts that occur 
during ego depletion – the shift away from self-controlled behaviour, and the concurrent shift 
towards immediately gratifying behaviour. Drive theory makes no a priori assumptions as to the 
accuracy of this claim, but is capable of explaining either motivational shift by framing them in 
terms of relative drive activations that result from cognitive relations entered into during and 
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following self-controlled behaviour. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that observed ego 
depletion effects must be due to the combination of motivational shifts suggested by the process 
model (although, in the model's defence, it is nowhere stated that ego depletion necessarily 
requires both; they are offered merely as an account of the likely process). Thus, in any particular 
self-control scenario, ego depletion may be a result of a shift in motivation away from the self-
controlled behaviour; a shift in motivation towards a gratifying behaviour; or, as the process 
model suggests, a combination of both.  
6.2.1 The shift away from controlled behaviour. 
 Engagement in any self-controlled behaviour must, according to drive theory, be the 
result of some drive activation, guided by beliefs about the behaviour's likely outcome regarding 
eventual gratification. That is, any self-controlled behaviour represents the running off of the 
extended and elaborated behavioural program of one or more of the drives. Given this, there are 
two mechanisms by which a drive could cause a shift in motivation away from self-controlled 
behaviour: either through the activation of the drive's satiation centre (i.e., through direct 
gratification), or through the cognitive relations into which the drive enters as a result of their 
engagement in self-controlled behaviours. The first of these, direct gratification, is an unlikely 
candidate as an explanation for most instances of the ego depletion effect, as self-controlled 
behaviours, by their nature, usually represent a delayed payoff; there is likely to be no direct 
activation of the satiation centre. Thus, in most cases of ego depletion, any shift in motivation 
away from being controlled will be the result of the cognitions into which the drives enter as a 
result of initial self-control behaviour. That is, given that the behavioural output of the drives is 
modified by beliefs, cognitions that occur as a result of self-controlled behaviour may cause a 
reduction in the drive's activity. 
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 One category of cognition that may be responsible for a shift in motivation away from 
being self-controlled could be broadly termed "justification beliefs" – the belief that having 
engaged in some self-controlled behaviour justifies a subsequent reduction in such behaviour. 
Self-control behaviours, by their nature, result in delayed gratification; as such, the behaviour 
itself can provide only symbolic immediate gratification. Nonetheless, symbolic gratification 
may be sufficient to terminate the running of that portion of the behavioural program. As an 
(extremely simplified) example, a person's hunger drive may come to recognise that money can 
be exchanged for food; thus, money comes to stand as a symbol for food (of course, it can come 
to stand as a symbol for any number of gratifying objects for multiple drives). Any activity that 
the individual engages in where money is the ultimate reward can thus provide only symbolic 
gratification for the hunger drive. Despite this, engaging in behaviours which are monetarily 
rewarded can cause the temporary reduction in hunger drive activity, as symbolic gratification 
has been achieved.  
 Given this, engaging in successful self-control may be recognised by the drives 
responsible as a means to an end of their ultimate gratification. That is, the (often implicit, 
unconscious, or repressed) beliefs an individual has regarding what needs to be done to acquire 
gratification will act as a causal determinant in their behaviour. As Newbery (2011) claims: 
 
Drives do not bypass thought processes on their way to triggering action; rather, a drive 
structure involves beliefs about the meaning of objects in the present environment, about 
the likely effects of actions on those objects, and about the relation of those effects to the 
attainment of "desired futures"... (p. 855, original emphasis) 
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Thus, while a self-controlled behaviour provides no immediate gratification for a drive, it is 
recognised in terms of its relation to the eventual gratification. Having engaged in a self-
controlled behaviour, then, the individual's beliefs about what is required of them (e.g., that they 
have done enough now for eventual gratification) may cause a subsequent reduction in the 
drive's activity – the running off of its behavioural program may be temporarily suspended or 
reduced. It is important to note that there is not necessarily any activation of the drive's satiation 
centre as a result of the self-control behaviour – the satiating event, after all, can only be the 
consummatory activity the drive has evolved to facilitate. However, because the drives are 
connected to the perceptual apparatus of the organism, and their expression is informed by 
awareness of the environment, the awareness of having performed some step in the 
consummatory program may be enough to temporarily reduce the drive's activity. 
 Support for this notion comes, ironically, from research findings that prove somewhat 
problematic for the strength model – research that demonstrated the ameliorating effect of a 
number of factors on the depletion effect. Alberts et al. (2007), for example, found that priming 
participants with the concept of persistence negated the depletion effect; these results were taken 
as an indication that the priming caused the individual to draw more deeply on the self-control 
resource. However, these findings are equally consistent with drive theory: priming the concept 
of persistence may change the individual's beliefs about the degree of effort required for eventual 
gratification. While these findings refer specifically to a factor which reduces or eliminates the 
depletion effect, they demonstrate the impact of even implicit beliefs on self-control behaviour. 
If manipulating an individual's belief regarding the amount of work required for an element of a 
consummatory program can reduce the depletion effect, then the converse of that is that the 
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beliefs held normally by the individual may be responsible for a shift away from the motivation 
to be controlled following initial self-control (i.e., believing that one has "done enough").  
 Further support is provided by Wan and Sternthal (2008), who conducted a series of 
studies investigating the effect of self-monitoring of performance on subsequent depletion. 
Providing participants who had engaged in an initial self-control task with information allowing 
them to self-monitor subsequent self-control performance (i.e., amount of time spent persisting at 
a frustrating task) ameliorated the depletion effect. Manipulating this information, however, so 
that participants thought that they had spent more time than was actually the case, did not have 
the same effect – participants given false monitoring information demonstrated a depletion 
effect. The fact that it is individuals' beliefs about their expended effort, rather than the actual 
amount of effort, that appears to have caused some degree of subsequent task disengagement, is 
entirely consistent with drive theory's claims that it is the drives' beliefs about what is necessary 
for their gratification that modifies behaviour. Research by Clarkson et al. (2010) demonstrated 
similar findings – individuals who believed they had expended more effort on self-control tasks 
than was actually the case demonstrated a depletion effect; participants who had performed 
exactly the same tasks but whose perception of effort had not been manipulated showed no 
depletion effect. Implicit beliefs about self-controlled behaviour may, therefore, be at least 
partially responsible for observed ego depletion effects. 
  Perhaps most supportive of the idea that it is the drives' beliefs about what behaviours 
are required to secure eventual gratification that causes the depletion effect is the research of Job 
et al. (2010), Martijn et al. (2002), and Miller et al. (2012), which examined the effect that 
beliefs about self-control had on subsequent self-control performance and the ego depletion 
effect. All three studies found that beliefs about self-control significantly impacted the 
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subsequent expression of the depletion effect: participants in all studies who believed that self-
control was a limited resource typically demonstrated the standard depletion effect; participants 
who held a view of self-control as non-limited appeared immune to the effect. Furthermore, 
Martijn et al. suggested that when presented with consecutive self-control tasks (as is typical of 
the dual-task paradigm), individuals tend to default to endorsing the "limited self-control" view, 
a belief which will affect subsequent self-control expression. These findings are consistent with 
the view that it is the drives' beliefs about what is required for eventual gratification that is 
responsible for the depletion effect – the belief that self-control is limited provides a justification 
for a subsequent shift away from being self-controlled after initial self-control, because it carries 
with it implicit information about what degree of effort can be reasonably expected for eventual 
gratification. 
 The effect of "justification beliefs" (believing that one has "done enough" to justify a 
reduction in subsequent self-controlled behaviour; the reduction in drive activity as a result of the 
belief's causal efficacy on behavioural expression) may be a partial cause of the depletion effect 
in the event that the initial self-control behaviour is engaged in successfully, and believed to be a 
necessary step in the consummatory program. It could be, however, that the individual 
commences a self-control behaviour with the belief that it is necessary, but comes to believe that 
it is, in fact, not; or that continued self-control behaviour has no benefit for eventual gratification. 
These beliefs might reasonably be termed "utility beliefs", on the grounds that they relate to the 
perceived utility of self-control. Their manner of action would be similar to that of justification 
beliefs – the drive comes to believe that further engagement in self-control behaviours will not 
lead to eventual gratification, leading to a shift in motivation away from being controlled. 
Indirect evidence for this claim can be taken from the research of Muraven and Slessareva 
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(2003), who showed that providing incentives to engage in self-control can ameliorate the 
depletion effect. While their research showed that increasing the value of further self-control via 
incentives could reduce the depletion effect, once again the converse would be expected to also 
hold: reducing the perceived utility of further self-control will lead to a shift in motivation away 
from the behaviour, and an observed ego depletion effect.  
 Not only can this position be argued for using the results of Muraven and Slessareva 
(2003), but also conceptually: if the ultimate causes of behaviour, as argued, are the drives 
seeking gratification, and the expression of the drives is modified by the beliefs they hold, then a 
belief that further self-control holds little utility will cause the drives to adapt accordingly, and 
pursue more immediate gratifications. As Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) note: 
 
...in almost every experiment on ego depletion, participants are offered little or no 
incentive for performing at Time 1...tangible rewards for performing specific tasks in the 
experiment (e.g., task at Time 1) have been virtually nonexistent. (p. 453) 
 
Thus, it is possible that having received no tangible incentive for performance at an initial self-
control task, individuals develop an implicit belief that further self-control will be likewise 
fruitless and reduce self-controlled behaviour accordingly. For example, an individual who 
wished to lose weight may embark on a particular diet in an effort to do so. If, after a certain 
amount of time, it appeared that the diet has failed to have any benefits, the individual would be 
unlikely to persist with it (ignoring for the moment incidental effects which might cause 
persistence, such as increased subjective wellbeing, the urging of friends or coaches, etc.), 
demonstrating a "failure" of self-control. Of course, in standard dual-task research participants 
typically perform for partial course credit or some other delayed reward, and would thus not 
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expect any degree of utility from the initial self-control task. That being the case, it is likely that 
the standard laboratory depletion effect is due more to justification beliefs than to utility beliefs; 
however, it may prove a fruitful area for future research.  
 Overall, then, there is evidence to support the claim that the implicit beliefs the drives 
hold regarding what must be done to achieve gratification are responsible for a shift in 
motivation away from being controlled after initial self-control, as the process model claims. The 
support for this claim comes from findings which, although claimed to support the depletion 
effect (in that they still demonstrate it, in the majority of cases), are problematic and require post 
hoc rationalisations (e.g., that beliefs cause the individual to draw more deeply on the self-
control resource). Given, however, the case against the strength model and its resource, the more 
parsimonious account of the effect of such beliefs is that they affect the expression of the drives. 
That is, the drives, via their experiences (both through socialisation and everyday living), acquire 
certain beliefs about what must be done in order to secure gratification; these beliefs, in turn, 
affect the expression of behaviours (which, as argued, occur as a result of the drives' various 
consummatory programs). Thus, if the beliefs held suggest that a certain amount of effort is 
required as part of the consummatory program, and the individual perceives that they have met 
that demand, the activity of the drives responsible for the self-controlled behaviour will reduce 
(the required portion of the program has been run, after all), resulting in the shift away from self-
controlled behaviour.  
6.2.2 The shift towards immediate gratification. 
   As Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) suggest, ego depletion can be accounted for by a 
number of underlying mechanistic processes. One of these is the shift in motivation away from 
being controlled; however, they suggest that it is accompanied by a concurrent shift in 
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motivation towards immediately gratifying stimuli. Drive theory, while agreeing that such a shift 
is possible (and, indeed, likely), makes no a priori claims as to whether such shifts necessarily 
occur in tandem – ego depletion can reliably be elicited via a shift away from being controlled, a 
shift towards immediate gratification, or the concurrent occurrence of both. That is, to use the 
scales metaphor proposed by Inzlicht et al. (2014), it could be that one side of the scales is 
getting lighter, one is getting heavier, or a combination of both. 
 According to drive theory, an increase in motivation towards immediate gratification can 
only occur if one of the drives not responsible for the initial self-controlled behaviour increases 
in activity. Evidence that this may occur during putative ego depletion comes from Schmeichel, 
Harmon-Jones, and Harmon-Jones (2010), who showed via a number of experiments that 
participants who had engaged in an initial self-control task demonstrated an increase in approach 
motivation (i.e., sensitivity to immediate rewards) relative to participants who had not engaged in 
initial self-control. It is possible, therefore, that engaging in an initial self-control task does cause 
a subsequent increase in the motivation for an immediate reward – that some feature of engaging 
in self-controlled behaviour results in increased drive activity from the other drives. 
 As with the shift in motivation away from being controlled, if engaging in self-control 
doesn't result in significant physiological changes (as Kurzban, 2010, argues), then any increase 
in approach motivation/drive activation must occur as a result of those cognitive relations into 
which the drives enter as a result of engaging in self-controlled behaviour. Given that, as Maze 
(1983) and Newbery (2011) claim, individuals' perceptions and cognitions are caused by sensory 
input, then the act of engaging in self-control may reasonably cause certain cognitions – 
cognitions which may include awareness of similarities between the self-controlled behaviour 
and previous occasions in which socially appropriate actions have been rewarded (e.g., 
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socialisation). If, for example, an individual has been consistently rewarded for demonstrating 
socially appropriate behaviours, then the awareness of just having engaged in self-controlled 
(i.e., socially appropriate) behaviour may cause the drives to expect a reward (i.e., gratification). 
Furthermore, because socially acceptable behaviour involves simultaneous drive frustration, and 
because of prior experiences whereby drive frustration has been subsequently rewarded (early 
affect regulation, general socialisation), there would be a learned relationship between frustration 
and subsequent gratification, leading to the expectation of reward after self-control. 
 Such a claim (as well as the general concept of an increase in motivation towards 
gratification following initial self-control exertion) is consistent with many experiences in 
socialisation, whereby certain behavioural expressions are rewarded. It is also consistent with 
research on self-licensing (e.g., Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006; 
Monin & Miller, 2001), whereby individuals who have previously engaged in some "positive" 
(i.e., socially desirable) behaviour are subsequently more likely to indulge in some gratifying 
behaviour. Researchers suggest that self-licensing occurs because initial virtuous acts essentially 
protect individuals from feeling bad for subsequent indulgence in immediately gratifying 
behaviours (e.g., Khan & Dhar, 2006; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). From a drive theory 
point of view, such a claim is roughly equivalent to the justification beliefs which lead to a shift 
away from controlled behaviour. However, it is equally plausible that having acted in a socially 
desirable manner, the individual, on the basis of past experiences, comes to expect a "pat on the 
back" in the form of some immediate reward. That is, environmental cues (e.g., awareness of just 
having engaged in self-controlled behaviour) cause an increase in drive activation of drives not 
associated with the initial act of self-control. 
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 Some evidence for this can be found in the research of Kivetz and Zheng (2006), who 
investigated the determinants of justification of self-gratification. Through the manipulation of 
individuals' perceived relative effort (i.e., making individuals believe they had expended 
relatively more or less effort than others; actual effort was held constant), they showed that 
people believing they had expended more effort showed a subsequently greater preference for 
"vice" rewards (i.e., more immediately gratifying) over "virtue" rewards (more delayed benefits) 
compared to those who believed they had expended relatively less effort. Technically speaking, 
these findings are consistent with both an increased motivation for immediate gratification 
interpretation or a decreased desire to be controlled interpretation. However, given that many 
experiences in socialisation involve socially appropriate or self-controlled behaviours being 
rewarded, it can be argued that individuals with such experiences develop a degree of "reward 
expectation" that results in a shift in motivation following initial self-control. The counterpoint to 
this claim are the findings of Giacomantonio, Jordan, Fennis, and Panno (2014), who found that 
depleted participants showed greater reward-seeking behaviour than did non-depleted 
participants only if the amount of effort required was low; if the effort required for a reward was 
high, depleted participants showed reduced reward-seeking. These findings are more consistent 
with the idea that the depletion effect is a result of a shift away from being controlled, rather than 
a shift towards gratification – that is, that the perceived utility of further effort is reduced. These 
findings, however, represent only a single study, and more research would be required before 
drawing any further conclusions. The lack of research in this area suggests that it may be a 
fruitful area for future research, disentangling the shifts in motivation that occur during ego 
depletion tasks.  
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6.3 Other Factors That Affect the Depletion Effect 
 The above offers an account of ego depletion through the lens of drive theory, providing 
a plausible account of the shifts in motivation suggested by the process model and how they 
might come to be. More research is undoubtedly required in the area, particularly examining the 
effects that various belief-manipulations have on subsequent self-control performance (which 
would appear to be the strongest endorsement of the drive theory framework – finding that 
beliefs about effort, rather than effort itself, affects self-control is more in line with drive theory's 
account of self-control than with the strength model's account). There are, however, numerous 
findings beyond the simple ego depletion effect that have been produced by the strength model, 
typically relating to some modification in the expression of the effect. Drive theory, therefore, 
must provide some attempt to address these as well. 
6.3.1 Glucose. 
 One of the most contentious areas surrounding the strength model has been their attempt 
to link the putative resource with glucose – initial research (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007) suggested 
that glucose was the resource underlying self-control; that acts of self-control caused an increase 
in glucose metabolisation by the brain, and a subsequent reduction in self-control performance. 
Numerous papers have since suggested that the initial claims were overstated (e.g., Beedie & 
Lane, 2012; Kurzban, 2010; Schimmack, 2012). Even Baumeister (2014) has since concluded 
that ego depletion is unlikely to be a result of low blood glucose, stating that "...at present it 
seems unlikely that ego depletion׳s effects are caused by a shortage of glucose in the 
bloodstream." (p. 315). However, Baumeister maintains that glucose has a role to play in self-
control, and suggests that the resource allocation model of Beedie and Lane offers a means to 
understand that role. While the resource allocation model is unconvincing (i.e., it implicitly 
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requires some controller to take in various inputs, including beliefs, and allocate resources on the 
basis of those), it seems very likely that glucose can play a role in self-controlled behaviour (e.g., 
research showing the positive effects on self-control that glucose mouth rinses can have, as in 
Molden et al., 2012).  
 The role that glucose can play, however, is easily understood through drive theory. Given 
that the drives are inextricably tied to physiological needs, blood glucose (which fluctuates as a 
function of the body's energy reserves) likely serves as a signal to at least one of the drives (the 
obvious candidate being the hunger drive). As Maze (1983) suggests, "The excitation centre [of a 
drive] becomes 'on' as a consequence of deprivation or noxious stimulation or some sensory 
process..." (p. 153). Levels of blood glucose, then, will function as physiological signals that 
affect the excitation or satiation of the hunger drive. When glucose levels are low, the drive's 
excitation centre will be more active, resulting in behaviour more likely to provide immediate 
gratification (i.e., poorer self-control). The converse of this is that stimuli which signal the 
imminent provision of fuel for the body (e.g., a glucose mouth rinse will signal the likelihood of 
incoming energy-rich nutrients) will cause a physiological reaction that will result in the 
activation of the drive's satiation centre. This, in turn, would cause a reduction in behaviour 
designed to acquire gratification; hence, an improvement in observed self-control. To return to 
the scales analogy, this is equivalent to the lightening of the "impulse" side of the scales, such 
that the side relating to self-controlled behaviour becomes relatively heavier. 
 Of course, it could also be that the ingestion (or detection) of glucose serves not only to 
directly activate a drive's satiation center, but also to cause certain cognitions regarding the 
utility of self-controlled behaviour. That is, having been explicitly rewarded for initial self-
control (i.e., provided with gratification), the drive enters into the cognitive relation that further 
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self-control holds utility as a means to gratification, thereby increasing the motivation to engage 
in it. The main point, however, is that the role of glucose is easily accommodated within the 
framework provided by drive theory – it is an input, in the form of a physiological signal, that 
may cause explicit activation of a drive's excitation or satiation centers, and may cause 
cognitions relevant to self-controlled behaviour as well. None of this is to claim that self-
controlled behaviour impacts blood glucose levels, or that it is a single underlying resource, as 
originally suggested by Gailliot et al. (2007). Rather, it is an attempt to explain how glucose 
levels could act as an influencing factor to the expression of self-controlled behaviour, as an 
input into drive structures (via their activation/satiation), and via their role in cognitions held by 
the drives. As a growing body of researchers have suggested, it is not a resource underlying self-
control (except inasmuch as it is a resource required by the individual in general), but functions 
as an input into behaviour. 
6.3.2 Conservation and longitudinal improvement. 
 The effects of glucose on self-control, as a physiological resource, are easy to 
accommodate within drive theory. Other strength model findings, such as conservation (Muraven 
et al., 2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009) and the apparent longitudinal improvement of self-control 
(Cranwell et al., 2014; Muraven et al., 1999) are less easy to account for, lacking clear 
physiological bases for their action. However, as with the shifts in motivation that occur during 
the ego depletion effect in general, both can be accounted for in terms of the beliefs and 
cognitive relations into which the drives enter.  
 Conservation, the strength model argues, represents the individual hoarding their self-
control resource against future demands. Evidence for this was presented from two converging 
sources: the fact that individuals who anticipated future self-control demonstrated a greater 
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depletion effect (Muraven et al., 2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009), and the fact that sufficient 
motivation appears able to overcome the depletion effect (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). 
However, given that there is no "resource" for individuals to actually conserve, the effects 
demonstrated must be the result of cognitions. The effect of providing incentives for engaging in 
self-controlled behaviour (as has been argued when discussing the shifts in motivation in 
general) serves to change the utility of self-controlled behaviour: either by providing explicit 
(though symbolic) rewards, such as money, or by appealing to the moral values instilled in 
individuals (e.g., informing them that further self-control performance will be of great benefit to 
science, etc.). Although neither necessarily acts directly on the drives' excitation or satiation 
centers, they do provide relevant information to the drives by which to modify their behaviour in 
seeking gratification.  
 The other evidence for the conservation effect, that individuals tend to demonstrate 
reduced self-control behaviour when they expect future demands of them, relates to the 
"justification" beliefs mentioned in explaining shifts in motivation away from being controlled. 
That is, that the drives hold implicit beliefs about the degree of effort required for future 
gratification; increasing the perceived degree of required effort will subsequently reduce 
performance at individual tasks. As when discussing justification beliefs, the support for this 
claim comes from research showing that manipulation of individuals perceptions of effort tends 
to modify the expression of the depletion effect (e.g., Kivetz & Zheng, 2006; Wan & Sternthal, 
2003). The drives' beliefs about what is required to secure gratification are a causal input in the 
expression of behaviour; changing that input will, therefore, change the behaviour (i.e., produce 
the conservation effect). 
204 
 
 As with the conservation effect, research demonstrating the longitudinal improvement of 
self-control can be accounted for in terms of the drives' beliefs and expectations relating to 
gratifying behaviours. In basic longitudinal-training studies (e.g., Cranwell et al., 2014; Muraven 
et al., 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), the most obvious explanation for the 
observed improvement in self-control at the second (i.e., follow-up) session is that being asked to 
engage in self-control tasks for the preceding several weeks changes the beliefs relating to the 
degree of effort expected of participants. Standard strength model research typically involves 
testing participants over a single session; thus, the implicit beliefs already held by participants 
will influence their performance (and the subsequent depletion effect). Testing participants for 
one session, then having them perform self-control tasks for an amount of time (typically from 
two to four weeks), however, will lead participants to form different expectations regarding 
required effort at the second session. That is, if participants have been asked by researchers to 
engage in regular self-control activities over a set period of time, their implicit beliefs at the 
second session will be that a greater degree of effort is required, resulting in a reduced depletion 
effect (consistent with the idea that they have "trained" their self-control muscle).  
 Giving participants time to adjust their expectations about the amount of effort required 
of them does appear to have an ameliorating effect on observed depletion. For example, 
Converse and DeShon (2009) demonstrated that participants who engaged in two initial self-
control tasks demonstrated little to no depletion effect (when compared with participants who 
engaged in a single initial task and did demonstrate depletion; as per standard strength model 
research). Such a finding is directly at odds with the strength model, which would predict greater 
depletion following two initial self-control tasks; it is, however, entirely consistent with the 
notion that the beliefs and expectations of the individual change and adapt on the basis of 
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experience. Converse and DeShon, who framed their results in terms of adaptation-level theory 
(Helson, 1964) and learned industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992), suggested that standard dual-
task studies give individuals insufficient time to adapt their expectations about required effort 
(resulting in the depletion effect); having them engage in more tasks allows for adaptation and, 
thus, the amelioration of the effect. 
 Similar results were found by Xiao et al. (2014), who replicated Converse and DeShon's 
(2009) study design, with the addition of controlling the total number of tasks which participants 
engaged in. That is, some participants completed two initial self-control tasks followed by the 
dependent task; some completed a single initial self-control task plus a "non-depleting" task, then 
the dependent task; and control participants completed two initial tasks not requiring self-control, 
followed by the dependent task. Thus, all participants engaged in a total of three tasks, varying 
only in the number of required self-control tasks. As with Converse and DeShon, Xiao et al. 
found that participants completing a single initial self-control task demonstrated the depletion 
effect, while control participants and those who completed two initial tasks did not. Again, these 
results were considered in light of adaptation-level theory and learned industriousness, both of 
which suggest that individuals' beliefs and expectations about what is expected of them vary as a 
function of initial exertion or previous experience.  
 The findings of both Converse and DeShon (2009) and Xiao et al. (2014) suggest that the 
beliefs the drives hold regarding their gratification (i.e., those beliefs relating to what must be 
done in order to secure it) change on the basis of experience and environmental input. In 
standard dual-task research, it appears that implicit existing beliefs regarding the degree of effort 
expected may dictate individuals' performance (excluding the effect of incentives the individuals 
receive during the course of the research). However, in research where these implicit beliefs are 
206 
 
challenged (through longitudinal training or multiple self-control tasks), there is opportunity for 
the beliefs relating to expected/required effort to change, prompting the improved performance 
seen in such research. Thus, rather than there being any "training" of the self-control "muscle", 
longitudinal improvements in self-control may be nothing more than a change in the drives' 
consummatory programs brought about by a change in the beliefs and expectations held by the 
drives regarding their gratification. 
 Changing beliefs about what is required for eventual gratification is one way of 
demonstrating an apparent longitudinal improvement in self-controlled behaviour. However, it is 
also likely such improvement can be the result of learning new strategies or behaviours that more 
efficiently serve to meet the drives' needs. For example, a smoker who is in the process of trying 
to give up may, at the start, employ less-than-optimal strategies in doing so (e.g., keeping a box 
of cigarettes handy, frequently taking breaks with other smokers, etc.), and consequently "fail" 
(i.e., start smoking again – this is not a failure of control, merely an example of one drive or 
subset of drives proving dominant over another). However, if he/she continues the attempt to 
quit, they may come to learn more optimal strategies (e.g., hiding their remaining cigarettes, 
avoiding social groups with other smokers, etc.), resulting in what appears to be a longitudinal 
improvement in self-control. Most improvements in apparently self-controlled behaviour will be 
a combination of both: the behaviours learned by the drives that are relevant to their gratification, 
and those beliefs regarding what behaviours are required/expected.  
 Thus, both the apparent conservation effect and longitudinal improvement in self-control 
performance can be interpreted in terms of the drives and the beliefs they enter into regarding 
what is necessary for their gratification. Challenging these beliefs may result in the apparent 
conservation effect (if they are given no time to adapt), or, in the case that they are given the 
207 
 
chance to adapt, improvement or immunity from the depletion effect. Drive theory is not only 
capable of explaining both effects without reference to a resource, but in doing so also makes 
sense of findings that prove troubling for a resource account of self-control (e.g., Converse & 
DeShon, 2009; Xiao et al., 2014).  
6.4 Summary and conclusion 
 Self-control, it is commonly claimed, is responsible for a number of apparently uniquely 
human attributes that greatly improve life. Self-control failures, by contrast, are claimed to be 
responsible for many of the ills that plague society: obesity, drug or alcohol abuse, and debt, to 
name a few. Over the past few decades, interest in self-control has increased, due largely to the 
efforts of Baumeister and colleagues, and the research impetus of the strength model. The model, 
with its layperson-friendly muscle metaphor and apparently robust experimental results, has 
served admirably to generate research interest and extend understanding of various aspects of 
self-control and its failures. The model, however, has not been without its critics, and there is a 
growing body of evidence suggesting that it may not be an adequate explanation for many of the 
observed effects; and even that the claimed effects may have been vastly overstated. 
 Despite these problems, self-control remains a valuable area of research – understanding 
the mechanisms by which it works, as well as the factors that influence them, has enormous 
potential benefits (e.g., as input into behavioural interventions, therapy, etc.). What has been 
lacking in the research thus far, however, has been a comprehensive account of the underlying 
motivational factors which, at their heart, are responsible for all self-control (which, as has been 
mentioned, can only ever be the result of motivational conflicts). Maze's (1983) drive theory 
provides the framework by which to accomplish this – a thoroughly deterministic, mechanistic 
account of motivation which can be used to understand motivational conflict, as well as having 
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the ability to explain the ego depletion effect (if it exists). According to drive theory, underlying 
all behaviour and motivation are innate biological drives – innate brain structures that have 
evolved in response to basic needs of the species. Via their connections to the organism's 
perceptual and cognitive apparatus, the drives learn facts about the world that are relevant to 
their gratification, and the organism's behavioural outputs are modified as a result. Thus, all 
behaviour, no matter how refined or apparently divorced from the basic needs, can ultimately be 
accounted for by the action of the drives. While this might be seen by some as an overly 
“reductionist” approach, the reply is that it is not reductionist but, rather, deflationist. It is 
certainly not biologically or neurophysiologically reductionist, because brain states are only one 
part of the mental/cognitive relation. However, the approach does challenge the view that there 
exist “higher” realms of human behaviour arising from “higher” motivations (art, music, 
morality, culture, etc.) that are entirely independent of the basic biological motivational 
structures. 
 There are several important implications to emerge from this shift to drive theory. One is 
that the types of task that have been used in self-control research should be re-evaluated – many 
of those used in contemporary research are based on the strength model's conception of self-
control which, as noted, is based on a conceptually confused notion of the self. Another is that 
the depletion effect should be re-thought (supported by the claims that it may not exist at all). 
That is, given that self-control appears to primarily be a result of the drives' beliefs, factors 
which impact those beliefs should be an emerging focus. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the entire concept of self-control needs to be recast based on the notion of competing drives. 
While it is unlikely that the term "Self-control" will ever be supplanted, it should come to be 
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recognised as convenient shorthand for what is, ultimately, a deterministic process – not some 
uniquely human attribute (free will) which allows us to choose to overcome our base impulses. 
 Drive theory has been neglected in contemporary psychology in favour of computational 
theories which divorce cognition from motivation. This may be due, in part, to lingering 
misunderstandings of drive theory (e.g., based on Hullian drive theory), or to the discomfort of 
accepting that all apparently "higher" motivations are nothing more than disguised  and 
elaborated consummatory actions. Whatever the reason, drive theory, properly understood, offers 
a coherent and plausible framework by which to understand human behaviour. It is time for 
psychology to once again embrace drive theory as Freud attempted to. As Maze (1983) 
concludes: 
 
What is required is to see that instinctual drives as conceived by Freud, divested of their 
unnecessary purposivistic terminology and given a local habitation in the central nervous 
system, are not only intelligible as working mechanisms, and entirely compatible with the 
concepts of neuroscience, but are indispensable as an explanatory basis for the science of 
behaviour and mental life. In the expression he adopted, we are lived by our instincts. 
They are the very stuff of human nature.  (p. 176) 
 
 While a shift towards drive theory provides several recommendations with regards to 
research directions, that does not mean that the current research paradigm should be entirely 
abandoned. Because drive theory shows how important are the various beliefs acquired by the 
drives, and that various factors can impact on those beliefs, there is good reason to expect the 
depletion effect to be sometimes observed and sometimes not observed (i.e., it offers a potential 
explanation for the inconsistent findings to date). Following the growing push in present 
psychological science for replications (e.g., Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), and Hagger et al.'s 
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(2016) suggestion, it is still worth pursuing a path towards replication of existing findings, in an 
effort to determine the limits (and, perhaps, existence) of the depletion effect.  
 The following sections contain a series of experiments providing just such a set of 
replication attempts (and extensions) to the existing depletion effect research. However, it is 
important to note that they are not intended to test drive theory, nor do they attempt to arbitrate 
between drive theory and the strength model, as such arbitration has already been accomplished 
via conceptual analysis. That is, because the strength model has been shown to be conceptually 
untenable (i.e., its underlying assumptions and claims are conceptually incoherent to the point 
that it is incapable of explaining empirical findings), there is no need to test between the models 
empirically – conceptual testing has resulted in the survival of only one model (drive theory), 
allowing the strength model to be discarded. Rather, drive theory offers the ability to provide a 
theoretically coherent explanation of the existing findings, without needing to provide new 
predictions.  
Given this, and in light of the doubts that have been cast on the actual existence of any 
depletion effect (whatever its theoretical explanation), there is a necessity for further replication 
of the effect, which can then be interpreted through the lens of drive theory – the findings 
(whether they show a depletion effect or not) can be used to inform better understanding of the 
motivational processes underlying self-controlled behavior. Such replication is important, as 
simply substituting drive theory for the strength model and continuing with existing research 
practices is useful only if there is a genuine effect to find. Replicating previous research can 
either strengthen the case against the depletion effect (which would suggest a different research 
direction is needed), or support the existence of the effect (in which case further experiments 
informed by drive theory would be appropriate).  
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PART THREE: EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES AND 
DISCUSSION 
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Chapter 7: Introduction to Experimental Studies 
 The previous sections of this thesis made the case that the strength model cannot offer a 
plausible account of the depletion effect due to its theoretical confusions, and that drive theory, 
properly understood, offers a coherent framework by which to understand the research findings 
generated by the model. According to drive theory, any experience of “self-control” is merely 
drive conflict, and “successful” self-control is the result of a drive’s behaviour according with 
more distant or socially acceptable goals than the frustrated drive’s more immediate gratification. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the drive theory framework allows for the explanation of the 
depletion effect via, as suggested by the process model (Francis & Inzlicht, 2016; Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014), shifts in motivation that come about as a result of 
engaging in an initial “self-control” task (i.e., an effortful task with no immediate payoff). That 
is, because the drives are connected to the perceptual apparatus of the organism and hold certain 
beliefs about what is necessary for their gratification, engaging in an initial "self-control" task 
may cause disengagement in subsequent similar tasks (in terms of both a shift away from the 
self-control tasks, and concurrently towards gratifying ones). 
 While drive theory offers a powerful framework with which to reinterpret existing 
findings, its ability to do so does not, a priori, imply that the depletion effect
7
 will be observed 
following initial self-control behaviour – it does not claim that decrements in self-control will 
necessarily follow initial self-control behaviours. It aims, instead, to offer an explanation for the 
depletion effect that has been thus far claimed in the literature. There is a growing body of 
research, however, which argues that the depletion effect found by strength model research may 
                                                             
7 Strictly speaking, if the critique of the Strength Model, and the proposal of a drive-theory , are accepted, then the 
label “depletion effect” is a misnomer. However, the term is now so widely used in the literature as to render 
counter-productive any suggestion to replace it. Accordingly, it is retained here as a label for the phenomenon itself, 
without thereby carrying any commitment to the idea of a resource and its potential for being depleted. 
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be a good deal smaller than actually claimed, or that it may not exist at all. Carter and 
McCullough (2013, 2014), and Carter et al. (2015), for example, make a convincing case that the 
depletion effect may be no more than a result of publication bias; that the size of the effect may 
not be significantly different from zero. In contrast to this, Inzlicht, Gervais, and Berkman 
(2015), while acknowledging the valuable contribution of Carter and colleagues, suggest that 
Carter et al.'s claim, that the depletion effect may not exist at all, is premature, and based on 
questionable meta-analytic techniques. Based on extensive meta-analytic simulation, they 
"...think the safest route is to present a variety of meta-analytic estimators, not just one or two, 
and to consider the range of possible effects these techniques suggest." (p. 16). However, they 
also note that meta-analytic techniques alone may be insufficient to address the existence of an 
effect, and suggest that large scale, registered replications might offer further insight.  
 Awareness of the need for replication in psychology is not new, nor is it limited to the 
depletion effect. Over the past several years there has been a growing "crisis of confidence" 
regarding the reliability of research findings (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), resulting in 
projects designed to provide large-scale replications of a number of key psychological 
experiments. The results of such replications, however, are less than positive – a recent attempt 
to replicate 100 experiments published in reputable psychology journals met with 
disappointingly low success rates (36% significant replication results vs. 97% significant original 
results; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Such findings, while depressingly supportive of 
Ioannidis' (2005) claim that "...it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true" (p. 
696), provide valuable insight about the likely reliability of psychological science as a whole.  
 However, such broad findings say nothing specific about the strength model or the 
depletion effect – they speak instead to the science of psychology in general. Nevertheless, a 
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recent large-scale, multilab, preregistered replication of the depletion effect has been conducted 
(Hagger et al., 2016). Using a modified version of the "crossing off letters" task used in much 
strength model research (the task was administered on computer; rather than crossing out letters 
according to a rule participants pressed a key when the letter was detected, or withheld the 
response when it violated the rule), and a second computer-based response inhibition task as the 
dependent task (the Multi-Source Inhibition Task; MSIT), 23 labs attempted to replicate the 
depletion effect with over 2100 participants. The findings were consistent with the claims of 
Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014) and Carter et al. (2015), as the reported mean effect size 
was extremely small, and the 95% CI included zero (d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]). 
Furthermore, the distribution of lab results was in accordance with the prediction of Hagger and 
Chatzisarantis (2014), that if the true effect size of the depletion effect were zero, "...one would 
expect the effect sizes...to be randomly distributed in both positive and negative directions about 
zero" (p. 298, see Hagger et al., 2016, Fig. 1). 
 The results of this replication have been disputed, however, by Baumeister and Vohs 
(2016). Their critique focused on both the manipulation of self-control and the dependent 
measure. The main dependent measure of the replication was reaction time variance (RTV) on 
the MSIT – it was considered by Hagger et al. (2016) that depletion would lead to reduced 
attentional control, which would in turn lead to greater variability in response times as 
participants suffered more lapses in attention. Baumeister and Vohs question whether variability 
in reaction time is truly a measure of self-control, stating "We still do not understand why 
reaction time variance is a measure of self-control failure (are people overriding some impulse to 
react with variable speed?)" (p. 574). The manipulation task (modified crossing off letters), they 
argue, fails to adequately manipulate self-control due to its neglect of an initial learning phase in 
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which the button-pressing response becomes automatic. Without making the response automatic, 
there is no overriding of a dominant response, and thus no self-control. As they conclude, "This 
may be a difficult cognitive judgment task, but no impulse is overridden, contrary to the nature 
of self-control tasks" (p. 574). 
 Drive theory would argue that no such learning period is needed – Baumeister and Vohs' 
(2016) critique rests upon the strength model's view of self-control, which requires the agential 
self to actively be involved in overriding responses. According to drive theory, any initial task 
that is sufficiently effortful as to cause a shift in motivation will result in a "depletion" effect. 
Nonetheless, it may be that an initial learning phase, whereby one response becomes automatic 
and must be substituted in a subsequent phase of the task, is more effortful that a version of the 
task without an initial learning phase. If this is the case, then Baumeister and Vohs' critique may 
help to explain the lack of depletion effect observed in the replication attempt from Hagger et al. 
(2016). For example,  Lee, Chatzisarantis, and Hagger (2016) argue that insufficiently effortful 
initial tasks will result in a lack of depletion effect – as they state: 
 
If participants do not engage in effortful self-control on the first task, it is unlikely that 
they will be sufficiently depleted to show decrements in performance on subsequent 
tasks, leading to null or greatly reduced ego-depletion effect. (p. 2) 
 
Thus, Baumeister and Vohs' (2016) argument that the initial task is insufficiently effortful may 
explain the lack of observed depletion. However, their argument rests on premises that are at 
odds with the stated procedure adopted for the crossing off letters task used by Baumeister et al. 
(1998), where there is no mention of an initial habituation phase – besides the presentation 
medium, the mechanism by which the Hagger et al. (2016) manipulation was thought to deplete 
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self-control appears identical to that of Baumeister et al. (1998), who still found a significant 
depletion effect.  
 While Baumeister and Vohs' (2016) argument against the manipulation used by Hagger 
et al. (2016) is thus weakened, it could still be that some other feature of the tasks used in the 
replication caused the lack of depletion. The validity of the dependent variable, for example, 
plays an enormous role in the conclusions that can be drawn from replications. As Rotello, Heit, 
and Dubé (2014) note, replications can be rendered largely meaningless if the dependent 
variables fail to adequately assess what they are intended to assess. As they state, "Though 
failure to replicate presents a serious problem, even highly replicable results may be consistently 
and dramatically misinterpreted if dependent measures are not carefully chosen" (p. 944). Given 
Baumeister and Vohs' cited concerns about the validity of the DV chosen by Hagger et al., it 
could well be that the null results observed in the replication study cannot be interpreted as 
evidence against the depletion effect. 
 The picture that emerges from these various claims and counterclaims is not a clear one. 
While the strength model and its resource-based account of self-control have been shown to be 
untenable (see Chapter 3), the research findings generated by the model have, until recently, 
appeared robust. The claims of Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014), Carter et al. (2015), the 
replication attempt by Hagger et al. (2016), and various other failures to reproduce the depletion 
effect (e.g., Murtagh & Todd, 2004; Xu et al., 2014) leave this assumption in doubt, however. It 
appears unlikely that initial estimates as to the strength of the depletion effect (e.g., d = 0.62, 
Hagger et al., 2010) are accurate. It could be, then, that the depletion effect is no different from 
zero – the interpretation favoured by Carter et al. (2015) – or it could be that the effect exists, but 
is smaller than initially believed. The multilab replication report by Hagger et al. (2016) provides 
217 
 
the strongest evidence that the effect may be no different from zero, but even the results of that 
have been called into question (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). Further replications are required, 
therefore, in order to shed more light on the murky state of the depletion effect. 
7.1 Experimental Overview 
 The experiments in the current project aim to investigate the existence and magnitude of 
the depletion effect through close replication of previous dual-task studies, as well as extending 
previous research by examining performance over time at the initial task. To date there appear to 
have been no studies that have examined continuous performance over time at the initial self-
control task. Dang, Dewitte, Mao, Xiao, and Shi (2013) have come the closest, assessing the 
degree of Stroop interference after each block of 48 presentations in their experiment, but their 
measure was not one of continuous performance. Collecting such data provides valuable insight 
as to the nature of participant engagement across the duration of the initial task (i.e., whether the 
depletion effect begins during the first task, or as a consequence of the first task). According to 
drive theory, either is possible, but will depend largely on the participant's implicit beliefs and 
expectations, and the length of the initial task. Engaging in and completing an initial task is a fact 
that can be cognised, and may subsequently act as a causal factor in subsequent self-control 
performance, but that does not mean that performance during the initial task will be affected 
(i.e., the act of having completed the task may be the environmental input that causes the 
participant to believe they have done enough for the experimenter). If, however, the initial task is 
of sufficient length and difficulty that a participant believes they have done enough prior to 
completion, performance decrements may be observed. 
 In deference to the critiques leveled by Baumeister and Vohs (2016), the experiments that 
are reported here use a variety of previously successfully-used manipulations (Stroop 
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[Experiments 1 & 2] and crossing off letters [Experiment 3]) and measures (unsolvable anagrams 
[Experiment 1] and handgrip persistence [Experiments 2 & 3]) of the depletion effect. The 
experiments also use two different durations of the initial task, a shorter (5 minute) condition, 
and a longer (15 minute) condition. Previous research has often reported a significant depletion 
effect utilising initial tasks of less than 10 minutes duration (Hagger et al., 2010; Vohs et al., 
2008), so the two time conditions of the present experiments should provide a duration bracket 
that encompasses the majority of commonly used depleting tasks, from typical duration to the 
upper range. As Hagger et al. (2010) note, examining the effect of duration on both the initial 
task and subsequent depletion is an area requiring further research: 
 
The identification of a decline in performance on the initial task would be a useful 
additional index of resource depletion…Furthermore, no study has manipulated initial 
task duration in a dual-task paradigm and examined its effects on performance of both 
initial and second tasks. (p. 516) 
 
Although, as argued, there is no "resource" being depleted by any of the self-control tasks used 
in typical dual-task research, a decline in performance may serve to indicate the degree to which 
a participant is motivated to exert effort at the task. Furthermore, the inclusion of the longer 
duration condition allows for the study of adaptation to the first task as shown by Dang et al. 
(2013). They argue that longer initial tasks allow participants to adapt to the cognitive demands 
of the task (i.e., become practiced at it such that it becomes less demanding), thereby eliminating 
the depletion effect. Drive theory, while agreeing that adaptation may occur, would suggest that 
in addition to a task becoming relatively easier as a result of practice, the difficulty and length of 
a task combine to affect the implicit beliefs and expectations an individual has about what is 
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required of them, thus ameliorating the effect. Examining continuous performance over time at 
the initial task will provide some insight into this. 
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Chapter 8: Experiment 1 
8.1 Overview 
 The overall aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate previous depletion effect research in an 
attempt to establish whether the effect could be elicited by tasks different from those used by 
Hagger et al. (2016). Furthermore, Experiment 1 aimed to extend previous research by 
examining performance over time at the initial task in order to assess whether, should the 
depletion effect be observed, it can be seen to occur during the initial task or whether it happens 
as a consequence of the first task. In order to assess self-control performance over time, a task 
which allows for constant monitoring of performance was necessary. The Stroop task is just such 
a task, and has been used as a both a measure of self-control ability and as a depleting task in 
previous research, and was thus chosen as the initial task for the present experiment. 
Performance is usually measured as average response time or error rate (or a combination of 
both), with "depleted" participants taking longer to make correct responses than non-depleted 
participants and making more errors (e.g., Bruyneel et al., 2009; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; 
Webb & Sheeran, 2003; etc.). Hagger et al. (2010) classified the Stroop task as an impulse 
control task, which requires participants to override an initial impulse reaction and substitute it 
with a rule-appropriate one, and participants in previous studies have indicated that hard versions 
of the Stroop are more effortful than are control versions (e.g., Dang et al., 2013). Importantly, 
the Stroop task does not require an initial "practice" period as the crossing off letters task is 
claimed to (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016); reading and processing the presented words is automatic. 
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Thus, use of the Stroop overcomes the complaints leveled by Baumeister and Vohs against the 
task used by Hagger et al. (2016). 
 The dependent self-control task chosen for the present study was likewise one used in 
previous research; namely, persistence at attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams. This task has 
been hypothesised to require persistence in the face of frustration (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998; 
Tyler & Burns, 2009). The degree to which a participant feels they have expended sufficient 
effort to satisfy experimenter demands (as a result of the initial task) will thus influence the 
amount of effort they are subsequently willing to exert at the anagram task. This task has, like 
the Stroop, been used successfully in previous research, and unlike the reaction time variance 
used by Hagger et al. (2016), there is no question that it satisfies the criteria of strength model 
researchers as a valid measure of self-control. In order to study the differential effects of both 
task difficulty and task duration, a control and an experimental version of the Stroop were used, 
either 100 presentations (short condition) or 300 presentations (long condition). 
 On the basis of both previous research results and drive theory, the following hypotheses 
were proposed: 
 (1) Based on the growing body of research which suggests that increasing the amount of 
“depleting” behavior a participant engages in will ameliorate the depletion effect (e.g., Converse 
& DeShon, 2009; Dang et al., 2013), it is hypothesized that there will not be a depletion effect in 
the longer condition. That is, because the longer condition may cause a change in participants' 
implicit beliefs about the degree of required effort, if a depletion effect is observed it is 
hypothesized to occur only in the short/hard condition. Therefore, persistence at attempting to 
solve unsolvable anagrams will be worse for participants in the short/difficult condition only. 
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 (2) Based on Dang et al.'s (2013) claims of task adaptation, performance over time at the 
Stroop will show improvement (in terms of both reaction speed and accuracy). In the short 
condition it is hypothesised that this improvement will appear continuous (i.e., there will be no 
"leveling out" of performance), consistent with Dang et al.'s findings. It is, however, 
hypothesised that performance over time in the long conditions will plateau. It is not anticipated 
that the long condition will prove effortful enough to demonstrate a subsequent decrease in 
performance following the initial improvement period. 
 (3) Furthermore, while improvement is expected to be seen in both the hard and easy 
Stroop conditions, the nature of the conditions make differences in both speed and accuracy 
likely. That is, there will be a main effect of task difficulty for both response speed and accuracy 
for performance over time at the Stroop task.  
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Design. 
The present study used a between-subjects 2 x 2 design. Task length (short [5 minutes] 
vs. long [15 minutes]) and task difficulty (easy vs. hard) were the manipulated independent 
variables. The primary dependent variable was the amount of effort exerted by participants, 
operationalised as amount of time spent persisting at attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams. 
Response speed and accuracy were both assessed to form the measure of Stroop performance. 
8.2.2 Participants. 
Eighty-four (58 female, 26 male) introductory psychology students from Western Sydney 
University volunteered for the experiment via an online research participation website, in 
exchange for course credit. An alternative to participation was available to students who did not 
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wish to engage in research participation. The average age of participants was 20.87 years (SD = 
4.76, range = 18-49 years). The majority of participants identified as Caucasian (50%). 
Additionally, 15.5% were Asian, 7.1% were Middle Eastern, 4.8% were African, 2.4% were 
Indigenous Australian, 2.4% were Pacific Islander, and 17.9% chose "Other". English was the 
first language of 82% of the sample, but 100% rated themselves fluent in English (relevant for 
both processing the Stroop, and for attempting anagrams). All participants were treated in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the Australian Psychological Society and WSU Human 
Research Ethics
8
. 
8.2.3 Materials. 
 Three short personality scales were included in the present experiment in order to ensure 
that baseline levels of self-control and social desirability did not differ between conditions. Two 
of the scales (Delaying Gratification Inventory [DGI]: Hoerger, Quirk, & Weed, 2011; Self-
Control Scale [SCS]: Tangney et al., 2004) relate specifically to self-control behaviours, while 
the third (Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form 1 [MCS1]: Ballard, 1992) 
relates to socially desirable behaviour (which, as argued in previous chapters, forms the basis of 
most self-controlled behaviours). 
8.2.3.1 Delaying Gratification Inventory.  
 The DGI consists of a 35-item self-report scale designed to provide an easy-to-administer 
measure of the ability to delay gratification, a form of self-regulation (Hoerger et al., 2011). The 
shorter, 10-item version (DGI-10; see Appendix A) is designed to provide a time-efficient 
measure of gratification-delaying ability, and was used in the present study. While the reliability 
                                                             
8 UWS HREC approval number H9616 (The acronym "UWS" refers to "University of Western Sydney", the name 
of Western Sydney University prior to its re-branding in 2015, and explains the use of this acronym on 
correspondence regarding ethics). 
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of the full DGI-35 has been reported as α = .90 by Hoerger et al. (2011), the reliability of the 
DGI-10 is a still acceptable α = .79. In addition, both the DGI-10 and the DGI-35 exhibit good 
external validity, with similar and expected correlations between gratification delay and other 
established measures of self-control and behavioural inhibition, such as the Self-Control Scale 
(SCS), the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS), and the Academic Delay of Gratification Scale 
(ADOGS) (Hoerger et al., 2011). 
 When completing the DGI-10, participants are required to indicate how much each item 
in the scale describes them, using a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). 
Example items are “I have always tried to eat healthy because it pays off in the long run” and “I 
try to spend my money wisely”. Five of the items in the DGI-10 are reverse-coded (e.g., “I 
would have a hard time sticking with a special, healthy diet”). The possible range of scores on 
the scale is 10-50, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to delay gratification. 
8.2.3.2 Self-Control Scale.  
 The SCS consists of a 36-item self-report scale designed to assess dispositional self-
control. As with the DGI, the shorter version of the scale (the Brief Self-Control Scale [BSCS]: 
Tangney et al., 2004) was used in the present studies as it is designed to be more time efficient. 
The BSCS consists of 13 items from the full 36-item Self-Control Scale (see Appendix B). The 
reliability of the BSCS as reported by Tangney et al. (2004) is between α = .83 and α = .85 
(compared to a reliability of α = .89 for the full SCS), indicating adequate internal reliability. 
Additionally, a recent meta-analysis found a significant relationship between the SCS and 
behavioural outcomes theoretically related to self-control, over and above that provided by the 
BIS or the Low Self-Control Scale (de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & 
Baumeister, 2012). 
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 The BSCS requires participants to respond to 13 items by indicating how much each item 
reflects how they typically are, using a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). Example items 
are “I am good at resisting temptation” and “I am able to work effectively toward long-term 
goals”. Nine items are reverse coded (e.g., “I have a hard time breaking bad habits”). The range 
of possible scores for the scale is 13-65, with higher scores indicating greater dispositional self-
control. 
8.2.3.3 Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale short form X1.  
 The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is typically used as a means of measuring 
socially desirable responding in larger questionnaires (Fischer & Fick, 1993). However, as 
argued in earlier chapters, the essence of self-controlled behaviour is the social desirability of it; 
thus, a social desirability scale may also serve as a rough proxy for the tendency to respond in a 
"self-controlled" manner. As with the previous two scales, a more time-efficient short form of 
the full 33-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS: Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
was used in the present experiment, the short form S1 (MCS1: Ballard, 1992). The MCS1 
consists of 11 True/False items relating to "...culturally acceptable and approved behaviours 
which are, at the same time, relatively unlikely to occur." (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  
 Internal consistency reliability scores are unfortunately slightly lower than is typically 
desirable in research (α = .69; Ballard, 1992), an artefact of the potentially less-than-ideal factor 
structure of the full scale (Loo & Loewen, 2004). However, a study performing confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) on multiple short forms of the SDS concluded that there was support for 
the use of short forms of the full SDS, and in addition suggested that the short form most 
consistently supported by various fit indexes was the MCS1 (Loo & Loewen, 2004). 
Additionally, a study by Fischer & Fick (1993) on several short forms of the SDS (using CFA) 
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concluded that all of the short forms represented a significant improvement on fit over the full 
scale. It should be noted, however, that Loo and Loewen (2004) observed internal consistency 
reliability of only α = .60 when performing a CFA, so results may need to be interpreted with 
caution. 
 The SDS (both full form and short forms) requires participants to read a number of items 
and indicate whether each item is true or false as it pertains to them personally. Example items 
are “I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget” and “I’m always willing to admit 
it when I make a mistake”. Items are dichotomously scored (one or zero), with some items keyed 
as true, and some keyed as false, such that indicating true to socially desirable behaviours and 
false to socially undesirable behaviours will result in a higher score on the scale. The range of 
possible scores on the scale is 0-11, with higher scores indicating that a person is more likely to 
respond in a socially desirable manner. 
8.2.3.4 Stroop task.  
 Manipulating initial participant effort was accomplished using a Stroop colour-naming 
task with various levels of difficulty. Previous research has supported the use of such a Stroop 
colour-naming task both as a measure (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006; Wallace & 
Baumeister, 2002) and as a manipulation (Bruyneel et al., 2009; Dang et al., 2013) of self-
control. In this task, colour words (e.g., red, green, blue) are displayed on a screen, and the text 
they are presented in is also coloured. In the low difficulty condition, words and text colour were 
congruent in 80% of trials (e.g., the word "red" presented in red text), while in the high difficulty 
condition, words and text colour were incongruent in 90% of the trials (e.g., the word "red" 
presented in yellow text). Bruyneel et al. (2009) introduced another rule designed to make the 
task more difficult, whereby every time a word presented in blue ink appeared the participant had 
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to indicate the word rather than the word colour; these deviations occurred in approximately 25% 
of trials (a similar approach was used in research by Bray, Ginis, Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008). 
This additional condition was retained in the present research to prevent participants from 
developing a response strategy that could be applied easily and consistently, thereby diminishing 
any difference between the control and experimental tasks. In addition, the time delay between 
presentations was held at a constant for the low difficulty condition (two seconds), while it was 
randomly generated for the high difficulty condition (between 0.5 and 3 seconds). Participants 
were asked to indicate, as quickly as possible, the text colour of a word presented on the screen 
(with the exception, in the high difficulty condition, of a word coloured blue), which they 
accomplished by using the mouse cursor to click on one of four buttons present on the screen 
(see Appendix D). 
8.2.3.5 Anagrams.  
 Assessing self-controlled behaviour following the initial task was accomplished with the 
use of an unsolvable anagram task. Such a task has previously been successfully employed as a 
measure of self-control, as it has been hypothesised that persisting in the face of frustration 
(which is supposed to occur as a result of being unable to solve any) requires self-control 
(Muraven et al., 1998; Tyler & Burns, 2009). In a similar vein, drive theory suggests that the 
degree of effort a participant is willing to exert on such a difficult task will be a function of the 
beliefs of the individual regarding required effort, and cognitions about recent effort. The 
anagram task used in the present experiment consisted of ten unsolvable anagrams, each one 
containing eight letters. Anagrams were formed by taking seven-letter words, scrambling them, 
and then adding a letter, making them unsolvable (all were run through a number of online 
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anagram solving databases to ensure this was the case). See Appendix E for full list of anagrams 
and instructions. 
8.2.4 Procedure. 
 Participants were tested individually, seated in a lab test room with a Lenovo notebook 
computer and asked to fill out an attendance sheet (in order to award research participation 
credit). They were then given the information sheet (Appendix F), with a cover story indicating 
that their participation was related to a study on how personality differences affect reaction speed 
in processing and problem solving ability. They then had any questions answered and signed the 
consent form (Appendix G), and were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions. 
 Participants in all conditions commenced by answering demographics questions, the 
DGI-10, the BSCS, and the MCS1. Questions from these three scales were presented one at a 
time, in a random order, via a web browser, and participants were required to actively select an 
option for each question before the next question was presented (i.e., the default option read 
"Please select an option"). This was designed to minimise careless responses, increasing 
response reliability.  
 Participants then began the Stroop colour-naming task. Participants were given the task 
instructions and informed that they would be exposed to a large number of presentations, and 
that completion of this task would depend on their reaction speed, but could take up to 15 
minutes. In reality, participants in the short task-length condition were only exposed to 100 word 
presentations, which took roughly five minutes. Participants in the long task-length condition 
were exposed to 300 word presentations, which took roughly 15 minutes. Participants completed 
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either the “high” difficulty version of the Stroop or the “low” difficulty version. Participant 
response accuracy and response time were recorded for each presentation. 
 Having completed the Stroop colour-naming task, participants were then informed that 
their problem solving ability would be tested. They were presented with a sheet of paper 
containing ten (unsolvable) anagrams, and asked to solve as many as they could. Participants 
were informed that the anagrams had been considered “extremely difficult” by participants in a 
pilot study, and that one of the effects the study was looking at was whether the response time 
task interfered with their ability to solve them. Participants were asked to make a serious attempt 
to solve all of the anagrams, but to inform the experimenter if they wished to stop before having 
done so, or if they were unable to solve any of them. If the participant did not voluntarily cease 
after 20 minutes, they were informed that enough time had passed and the experiment was being 
stopped. Amount of time spent persisting at this task formed the dependent variable for self-
control exertion. Participants were then debriefed, and asked not to discuss the experiment with 
their peers, in order to mimimise the chance that future participants’ results could be 
contaminated through discussion with prior participants. 
8.3 Results 
 No participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening was 
undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data, assess for outliers, and ensure no missing data. No 
data were missing for any participant, and no outliers were indentified for anagram persistence. 
Therefore, all available cases (N = 84) were retained for analysis. One-way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant differences between any of the experimental conditions for any of the personality 
scales (DGI-10, BSCS, MCS1), suggesting that baseline levels of self-control and socially 
desirable behaviour were equivalent between the groups. As the dependent task relied heavily on 
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language, it was considered that whether an individual’s first language was English might 
influence anagram persistence. A t-test was run to assess this, but found no significant difference 
in persistence between participants for whom English was their first language, and those for 
whom it was not, t(82) = 0.86, p = .39. 
8.3.1 Dependent measure - anagram persistence. 
 Because of the a priori nature of the hypothesis regarding anagram persistence (i.e., that 
the only participants to show reduced mean persistence would be those in the short/hard 
condition), a planned comparison was used, contrasting short/hard with the remaining three 
conditions. Descriptive statistics for the groups can be seen in Table 1. The test of homogeneity 
of variance was violated, indicating that variance was not equal between the groups; a correction 
was applied to the df as a result. The planned comparison revealed that mean anagram 
persistence did not differ significantly between the short/hard condition and the other three 
conditions, t(33.90) = -1.19, p = .24. Thus, there is no evidence that participants in the short/hard 
condition demonstrated any less persistence at the dependent anagram task than did participants 
in the other conditions.  
Table 1 
Mean Anagram Persistence in Seconds Between Stroop Conditions 
 Short Long Total 
Type of Stroop n M (SD) n M (SD)  
   Easy  21 457.00 (186.68) 21 619.14 (301.12) 538.07 (260.70) 
   Hard 22 677.41 (337.52) 20 664.05 (396.36) 671.05 (362.21) 
Total              569.77 (293.23)             641.05 (347.09)  
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As Table 1 shows, the least persistence was demonstrated by participants in the 
short/easy condition. A 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA was run to investigate this difference; however, 
it revealed no significant interaction, F(1, 80) = 1.64, p > .05, partial η² = .02. Thus, there is no 
evidence that participants in any condition demonstrated significantly less persistence at the 
anagram task than in any other. 
8.3.2 Stroop – performance over time. 
 In order to assess participants' performance over time at the Stroop task, a series of 
mixed-ANOVAs were conducted, using both reaction speed and accuracy as dependent 
variables. This was done because changes in performance could take one of several forms: a 
change in reaction time (e.g., participants begin responding more slowly, a typical measure of 
performance in strength model research); maintaining reaction speed, but changing accuracy 
(i.e., maintaining constant speed but increasing accuracy would represent increased 
performance);  or simultaneous changes in both reaction speed and accuracy. 
 The inclusion of the variable "Stroop Length" (short vs. long) meant that a single mixed-
ANOVA was inappropriate, as participants in the "short" condition were exposed to only 100 
Stroop presentations, while participants in the "long" condition were exposed to 300, making a 
single overall comparison impossible. As a result, two separate mixed-ANOVAs were run for 
each dependent variable. The first pair of these examined participant performance (reaction 
speed and accuracy) over the first 100 presentations, using the entire participant sample. Using 
the entire sample was appropriate, as, over the first 100 presentations participant experience was 
identical, regardless of which Stroop length condition they had been assigned to. The second pair 
of analyses examined only those participants in the "long" Stroop condition, and assessed their 
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performance over the full 300 presentations. For all analyses, the between-subjects factor was 
Stroop difficulty (easy vs. hard). 
The within-subjects factor was individual performance over time, labelled "Time". As it 
would be impractical to run a repeated-measures analysis with 100+ levels (i.e., the number of 
presentations received by the individual), blocks of presentations were averaged to produce five 
levels. For the first pair of analyses (100 presentations), this resulted in each level of the Time 
variable being the average of 20 presentations. For the second pair of analyses (300 
presentations), each level was the average of 60 presentations. Thus, each analysis was a 2 x (5 x 
S) mixed-ANOVA design. 
8.3.2.1 Reaction-time analysis, 100 presentations, all participants.  
The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main 
effect of Time, χ²(9) = 51.37, p < .001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .74), as per Field (2009). In addition, the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's test were violated at all five 
levels of the dependent variable. As the groups were relatively large, and equal (n = 42 for both), 
it was considered that the analysis was robust to such violations. 
Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, was significant, F(2.94, 241.35) = 12.91, p < .001, partial η² = .14. There is evidence 
that mean participant reaction speed at the Stroop changed at some point during the task. The 
main effect for Stroop difficulty (between-subjects) was significant, F(1, 82) = 88.55, p < .001, 
partial η² = .52, suggesting that, on average, reaction time was slower for participants in the Hard 
condition. The interaction between Time and Stroop difficulty, however, was not significant 
using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F(2.94, 241.35) = 2.04, p = .11, partial η² = .02, 
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suggesting that the differences in performance over time did not differ as a function of the 
difficulty of the Stroop. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of performance over time 
between the Stroop conditions. 
In order to assess the trend of participant performance over time, polynomial contrasts 
were used. With the interaction between Time and Condition proving non-significant, only 
contrasts for the main effect of Time were considered. As three contrasts achieved significance 
(linear, quadratic, and cubic), a visual inspection of the profile plot was used to determine which 
provided the best fit (see Figure 2). The plot suggested that a quadratic trend provided the best fit 
of the data, F(1, 82) = 9.59, p = .003, partial η² = .11. This was further supported by pairwise 
comparisons (using a Sidak adjustment for multiple comparisons), which showed that reaction 
speed at Time 1 was significantly longer than at any of the other time periods; reaction speed 
between the remaining time periods did not significantly differ. Thus, the data overall supports 
the notion that participant performance significantly improved from Time 1 to Time 2, and then 
leveled off (although a visual inspection shows a continuing trend towards improving reaction 
speeds). 
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Figure 1. Response speed in milliseconds across time between the easy and hard Stroop 
conditions (each time interval represents the average of 20 Stroop presentations). 
 
 
Figure 2. Combined Hard and Easy mean reaction time in seconds across time (each time 
interval represents the average of 20 Stroop presentations). 
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8.3.2.2 Accuracy analysis, 100 presentations, all participants.  
As for the reaction-time analysis, the within-subjects factor (Time) of the present analysis 
was created by averaging accuracy scores every 20 presentations. This provides the "Time" 
factor with five levels, tracking the average proportion of correct responses across the duration of 
the Stroop task. As in the previous analysis, the between-subjects factor was Stroop difficulty 
(hard vs. easy), using the entire participant sample. The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by 
Mauchley's test, was violated for the main effect of Time, χ²(9) = 45.47, p < .001. Therefore, 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimate of sphericity (ε = .831), as per 
Field (2009). In addition, the assumptions of homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's 
test were violated at all five levels of the dependent variable. As the groups were relatively large, 
and equal (n = 42 for both), it was considered that the analysis was robust to such violations. 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Huynh-Feldt correction, 
was not significant, F(3.33, 272.62) = 1.80, p = .14, partial η² = .02, indicating that average 
participant accuracy did not change significantly across the duration of the Stroop task. The main 
effect for Stroop difficulty (between-subjects) was significant, F(1, 82) = 25.76, p < .001, partial 
η² = .24, suggesting that, on average, accuracy was lower for participants in the Hard condition. 
The interaction between Time and Stroop difficulty was also significant using a Huynh-Feldt 
correction, F(3.33, 272.62) = 3.48, p = .01, partial η² = .04. Thus, accuracy appears not to vary 
purely as a function of how long the participant had been engaged in the task, but the difference 
in accuracy between the Hard and Easy conditions does appear to be a function of duration  (see 
Figure 3 for average accuracy over time between the groups). 
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 In order to assess the trend in the performance difference between the two conditions 
over time, polynomial contrasts were used. Both the linear (F[1, 82] = 4.13, p = .05) and 
quadratic (F[1,82] = 5.87, p = .02) contrasts were significant. Visual inspection of the profile 
plots suggested that the quadratic contrast provided the best fit (see Figure 3). The pattern of 
performance suggested that participants in the "Easy" condition maintained relatively stable 
accuracy across the duration of the task, while participants in the "Hard" condition demonstrated 
marked improvement followed by a leveling out. These results are similar to those concerning 
reaction speed, where performance was observed to improve, then plateau. There is no 
suggestion that performance decreased over the course of the short Stroop task. 
 
Figure 3. Average accuracy (as a proportion of correct responses) between Stroop conditions, 
across Stroop duration (each time interval represents the average of 20 Stroop presentations). 
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8.3.2.3 Reaction-time analysis, 300 presentations, long condition only.  
The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main 
effect of Time, χ²(9) = 54.86, p < .001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .59), as per Field (2009). In addition, the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's test were violated at all but the 
4th level of Time. Although the groups were smaller than the previous two analyses (Easy n = 
21; Hard n = 20), the differences in variance were also smaller and less significant; thus, it was 
considered that the analysis was robust to such violations. 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, was significant, F(2.38, 92.73) = 24.00, p < .001, partial η² = .38, suggesting that, on 
average, participants' reaction speed varied as a function of time spent on the task. The main 
effect for Stroop difficulty was significant, F(1, 39) = 48.54, p < .001, partial η² = .55, suggesting 
that, on average, reaction time was slower for participants in the Hard condition. The interaction 
between Time and Stroop difficulty was also significant using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, 
F(2.38, 92.73) = 6.96, p = .001, partial η² = .15, observed power = 0.95. Thus, there is some 
suggestion that the difference in reaction speed between Stroop conditions was a function of time 
spent completing the task (see Figure 4 for reaction speed over time between groups). 
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Figure 4. Response speed in milliseconds across time between the easy and hard Stroop 
conditions for long condition participants (each time interval represents the average of 60 Stroop 
presentations). 
 
For the main effect of Time, a quadratic trend appeared to be the best fit for the data, F(1, 
39) = 6.48, p = .02, partial η² = .14, suggesting that average participant reaction speed improved 
over the majority of the Stroop task, before levelling out (see Figure 4). However, for the 
interaction between Stroop condition and Time, the only polynomial contrast to achieve 
significance was linear, F(1, 39) = 13.35, p = .001, partial η² = .04. Thus, there is some 
suggestion that there was a linear decrease in the difference in reaction speed between Stroop 
conditions. This can be accounted for by the fact that reaction speed in the easy condition 
remained relatively stable across the duration of the task, while in the hard condition it showed 
consistent decreases over the first four time periods, before reversing slightly. 
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Further analysis was conducted for Easy and Hard conditions separately, using pairwise 
comparisons with a Sidak adjustment for multiple comparisons. For the Easy condition, the 
pairwise comparisons revealed that performance at Time 1 was significantly worse than at any of 
the other time periods, with no other significant differences. This indicates that performance in 
the Easy condition improved rapidly, before levelling off (although as seen in Figure 4, there was 
a continuing non-significant trend towards improvement over the duration).  
 For the Hard condition, there was an overall trend towards improvement in reaction 
speed. Performance at Time 1 was significantly worse than at times 4 and 5, as was performance 
at Time 2. Performance at Time 3 was significantly worse than at Time 4, but not Time 5. 
Performance did not significantly differ between Times 4 and 5. 
8.3.2.4 Accuracy analysis, 300 presentations, long condition only.  
 The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main 
effect of Time, χ²(9) = 44.39, p < .001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = .579), as per Field (2009). In addition, the 
assumptions of homogeniety of variance as assessed by Levene's test were violated at the first 
two levels of the Time variable. Once again, although the groups were smaller than the two 
analyses which used the entire participant sample, overall group sizes were still large and equal 
enough to be robust to such violations. 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, was significant, F(2.32, 90.39) = 4.72, p = .008, partial η² = .11, indicating that there 
was a significant difference in average participant accuracy (proportion correct) across the 
duration of the Stroop task. The main effect for Stroop difficulty (between-subjects) was also 
significant, F(1, 39) = 26.71, p < .001, partial η² = .41, suggesting that, on average, accuracy was 
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lower for participants in the Hard condition. The interaction between Time and Stroop diffiulty 
was also significant using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F(2.32, 90.39) = 4.60, p = .01, 
partial η² = .11, observed power = 0.81. Thus, the difference in accuracy between the Hard and 
Easy conditions appears to be a function of duration  (see Figure 5 for mean accuracy over time 
between groups). 
 In order to assess the trend in the performance difference between the two conditions 
over time, polynomial contrasts were used. For the main effect of Time, both the linear (F[1, 39] 
= 6.03, p = .02) and quadratic (F[1,39] = 6.73, p = .01) contrasts were significant. Visual 
inspection of the profile plots suggested that the quadratic contrast provided the best fit (see 
Figure 6 for the combined accuracy over time), with average participant accuracy increasing 
rapidly, before leveling off. For the interaction between Time and Stroop difficulty, both the 
linear (F(1, 39) = 7.30, p = .01) and quadratic (F(1,39) = 6.23, p = .02) contrasts were significant 
also. Again, the profile plots suggested that the best fit was quadratic, with participants in the 
"Easy" condition demonstrating relatively consistent accuracy across the duration of the task, 
while participants in the "Hard" condition evidenced rapid improvement, followed by levelling 
off. 
 However, follow-up analysis using pairwise comparisons and a Sidak adjustment 
revealed no significant differences between any of the time periods. The difference between 
Time 1 and 4 was the largest, and approached significance (p = .07), but no other difference 
could be said to. Nevertheless, the overall trend of the data appears consistent with that of 
reaction speed - improvement, followed by a plateau. 
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Figure 5. Average accuracy (as a proportion of correct responses) between Stroop conditions, 
across Stroop duration (each time interval represents the average of 60 Stroop presentations). 
 
 
Figure 6. Combined average accuracy (as a proportion of correct responses) across Stroop 
duration (each time interval represents the average of 60 Stroop presentations). 
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8.4 Discussion 
 The hypothesis that there would be a depletion effect observed in the short/hard condition 
was not supported in the present experiment. That is, participants' anagram persistence was not 
significantly worse in the short/hard condition than in any of the other conditions. Indeed, a 
follow-up analysis revealed that there was no observed depletion effect for any of the conditions. 
The hypotheses regarding performance over time at the Stroop task were broadly supported – 
there was initial improvement, followed by a plateau, and no sign of subsequent worsening; and 
there was a significant difference in both reaction speed and accuracy between the easy and hard 
groups. The caveat to this, however, is that the prediction made by hypothesis two was not 
supported – it was hypothesised that performance over time for 100 presentations would 
continually improve without plateauing; performance over time for 300 presentations was 
expected to show initial improvement followed by a plateau. In fact, almost the opposite was 
observed, with performance over 100 presentations appearing to plateau very quickly, and 
performance over 300 appearing to improve almost the entire time (for response speed; accuracy 
appeared to plateau more quickly).  
 The disparity in performance over time between the two duration conditions can be 
explained by appeal to the degree of detail each time-point encompasses – for the 100-
presentation analyses, each time-point represented the average of 20 presentations; for the 300-
presentation analyses, each time-point represented the average of 60 presentations. Given that 
although not significant, performance over the 100 presentations could still be seen to be 
trending towards improvement, it is unsurprising that the improvements in reaction speed were 
greater when averaged over 60 presentations than over 20.  
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 The fact that there was improvement over time is consistent with the findings of Dang et 
al. (2013). They claimed, however, that participants had adapted to the Stroop task within 144 
presentations, whereas participants in the present experiment demonstrated continual 
improvement up to 240 presentations (in the hard condition only; participants in the easy 
condition had little to adapt to and thus plateaued quickly). This difference may be due to 
slightly different protocols in administering the Stroop – Dang et al. used a version with a neutral 
stimulus (i.e., XXXX presented in coloured text), and subtracted response times on such trials 
from response times to colour words (also presented in coloured text). Given that their version 
was composed of 50% neutral stimuli and used only two colours (red and blue), it may have been 
that participants were able to adapt to the task more quickly than the present version.  
 The results of the present experiment were consistent with the claims of Carter and 
McCullough (2013, 2014), Carter et al. (2015), and Hagger et al. (2016), that the depletion effect 
may be no different from zero. However, a number of factors suggest caution when interpreting 
the findings. Four specific problems with the study were identified. 
 First, the power of the present experiment was extremely low. Although the sample size 
was comparable to that of many published studies, a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 software 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed that the present sample size would have 
provided adequate power only if the effect size was extremely large (d ≥ 0.80). As there is 
growing evidence that, even if the depletion effect does exist, the actual effect size is likely to be 
substantially lower than that reported by Hagger et al. (2010) of d = 0.62, the present sample size 
was likely too small to detect an effect even should one exist. This was based on both oversight 
(at the time of recruitment it was believed that the effect size was larger, based on the claims of 
244 
 
the Hagger et al. meta-analysis), and restrictions on recruitment size as a result of the available 
participant pool. Unfortunately this problem was evident in all three experiments. 
 Second, the instructions given to participants may have unduly influenced their 
expectations regarding the amount of effort required, and subsequently caused them to try harder 
at the dependent task. While it is tempting to say that this may have "masked" a depletion effect, 
the reality is that, according to drive theory, a depletion effect will only be observed when 
motivation to continue self-controlled behaviour changes. Thus, if the instructions given to 
participants increased motivation to perform the second self-control behaviour, then there was no 
"depletion" effect to observe – merely the effects of motivation. In particular, two of the 
instructions may have had such an effect. The first was that prior to engaging in the Stroop, 
participants were told that the task could take up to 15 minutes. This would have provided 
participants with explicit knowledge regarding the experimenter's expectations of them; the long 
condition, therefore, would have been entirely consistent with what participants were expecting, 
and participants in the short condition would likely have felt that they had expended less effort 
than was expected of them (leaving them more willing to exert effort at the subsequent anagram 
task). The second was that participants were told that the anagrams they were being asked to 
solve were "extremely difficult". This may have provided an explicit cue to participants 
regarding the experimenter's expectations of them, motivating them to persist for longer than 
otherwise. On the other hand, it could be that having been told that the anagrams were extremely 
difficult, participants had no expectation that they would solve many/any, and thus the task was 
not experienced as frustrating (it seems likely that it would be more frustrating to be told that a 
task was easy and yet be unable to complete it). 
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 Thirdly, the nature of the dependent task itself may have resulted in the lack of an 
observed depletion effect. Persistence at unsolvable anagrams has been previously theorised to 
be a self-control task because it requires continued effort in the face of frustration. If, however, 
the participants were expecting a very difficult version (as per the instructions), then not only 
will the degree of likely frustration engendered by the task be reduced, but it may be seen as an 
enjoyable challenge. The result of this is that the anagram task, rather than acting as a dependent 
measure of self-control, would actually do nothing of the sort. This is consistent with the 
findings of Moller, Deci, and Ryan (2006), who demonstrated that engaging in "autonomous" 
self-control (i.e., behaviours felt to be more interesting and freely engaged-in) did not produce a 
depletion effect, in contrast to engaging in "controlled" self-control (i.e., behaviours felt to come 
about as a result of pressure or coercion). If participants in the present study felt challenged by 
the anagram task, rather than frustrated, it may account for there being no depletion effect. 
 Lastly, the use of the Stroop task as a manipulation may have been less than ideal to 
cause a depletion effect. In their analysis of commonly-used depleting tasks, Hagger et al. (2010) 
claimed that the typical effect size when using a Stroop task was significantly smaller and more 
heterogenous than many other commonly-used tasks. Thus, the Stroop could be considered a 
less-than-perfect choice for eliciting a depletion effect. The present experiment neglected to 
include explicit manipulation checks as is standard in many strength model experiments, making 
it difficult to draw any conclusions about participants' subjective experience of the Stroop, which 
might provide more reliable information about whether it was perceived as differently effortful 
in the various conditions. Nonetheless, it was chosen for the present experiments because it was 
necessary to use a task at which performance could be constantly monitored, and because it has 
been used successfully before (albeit less reliably than other manipulations). However, just as 
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Baumeister and Vohs (2016) argued that Hagger et al.'s results were due to a poor choice of 
manipulation, it could be that the present lack of depletion effect was due to the choice of the 
Stroop.  
 Thus, in keeping with drive theory's suggestion that the beliefs and expectations of the 
drives play a prominent causal role in behaviour, a number of features of the experimental tasks 
used in the present experiment may have contributed to the lack of observed depletion effect, 
without necessarily supporting the claim that the effect does not exist. Notably, the use of the 
anagram task as a dependent variable seems particularly suspect when examining self-control 
behaviour, as its effectiveness relies entirely on participants finding the task frustrating, as 
opposed to challenging. It was decided, therefore, to replicate Experiment 1, but use a different 
dependent measure (one that more reliably related to self-control), as well as include a number of 
manipulation checks to assess participants' experience of the Stroop. 
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Chapter 9: Experiment 2 
9.1 Overview 
 The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate Experiment 1, maintaining the Stroop task as 
the initial self-control task, while substituting for the anagram task another commonly used 
measure of self-control: handgrip persistence. Despite the possible weaknesses of the Stroop 
mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 1, it was decided to retain it as the initial self-control 
task for Experiment 2 primarily because its ability to provide continuous monitoring of 
participant performance is unmatched by most other commonly-used initial self-control tasks.  
 Handgrip persistence has been used as a measure of self-control performance in a large 
number of strength model studies (e.g., Alberts et al., 2007, Study 1; Finkel et al., 2006, Study 4; 
Muraven & Shmueli, 2006; Muraven et al., 1998, Study 1; Seeley & Gardner, 2003, Studies 1 & 
2; Tyler, 2008, Study 2; Tyler & Burns, 2008, Study 1). Typically, the task involves having a 
participant hold a spring-loaded handgrip closed for as long as possible (taking a baseline 
measure and controlling for individual differences). This is hypothesised to require self-control 
as the participant is required to overcome discomfort as their muscles begin to fatigue. Muraven 
et al. (1998) claim that it functions as a measure of self-control as "...maintaining a grip is almost 
entirely a measure of self-control and has very little to do with overall bodily strength" (p. 777). 
Importantly, the handgrip task does not rely on participants' cognitions of the task to function as 
a self-control task – while the perception of the anagram task (e.g., finding it frustrating vs. not-
frustrating) changes the degree to which it supposedly assesses self-control behaviour, the 
handgrip task causes physical fatigue independently of perceptions of it. Thus, it should more 
reliably serve to measure the degree of effort participants are willing to exert in the second task. 
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 Besides the change in the dependent task, the present study also featured the addition of a 
number of manipulation checks. The lack of manipulation checks in Experiment 1 made it 
impossible to examine participants' subjective responses to the different Stroop conditions, 
which would have provided valuable information about how effortful it was perceived to be, how 
motivated participants were to do well at it, etc. It was felt that the inclusion of such checks in 
the present study, therefore, would allow for an investigation of the claim that the Stroop task 
does indeed function as an appropriate experimental manipulation for self-control research. 
 The hypotheses for Experiment 2 were largely unchanged from Experiment 1, despite the 
lack of observed depletion.  
 (1) It was hypothesised that with the change in dependent task, a depletion effect would 
be observed in the short/hard condition only (i.e., adaptation to task demands in the long 
condition would ameliorate any depletion effect).  
 (2) Because Stroop response accuracy rapidly approached 100% in even the hard 
condition in Experiment 1, it was decided to focus on response speed as the measure of 
performance over time in the present Experiment. In line with the performance observed in 
Experiment 1, it was again hypothesised that performance would show rapid improvement (i.e., 
increased response speed), followed by a leveling out, and no subsequent worsening. As the 
results of Experiment 1 suggested that participants in the easy condition maintained relatively 
stable performance, it was hypothesised that this improvement would be seen in participants in 
the hard condition only. It was hypothesised that this would appear to be the case in both the 
long and short conditions. 
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 (3) As with Experiment 1, it was hypothesised that there would be a main effect of Stroop 
difficulty on response time, such that participants in the easy condition would respond, on 
average, more quickly than would participants in the hard condition. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Design. 
 The present study used the same between-subjects 2 x 2 design as did Experiment 1. Task 
length (short [5 minutes] vs. long [15 minutes]) and task difficulty (easy vs. hard) were the 
manipulated independent variables. The primary dependent variable was the amount of effort 
exerted by participants, operationalised as the change in the amount of time spent squeezing a 
spring-loaded handgrip. Response speed formed the dependent measure of Stroop performance. 
9.2.2 Participants. 
 Eighty (61 female, 19 male) introductory psychology students from Western Sydney 
University volunteered for the experiment via an online research participation website, in 
exchange for course credit. An alternative to participation was available to students who did not 
wish to engage in research participation. The average age of participants was 21.91 years (SD = 
5.63, range = 17-43 years). The majority of participants identified as Caucasian (45%). 
Additionally, 22.5% were Middle Eastern, 17.5% were Asian, 7.5% were Central or South 
American, 3.8% were Maori or Pacific Islander, and 3.8% chose "Other". English was the first 
language of 80% of the sample, but 100% rated themselves as fluent in English (relevant for 
processing the Stroop). All participants were treated in accordance with the ethical standards of 
the Australian Psychological Society and WSU Human Research Ethics
9
. The present sample 
                                                             
9 UWS HREC approval number H9616 
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size provided adequate (.80) power to detect an effect size equivalent to that suggested by 
Hagger et al. (2010) of 0.64, assuming testing between two groups (e.g., hard vs. easy condition). 
However, should the true effect size be smaller – 50% of that suggested by Hagger et al., for 
example (0.32) – the present sample size would provide inadequate power (.30). Recruitment 
constraints, however, prevented a larger sample being obtained for the present experiment (as for 
Experiment 1). 
9.2.3 Materials. 
 The Stroop task used in the present experiment was identical to that used in Experiment 
1. Experiment 2 also retained the three scales used in Experiment 1 (DGI-10, BSCS, and MCS1). 
9.2.3.1 Dependent measure.  
 Self-control performance following the initial task was assessed by means of a handgrip 
persistence task. Participants were instructed to hold a spring-loaded handgrip closed for as long 
as possible, with a metal spoon held between the handles. Previous studies had reported using a 
wad of paper (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998), but pilot testing for the current study found it to be too 
unreliable. As the handles of the handgrip were foam-coated, the wad of paper would get stuck at 
various degrees of opening, causing variation in the determined “fail point”. Using a metal spoon 
overcame this limitation. Grip-persistence failure was judged as the time that the participant’s 
grip loosened enough for the spoon to fall. Persistence was measured by the experimenter 
through use of a stopwatch, out of view of the participant. Of interest was the change in 
persistence from before the manipulation to after; thus, the dependent measure was the difference 
between baseline grip-persistence and post-manipulation-task grip-persistence. 
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9.2.3.2 Manipulation checks.  
 Experiment 1 failed to include any manipulation checks, and was thus unable to provide 
insight into participants' subjective experience of the Stroop task (a factor with implications for 
the engaging in subsequent self-control behaviour). To overcome this shortcoming, the present 
experiment included several manipulation checks intended to assess participant experiences with 
the Stroop task. These included: a pre- and post-manipulation measure of tiredness, requiring the 
participant to rate their level of tiredness on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all tired; 7 = Extremely 
tired); a post-manipulation measure of concentration (“How hard were you concentrating on the 
previous task?”, 1 = Not at all; 7 = Extremely hard); a post-manipulation measure of effort 
(“How much effort did you put into the previous task?”, 1 = None; 7 = As much as I could); and 
a post-manipulation measure of difficulty (“How difficult did you find the previous task?”, 1 = 
Not at all; 7 = Extremely difficult). Previous studies have successfully used similar measures to 
assess the efficacy of self-control manipulations (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 
1998; Muraven et al., 2006). In general, it would be expected that participants who have found 
the task more tiring, difficult, and feel that they have expended more effort, would demonstrate a 
subsequently reduced motivation to persist at another aversive task (maintaining grip persistence 
in the face of muscle fatigue). 
 Also included in the present study was a measure of engagement/motivation (“How 
engaged were you with the previous task [that is, how motivated were you to do well]?”), and a 
measure of enjoyment ("How much did you enjoy the previous task?"). As with the previous 
scales, these measures required participants to rate, on a 7-point scale, their engagement and 
enjoyment of the Stroop task (1 = Not at all; 7 = Extremely). Drive theory suggests that, if there 
is a depletion effect, it is likely to occur due to shifts in motivation. Including measures of 
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motivation and enjoyment, therefore, allows for the investigation of whether this is the case or 
not. 
9.2.4 Procedure. 
 The procedure of the current experiment was largely identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Participants were seated in a lab test room with a Lenovo notebook computer and asked to fill 
out an attendance sheet (in order to award research participation credit). They were then given 
the information sheet, with a cover story indicating that their participation was related to a study 
on how personality differences affect reaction speed in processing, and the experience of fatigue. 
They then had any questions answered and signed the consent form, and were randomly assigned 
to one of the four experimental conditions. 
 Participants were then informed that, as the study was interested in examining fatigue, it 
was necessary to control for individual differences by gaining a baseline measure of handgrip 
strength. They were asked to squeeze the handles of a commercially available handgrip exerciser 
together for as long as possible. A metal spoon was inserted between the handles to provide an 
objective measure of relaxation of grip. The experimenter began timing with a stopwatch when 
the spoon was inserted between the handles, and stopped timing when the spoon fell. Consistent 
with Muraven et al. (1998), participants were given no feedback or encouragement regarding 
their grip persistence performance during or after the task, nor were they allowed to see how 
much time had elapsed. 
 After the initial assessment of their handgrip persistence, participants were required to fill 
out the three personality scales (DGI-10, BSCS, MCS1), presented in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1, and the pre-manipulation measure of tiredness. Following this, participants then 
engaged in the Stroop colour-naming task, again following the same procedure as Experiment 1. 
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As performance over time at the initial self-control task was of interest, data were collected on 
response speed and accuracy for the course of the task (although, as noted, only response speed 
was subsequently analysed). 
 After the participants completed the Stroop task, they answered the remaining 
manipulation-check questions (post-manipulation tiredness, concentration, enjoyment, difficulty, 
effort, and engagement). The experimenter then assessed their handgrip persistence again. The 
key measure was the duration of squeezing the handgrip, assessed in the same manner as the pre-
measure. The experimenter then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed the participants. 
9.3 Results 
 No participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening was 
undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data, assess for outliers, and ensure no missing data. No 
data were missing for any participant. Visual inspection of the data suggested several possible 
outliers; assessing the z-scores suggested that all fell within acceptable degrees of variability. 
Therefore, all available cases (N = 80) were retained for analysis. One-way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant differences between any of the experimental conditions for any of the personality 
scales (DGI-10, BSCS, MCS1), suggesting that baseline levels of self-control and socially 
desirable behaviour were equivalent between the groups.  
9.3.1 Manipulation checks. 
 A number of manipulation checks were included in the current study in order to assess 
the effectiveness of the initial self-control task. A series of 2 x 2 factorial ANOVAs were run to 
determine what effect the various Stroop conditions had on the manipulation check variables. 
Whether a participant was in the easy or hard Stroop condition had a significant impact on how 
difficult they found the task, F(1, 76) = 10.21, p < .01, partial η² = .12, indicating that 
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participants in the hard Stroop condition on average rated the task as significantly more difficult 
than did those in the easy Stroop condition. 
 Changes in reported tiredness (pre-manipulation – post-manipulation) were not 
significantly affected by Stroop difficulty. However, the main effect of Stroop length did have a 
significant impact, F(1, 76) = 17.93, p < .01, partial η² = .19, indicating that participants in the 
long Stroop condition exhibited significantly greater increases in self-reported tiredness 
following the manipulation. 
 Participants’ reported motivation to do well at the Stroop task (measured upon 
completion of the Stroop) were likewise significantly affected by the length of the Stroop task, 
F(1, 76) = 7.75, p < .01, partial η² = .09, indicating that participants in the long Stroop condition 
reported lower mean motivation to do well at the task at completion. 
 Neither Stroop length nor Stroop difficulty had any significant effect on participants’ 
reported enjoyment of the task, nor how much effort participants reported exerting in the task. 
Means for the manipulation checks can be seen in Table 2. 
9.3.2 Dependent measure – grip persistence. 
 To assess grip persistence, the mean change in persistence was calculated by subtracting 
baseline grip persistence from post-manipulation grip persistence, such that negative scores 
indicated a decrease in grip persistence, positive scores indicated an increase. A depletion effect 
would be observed if a condition demonstrated, on average, a greater decrease in grip persistence 
between to the two measures than did the other conditions. As with Experiment 1, because of the 
a priori nature of the hypothesis regarding grip persistence (i.e., that the only participants to 
show a greater reduction in mean grip persistence would be those in the short/hard condition), a 
planned comparison was used, contrasting short/hard with the remaining three conditions. 
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Descriptive statistics for the groups can be seen in Table 3. The assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met. The planned comparison revealed that mean changes in grip persistence did 
not differ significantly between the short/hard condition and the other three conditions, t(76) = -
0.47, p = .64. Thus, there is no evidence that participants in the short/hard condition 
demonstrated any greater decrease in grip persistence than did participants in the other 
conditions.  
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Manipulation Checks 
 Easy/Short 
M (SD) 
Hard/Short 
M (SD) 
Easy/Long 
M (SD) 
Hard/Long 
M (SD) 
Concentration 5.35 (1.50) 5.40 (1.23) 5.45 (1.40) 5.40 (1.00) 
Enjoyment 4.45 (1.40) 4.35 (1.60) 3.70 (1.49) 4.05 (1.43) 
Motivation 6.00 (0.97)
1 
5.85 (1.31)
1 
4.95 (1.43)
2 
5.40 (1.05)
2 
Difficulty 2.85 (1.23)
1 
3.65 (2.08)
2 
2.40 (1.27)
1 
3.70 (1.08)
2 
Effort 5.55 (1.23) 5.50 (1.57) 5.40 (1.10) 5.45 (0.69) 
Tiredness change 0.20 (0.52)
1 
0.10 (0.85)
1 
0.75 (0.97)
2 
1.05 (0.76)
2 
Note: Superscript numbers in a row indicate a significant main effect 
 
As Table 3 shows, grip persistence was relatively similar between all conditions, with a 
high degree of variance. A 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interaction; thus, there is no evidence to suggest that the change in grip persistence was 
significantly different between any of the conditions. 
 
256 
 
Table 3 
Mean Change in Grip Persistence in Seconds Between Stroop Conditions 
 Short Long Total 
Type of Stroop n M (SD) n M (SD)  
   Easy  20 -7.70 (19.53) 20 -4.15 (34.94) -5.92 (28.00) 
   Hard 20 -4.95 (20.49) 20 -11.70 (17.56) -8.33 (19.14) 
Total              -6.33 (19.80)             -7.93 (27.56)  
 
9.3.3 Stroop - performance over time. 
 As for Experiment 1, performance over the duration of the Stroop task was analysed 
using mixed ANOVAs, focusing on reaction speed as the DV. Two mixed ANOVAs were run: 
one examining reaction speed over 100 presentations (the length of the short Stroop condition), 
split by Stroop type (easy vs. hard); the other examining reaction speed over 300 presentations, 
split by Stroop type. As with Experiment 1, analysis of the 100 presentations included all 
participants, with reaction speed averaged every 20 presentations to provide five levels for the 
within-subjects factor, "Time". Analysis of the 300 presentations included only the participants 
from the long conditions, and performance was averaged every 60 presentations to provide the 
five levels for "Time". Thus, as with Experiment 1, the analyses were a 2 x (5 x S) mixed-design, 
with reaction speed as the DV. 
9.3.3.1 Reaction-time analysis, 100 presentations, all participants.  
The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main 
effect of Time, χ²(9) = 48.21, p < .001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .80), as per Field (2009). In addition, the assumptions of 
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homogeniety of variance as assessed by Levene's test were violated at all five levels of the 
dependent variable. As the groups were relatively large, and equal (n = 40 for both), it was 
considered that the analysis was robust to such violations 
Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Huynh-Feldt correction, 
was significant, F(3.21, 250.64) = 12.23, p < .001, partial η² = .14. Thus, there is some evidence 
to suggest that average participant reaction speed differed across the duration of the task. The 
main effect for Stroop difficulty (between-subjects) was significant, F(1, 78) = 76.71, p < .001, 
partial η² = .50, suggesting that, on average, reaction time was slower for participants in the Hard 
condition. The interaction between Time and Stroop difficulty was also significant using a 
Huynh-Feldt correction, F(3.21, 250.64) = 5.89, p < .001, partial η² = .07. Thus, the pattern of 
change over time appears to differ as a function of Stroop-type. Figure 7 provides a visual 
representation of performance over time between the Stroop conditions. 
In order to assess the trend of participant performance over time, polynomial contrasts 
were used. For the main effect of Time, three contrasts achieved significance (linear, quadratic, 
and cubic). However, given the significant interaction between Time and Stroop-type, it was 
considered main effect trends would be less illuminating than those of the interaction, for which 
both linear and quadratic contrasts were significant. A visual inspection of the profile plots (see 
Figure 7) suggested that a quadratic contrast provided the best fit for the data, F(1, 78) = 11.53, p 
= .001, partial η² = .13. Pairwise comparisons using a Sidak adjustment provided further support 
for this, showing that in the "Easy" condition there was no significant change in performance 
across the duration of the task, whilst in the "Hard" condition performance was significantly 
worse at Time 1 than at any of the other times. Thus, there is some suggestion that in the Hard 
condition performance improved rapidly before reaching a plateau, while performance in the 
258 
 
Easy condition was consistent across the duration. This pattern of performance is almost 
identical (within an acceptable margin of error) to that demonstrated in Experiment 1 – to be 
expected, given that the administration of the tasks was almost identical in both experiments. 
 
 
Figure 7. Response speed in milliseconds across time between the easy and hard Stroop 
conditions (each time interval represents the average of 20 Stroop presentations). 
 
   
9.3.3.2 Reaction-time analysis, 300 presentations, long condition only.  
 The assumption of sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main 
effect of Time, χ²(9) = 25.43, p = .003. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .721), as per Field (2009). In addition, the 
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assumptions of homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's test were violated at all five 
levels of Time. Group sizes were similar to those in Experiment 1 (n = 20 for both groups), so it 
was considered that the analysis was robust to such violations. 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, was significant, F(2.89, 109.64) = 2.82, p = .044, partial η² = .07, suggesting that, on 
average, participants' reaction speed varied as a function of time spent on the task. The main 
effect for Stroop Type was significant, F(1, 38) = 34.46, p < .001, partial η² = .48, suggesting 
that, on average, reaction time was slower for participants in the Hard condition. The interaction 
between Time and Stroop Type was also significant using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, 
F(2.89, 109.64) = 4.55, p = .005, partial η² = .11. Thus, there is some suggestion that the 
difference in reaction speed between Stroop conditions was a function of time spent completing 
the task. Figure 8 provides a visual representation of performance over time between the Stroop 
conditions. 
For the main effect of Time, the only polynomial contrast to achieve significance was 
linear, F(1, 38) = 5.02, p = .031, partial η² = .12, suggesting that the overall trend for participant 
performance was of improvement over the duration of the Stroop. Likewise, for the interaction 
between Stroop condition and Time, the only polynomial contrast to achieve significance was 
linear, F(1, 38) = 8.72, p = .005, partial η² = .19. Visual inspection of the profile plots (see Figure 
8) suggested that performance for participants in the Easy condition remained fairly constant 
over the course of the Stroop, while participants in the Hard condition demonstrated a linear 
improvement across the entire Stroop task. 
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Figure 8. Response speed in milliseconds across time between the easy and hard Stroop 
conditions for long condition participants (each time interval represents the average of 60 Stroop 
presentations). 
  
 Further analysis using pairwise comparisons using a Sidak adjustment, however, found 
no significant differences between any level of time for either group (when using the least 
squares difference, the only differences were for participants in the Hard condition, who 
performed significantly worse at Time 1 than at any other time, and significantly worse at Time 
2 than Time 3). Despite the adjusted comparisons suggesting no significant differences, there is a 
clear trend for participants in the hard condition to improve over time (with no evidence of that 
plateauing), while participants in the easy condition maintained relatively constant performance. 
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9.4 Discussion 
 As for Experiment 1, the hypothesis that there would be a depletion effect demonstrated 
by participants in the short/hard condition was not supported – there was no evidence that grip 
persistence in the short/hard condition decreased any more than that in any of the other 
conditions. Performance across the duration of the Stroop was likewise similar to that of 
Experiment 1 – as hypothesised, there was a main effect of task difficulty (hard vs. easy), with 
participants in the hard condition having a significantly slower reaction speed than did those in 
the easy condition. It was also hypothesised that participants in the hard conditions (both short 
and long) would show initial improvements in Stroop performance (i.e., faster reaction times), 
followed by a plateau in performance and no subsequent worsening. This was partially 
supported: in the short condition, as with Experiment 1, the improvement in performance 
appeared rapid, followed by a plateau; in the long condition, such improvement appeared 
continuous (with no observed plateau in performance). Thus, the hypothesis that there would be 
a plateau in performance was supported only in the short condition; in the long condition 
(although the Sidak-correction suggested that no changes in performance were significant) there 
was a clear trend towards improved reaction speed over the entire task with no obvious leveling 
off of performance. 
 The inclusion of manipulation checks in the present study allowed for a more in-depth 
analysis of the effect of the Stroop task on participants. It was expected that participants in the 
hard Stroop conditions would report increased levels of tiredness, concentration, effort, 
difficulty, and reduced motivation and enjoyment of the task than would participants in the easy 
Stroop conditions. However, task difficulty affected only difficulty perceptions, suggesting that 
the hard version of the Stroop was indeed perceived as more difficult than the easy. Task length, 
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however, had a negative effect on both tiredness (the longer the Stroop, the greater the increase 
in tiredness) and motivation (the longer the Stroop, the less the reported motivation to do well at 
the task). None of the remaining manipulation checks was significantly affected by either task 
length or difficulty. 
 The results of the manipulation checks provided useful information about participants' 
subjective experience of the Stroop task. Most telling is the lack of difference in reported effort 
between different Stroop conditions. Although participants in the hard condition did, indeed, 
report finding the task more difficult, the degree of effort they reported having exerted did not 
differ from participants in the easy condition, suggesting that all participants found the task 
equally effortful. Unlike the strength model, which suggests that the depleting qualities of the 
Stroop lie in its "required inhibition of dominant responses", drive theory suggests that for an 
initial task to cause subsequent depletion, it must be perceived as effortful by participants, such 
that they are caused to be less motivated to exert subsequent effort. The fact that there were no 
reported differences in experienced effort between the conditions, therefore, suggests that the 
lack of observed depletion may have been a result of all participants perceiving that they had 
exerted similar levels of effort. Thus, although reporting that the difficult version of the Stroop 
was, indeed, more difficult, that does not appear to have translated into an increase in 
subjectively experienced effort. 
 While participants in the long conditions did report a significant increase in tiredness, and 
reported significantly lower levels of engagement in the Stroop (that is, they reported having 
been less motivated to do well at it), the reported differences were not reflected in Stroop 
performance (i.e., there was continuous performance improvement over time). The reduced 
engagement in the Stroop reported in the long conditions appears not to have carried over to the 
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handgrip task – it appears that their motivation was compartmentalised to the Stroop task, 
separate from the handgrip. 
 As with Experiment 1, the present experiment suffered from extremely low power, as the 
design was similar and it used a similar number of participants. Thus, even if there was a 
depletion effect in the present experiment, the sample size may well have been too small to 
detect it. An immediately obvious solution to this problem would be to increase sample size. In 
the present study, as for Experiment 1, as noted, this was not possible due to recruitment 
limitations. Furthermore, as these experiments were conducted prior to the release of the 
replication attempt of Hagger et al. (2016), it was originally believed that the depletion effect, if 
it existed, would exhibit a larger effect size than may actually be the case – that is, required 
sample sizes were determined based on an effect size of 0.64, for which they would be 
acceptable. Given that this effect size now appears to be far more optimistic than is the actual 
case, the power of Experiments 1 and 2 is lacking, limiting the confidence in the conclusions that 
can be drawn from them. 
 Despite this, the results of Experiment 2 are consistent with the claim that there is no 
depletion effect, although, due to the abovementioned limitations, such an interpretation should 
be made cautiously. Most importantly, however, the results are consistent with drive theory – the 
fact that participants in no condition reported exerting significantly more effort than those in any 
other condition makes the fact that no depletion effect was observed unsurprising. That, indeed, 
is exactly what drive theory would predict – depletion will only be observed if a task is perceived 
to be effortful enough to cause a shift in motivation away from further self-control behaviours 
and/or towards more gratifying behaviours. It appears, based on the manipulation checks, that the 
Stroop is not such a task. That does not mean, however, that the depletion effect does not exist – 
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merely that it was not observed in the present experiment as a result of the present stimuli failing 
to adequately manipulate the degree of perceived effort exerted by participants. Thus, 
Experiment 3 was designed to be a further replication of Experiments 1 and 2, using a different 
manipulation task more likely to affect levels of perceived exertion. As for Experiments 1 and 2, 
Experiment 3 suffered from recruitment limitations that prevented the use of a sample size large 
enough to overcome the limited power problem observed thus far.   
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Chapter 10: Experiment 3 
10.1 Overview 
 The lack of observed depletion in Experiments 1 and 2 is consistent with the claim that 
the depletion effect may not exist. It is also consistent, however, with the idea that the effect 
occurs some of the time – that is, that there are situations in which initial self-control behaviour 
will cause reductions in subsequent self-control – but that the previous two experiments were not 
examples of such times. In Experiment 1, it was argued that the anagram task used as a 
dependent variable was likely to function as a "self-control" task only when it is genuinely 
perceived as frustrating (which, given the instructions provided in Experiment 1, was not a 
guarantee), and it was noted that the Stroop has a record of producing smaller and more 
heterogeneous effect sizes. In Experiment 2, manipulation checks included with the Stroop 
revealed that it failed to successfully manipulate the degree of perceived effort expenditure by 
participants – which, according to drive theory, is a key requirement of any depletion effect. 
Thus, it was decided that Experiment 3 would replicate Experiment 2, substituting for the Stroop 
task another commonly used task – the "Crossing off letters" task (Baumeister et al., 1998). 
 The Crossing off letters task has been successfully used as a depleting task in numerous 
strength model experiments (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; DeWall et al., 2008; Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007; Muraven, 2008; Tice et al., 2007; Tyler & Burns, 2009). The mechanism by 
which it supposedly draws upon self-control is similar to that of the Stroop – participants are 
required to inhibit an initial impulse, substituting a less-instinctive response in its place 
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Hagger et al., 2010). Although this should, theoretically, mean that it 
is no more effective a task than is the Stroop, the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. suggests 
otherwise – it results in larger and more homogenous effect-sizes than does the Stroop, and is 
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more commonly used as an initial task. Furthermore, the version of the Crossing off letters task 
used in the present experiment, while administered electronically, overcomes the shortcoming 
pointed out by Baumeister and Vohs (2016), as it includes an initial "habituation" phase whereby 
the act of crossing off letters should become a practiced and automatic response. 
 The aim of Experiment 3, therefore, was identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2 – to 
explore participant performance over the duration of the initial self-control task (in this case, 
crossing off letters), and to attempt to find evidence of a depletion effect. The hypotheses also 
remained unchanged – despite the lack of a depletion effect in Experiments 1and 2, it was 
expected that the hypothesised effect (i.e., a depletion effect for the short/hard condition only) 
would be observed in the present experiment as a result of a more effortful initial task.  
 The hypotheses regarding performance over time were likewise retained for the present 
experiment. However, as best as can be determined, the present experiment represented the first 
attempt to assess performance over time at the Crossing off letters task.  As such, it was not 
possible to use an established metric by which to judge performance. The results section details 
possible approaches to assessing performance over time at the Crossing off letters task. In 
general, it was hypothesised that there would be a difference between task difficulty conditions 
in performance, and it was hypothesised that, as with the Stroop, there would be an initial 
learning phase followed by a plateau in ability. 
10.2 Method 
10.2.1 Design. 
 The present study used the same between subjects 2 x 2 design as Experiments 1 and 2, 
although the "long" condition was shortened to ten minutes. This was done in order to 
accommodate the initial habituation phase while still maintaining a similar experimental duration 
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to Experiment 2. Task length (short [5 minutes] vs. long [10 minutes]) and task difficulty (hard 
vs. easy) were the manipulated independent variables of interest. The primary dependent 
variable, as for Experiment 2, was the amount of effort exerted by participants, operationalised 
as amount of time spent squeezing a spring-loaded handgrip. 
10.2.2 Participants. 
 Eighty-five (64 female, 21 male) introductory psychology students from Western Sydney 
University volunteered for the experiment via an online research participation website, in 
exchange for course credit. An alternative to participation was available to students who did not 
wish to engage in research participation. Individuals who had participated in Experiments 1 or 2 
were excluded from the current study, to avoid contamination of results, and two participants 
were excluded due to failing to adhere to experimenter instructions. Therefore, a total of 83 
students made up the examined sample (64 female, 19 male). The average age of participants 
was 19.65 years (SD = 2.72, range = 18-35 years). The majority of participants identified as 
Middle Eastern (30.1%). Additionally, 24.1% were Asian, 22.9% were Caucasian, 3.6% were 
Maori or Pacific Islander, 2.4% were African, and 16.9% chose "Other". English was the first 
language of 73.5% of the sample, but 100% rated themselves as fluent in English (relevant for 
processing the crossing off letters task). All participants were treated in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the Australian Psychological Society and WSU Human Research Ethics
10
. 
The same power considerations and limitations as for Experiment 2 applied to Experiment 3. 
                                                             
10 UWS HREC approval number H9616 
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10.2.3 Materials. 
 Excepting the manipulation task, the materials used in the present experiment were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2 (DGI-10, BSCS, MCS1; the manipulation checks; and 
the dependent self-control task, handgrip persistence). 
10.2.3.1 Crossing off letters task.  
 Because the Stroop task failed to elicit any change in perceived effort expenditure 
between groups, it was decided that the present experiment would use a different manipulation 
that still allowed for performance over time to be monitored. Thus, the present experiment 
elected to use a version of the standard “Crossing off letters” task used by previous researchers 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; DeWall et al., 2008; Tice et al., 2007; etc.). The standard version 
of this task as used in previous studies involves participants crossing off all instances of a certain 
letter (often the letter “e”) within a passage of text for a set time, so that it becomes a well-
practiced response. Hard versions (i.e., "depleting" versions) of the task then require participants 
to continue crossing off the letter in a new passage of text, but following certain rules designed to 
make them inhibit their initial impulse (e.g., cross off all instances of the letter “e”, unless it is 
next to another vowel or one letter away from a vowel). Non-depleting versions of the task 
simply have participants continue to cross off instances of the chosen letter, with no inhibitory 
rules. 
 The present experiment followed the standard design, with minor modifications. First, the 
text was presented on a computer screen (rather than a physical piece of paper), requiring 
participants to click on the letter with the cursor (as opposed to actually crossing it out). Second, 
letters that had been clicked on became highlighted, rather than being struck through – a 
cosmetic difference designed to improve visibility of already-clicked letters (once highlighted, 
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they could not be un-clicked, to discourage indiscriminate clicking). Third, the text that 
participants were presented with was presented one paragraph at a time, with each paragraph 
remaining on-screen for 20 seconds. Each paragraph presented was long enough that 20 seconds 
was not enough time to reach the end, even in low self-control conditions. This was done in an 
attempt to control for individual differences in reading speed – as the distribution of letters is not 
uniform within a passage of text, it was thought that fast readers might progress further in a 
passage than slower readers, varying the number of target letters (in the present experiment, the 
letter "e" was used) that they were exposed to. In presenting individual paragraphs, all 
individuals should have been exposed to a wide spectrum of the overall passage, ideally 
eliminating some of the distribution bias. Administering the task via computer allowed for 
recording accuracy and speed data from the crossing off letter task, enabling assessment of 
individual performance over time – to date, there appear to have been no other studies that have 
attempted this. 
 As mentioned, the structure of the task was identical to that used by previous studies. All 
participants engaged in crossing off every instance of the letter “e” in a passage of text for four 
minutes (12 individual paragraph presentations). Participants in the short condition then 
continued for a further five minutes, while those in the long condition continued for 10 minutes. 
In the easy condition, participants were instructed merely to keep clicking every instance of the 
letter “e” that they could find. In the hard condition, as per previous research, participants were 
instructed to cross off every “e” unless it was next to another vowel or one letter removed from 
another vowel (e.g., they would not cross off the “e”s in “break”, “level”, etc.). 
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10.2.4 Procedure. 
 The procedure for the present experiment was identical to that of Experiment 2, with the 
substitution of the “crossing off ‘e’s” task for the Stroop task. The cover story provided to 
participants was also modified slightly, from the study ostensibly involving individual 
differences in reaction time and experienced fatigue, to investigating individual differences in 
short-term muscular endurance and attention to detail. 
10.3 Results 
 No participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening was 
undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data, assess for outliers, and ensure no missing data. No 
data were missing for any participant. Two participants were identified as being outliers for the 
change in grip persistence, with z-scores > 3.29. As per the suggestion of Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007), these were modified to be one more than the next most extreme scores in their 
conditions. Therefore, all available cases (N = 83) were retained for analysis. One-way ANOVAs 
revealed no significant differences between any of the experimental conditions for any of the 
personality scales (DGI-10, BSCS, MCS1), suggesting that baseline levels of self-control and 
socially desirable behaviour were equivalent between the groups.  
10.3.1 Manipulation checks. 
 A number of manipulation checks were included in the current study in order to assess 
the effectiveness of the initial self-control task. A series of 2 x 2 factorial ANOVAs were run to 
determine what effect the various Crossing off letters conditions had on the manipulation check 
variables. Whether a participant was in the easy or hard task condition had a significant impact 
on how difficult they found the task, F(1, 79) = 22.72, p < .01, partial η² = .22, indicating that 
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participants in the hard condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.52) on average rated the task as significantly 
more difficult than did those in the easy condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.86). 
 Neither task length nor task difficulty had any significant effect on the remaining 
manipulation check scores. There were no significant differences between any of the groups for 
changes in tiredness, motivation, enjoyment, how much effort was exerted, or how much 
concentration they had claimed to use on the task. Means and standard deviations for the 
manipulation checks can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Manipulation Checks, by Group 
 Easy/Short 
M (SD) 
Hard/Short 
M (SD) 
Easy/Long 
M (SD) 
Hard/Long 
M (SD) 
Concentration 5.23 (1.57) 5.81 (0.81) 5.55 (1.10) 5.50 (0.95) 
Enjoyment 3.27 (1.49) 3.95 (1.91) 3.70 (1.49) 3.45 (1.32) 
Motivation 4.91 (1.72) 5.29 (1.42) 5.25 (0.91) 5.20 (1.11) 
Difficulty 2.77 (1.95)
1 
4.71 (1.35)
2 
2.80 (1.80)
1 
4.45 (1.70)
2 
Effort 4.82 (1.59) 5.62 (0.67) 5.55 (0.89) 5.40 (1.00) 
Tiredness change 0.50 (1.01) 0.19 (1.17) 0.75 (0.91) 0.85 (1.31) 
Note: Superscript numbers indicate that the main effect for task difficulty was significant. 
10.3.2 Dependent measure – grip persistence. 
 As in Experiment 2, grip persistence was assessed by calculating the mean change in 
persistence between pre- and post-manipulation. As before, it was calculated by subtracting 
baseline grip persistence from post-manipulation grip persistence, such that negative scores 
indicated a decrease in grip persistence, positive scores indicated an increase. A depletion effect 
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would be observed if a condition demonstrated, on average, a greater decrease in grip persistence 
between the two measures than did the other conditions. As with Experiments 1 and 2, because 
of the a priori nature of the hypothesis regarding grip persistence (i.e., that the only participants 
to show a greater reduction in mean grip persistence would be those in the short/hard condition), 
a planned comparison was used, contrasting short/hard with the remaining three conditions. 
Descriptive statistics for the groups can be seen in Table 4. The assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met. The planned comparison revealed that mean changes in grip persistence did 
not differ significantly between the short/hard condition and the other three conditions, t(79) = -
0.20, p = .84. Thus, there is no evidence that participants in the short/hard condition 
demonstrated any greater decrease in grip persistence than did participants in the other 
conditions.  
 As Table 4 shows, the change in grip persistence was relatively stable across conditions. 
A 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interaction; there is no 
evidence that experimental condition had any effect of changes in grip persistence. 
 
Table 5 
Mean Change in Grip Persistence in Seconds Between Manipulation Conditions 
 Short Long Total 
Task Difficulty n M (SD) n M (SD)  
   Easy  22 -8.09 (15.56) 20 -4.95 (18.91) -6.60 (17.09) 
   Hard 21 -5.57 (17.08) 20 -6.10 (11.51) -5.83 (14.45) 
Total              -6.86 (16.17)             -5.53 (15.46)  
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10.3.3 Performance over time – crossing off letters. 
10.3.3.1 Difficulties.  
 Assessing participant performance over the duration of the crossing off letters task 
presented a unique challenge. As far as can be determined, no-one has previously attempted to 
examine participant performance at this task – its success as a depleting task has been assumed, 
based on observed decrements in self-control performance following administration of the task. 
As a result, there is no template for how performance should be assessed, and a number of 
factors combine to make it a significantly different endeavour from the scoring of the Stroop task 
(despite superficial similarities in the strength model's claims of the mechanism by which both 
are meant to deplete self-control).  
 When a participant is faced with a Stroop presentation, the stimulus itself is fairly 
unambiguous – a colour word on a screen (or card), requiring the participant to either read the 
text of the word, or give the colour that it is presented in. Assessing performance at such a task, 
then, is quite straightforward – accuracy (as a binary variable, which can be averaged to give a 
proportion of correct responses), and response time (as a continuous variable). The participant 
isn't required to locate the stimulus – there is no concern as to whether they have seen it or not – 
and it is easy to impose an upper limit on the length of time that the stimulus is presented. 
 In the Crossing off letters task, however, the requirements of participants are significantly 
different. Unlike the Stroop task, the first thing a participant is required to do in the crossing off 
letters task is to scan the text and locate a relevant stimulus (i.e., the letter "e"). In the easy 
condition, the task of locating the stimulus is essentially equivalent to crossing it off, as there are 
no other rules to follow, and no reason (other than laziness) to fail to cross off the letter. Thus, in 
the easy condition, performance follows the basic pattern of: locate appropriate stimulus → cross 
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off stimulus → move to next stimulus. This initial "location" requirement immediately 
introduces a larger amount of participant variance than does the Stroop – participant performance 
will be impacted by the number of targets they successfully locate. 
 In the hard condition, however, there are additional location confounds. The initial 
requirement is the same – the participant must locate an initial target stimulus. Having done so, 
they must then apply the given rule ("Do not cross off the letter "E" if it is next to a vowel, or 
one letter away from a vowel"). This requires a level of secondary (and more complex) stimulus 
detection – having located an initial stimulus candidate, the participant must then perform a 
secondary scan of surrounding letters for letters that would invalidate their present target. Should 
any such letters be present, and the participant fails to detect them and incorrectly clicks/crosses 
off the target letter, their response is technically invalid – they have not correctly applied the rule 
they are required to follow. However, the dual-level detection required of the task means that 
such incorrect responses may not represent a failure to "inhibit an impulse", but rather a 
detection failure. 
 Thus, the question is raised as to how to accurately assess participant performance across 
the duration of the task in the hard condition. In the easy condition, performance can be 
relatively easily assessed via response rates – with no additional rules to follow, performance is 
measured by how many targets they find and cross-off (although such a measure really assesses 
reading speed, as there is little self-control required). The hard condition, including as it does the 
possibility that a crossed off letter is an invalid target, is less easily assessed, and not directly 
comparable with the Easy condition. Several options present themselves: 
1. Assess only correct responses. Such an approach is less than ideal, as it lacks the 
ability to distinguish between participants who are applying the rule correctly and those 
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who are simply clicking on every target they see (and failing to apply the rule at all). For 
example, a participant could achieve an average correct response rate of two per time 
period by carefully and conscientiously applying the rule, and crossing off only those 
targets that they judge as meeting the criteria. By the same token, a participant could 
achieve the same result by simply clicking every target they come across, without regard 
for the rule. Their average correct responses would be the same, but the second 
participant would have a far greater number of false positives/incorrect responses. 
However, should such cases be weeded out through preliminary analysis, assessing only 
correct responses may be a viable measure of performance. 
2. Assess the proportion of correct/incorrect responses. Such an approach gives 
more detailed information than assessing only correct responses, as it allows for the 
differentiation between participants who are attempting to apply the rule, and those who 
are not. However, looking at only proportion of correct responses gives no information 
about the overall number of responses. For example, a participant could dutifully and 
consistently attempt to apply the rule, but make a number of incorrect selections due to 
detection errors, and end up with an average proportion correct of 25%. By the same 
token, a participant could select every target they come across and end up with the same 
proportion correct, despite a lack of effort in applying the rule. It is almost certain, 
however, that the hypothetical participant in the second case would have a far higher rate 
of total responses than would the first participant. Thus, again, it would be necessary to 
engage in preliminary analysis to weed out those participants not making any attempt to 
apply the required rule. Also, a participant could show a decrease in performance despite 
maintaining a static proportion of correct responses, compensating by becoming slower 
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overall (i.e., total responses go down, proportion correct remains the same). Thus, 
assessing proportion only is not a valid measure of performance. 
3. Assess a combination of total responses, and total correct. Such an approach 
appears to be the best method for capturing performance over time. Of the two variables, 
total responses is likely the most important – it gives a clear indication of whether the 
participant is attempting to apply the rule or not. Participants who are attempting to apply 
the rule should, on average, show a much lower rate of responding than participants who 
are not (and whose response rate should not differ significantly from participants in the 
Easy condition). As this approach looks at total responses (both correct and incorrect) for 
each time period, the second variable could be either total correct, or proportion correct - 
both amount to the same information.  
 Changes in performance over time could thus be observed in one of several ways:  
i. A change in total responses, with no change in total correct. For example, if 
response rate goes up, but total correct remains the same, it would suggest that the 
participant is being less careful with their application of the rule (i.e., performance is 
decreasing). However, if response rate goes down, but total correct remains the same, it 
could indicate that the participant is becoming more careful with their application of the 
rule (performance increase – the overall proportion correct would be increasing). 
ii. Total number of responses stays constant, total correct changes. If the number of 
responses doesn't change, but total correct goes up or down, it is a clear indication of the 
participant's performance increasing or decreasing. 
iii. A change in both total number of responses, and total correct. What this would 
indicate would be dependent on the nature of the interaction between the two variables – 
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an increase in total correct coupled with a decrease in total responses (and therefore an 
increase in proportion correct), for example, would likely indicate increased performance, 
as the participant sacrifices speed for accuracy. A decrease in both variables would 
clearly indicate a decrease in performance, etc. 
 
 From the point of view of drive theory, as an absolute value, accuracy in a given block of 
presentations is somewhat less important than would be expected. That is, if a participant is 
demonstrably attempting to apply the rule (i.e., demonstrates a significantly lower rate of 
responding than participants in the Easy condition), then it can be assumed that they are exerting 
effort, and will therefore feel that they have done more than will participants in the Easy 
condition (i.e., they will be "depleted"). The depletion effect, therefore, would be a result of the 
attempt to apply the rule, performance at which can be assessed by trends in the data as noted. In 
contrast to this, the strength model suggests that crossing off letters only depletes self-control 
when participants successfully inhibit the impulse to cross off a letter – no consideration has 
been paid to the notion of detection errors, or assessing performance at all.  
 In summary, assessing performance over time for the Crossing off letters task is a 
significantly more challenging task than assessing performance for the Stroop. The fact that the 
hard condition includes the possibility of "bad" letter selections, and includes a much smaller 
pool of valid target letters, makes it impractical to compare against the easy condition. However, 
average performance in the easy condition forms a useful benchmark by which to assess 
individual performance in the hard condition, and to determine whether a participant is actively 
attempting to apply the rule or not. 
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10.3.3.2 Performance over time, short condition, all participants.  
 In order to assess performance over time, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, 
with two factors: Time, with five levels, and Metric, with two levels (denoting whether the 
performance metric was the total number of responses, or the number of correct responses). 
Because performance in the easy condition was not being considered in the analysis, only 
participants in the hard condition were included in the analysis. The assumption of sphericity, as 
assessed by Mauchley's test, was violated for the main effect of Time, χ²(9) = 38.80, p < .001. 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Grenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε 
= .64), as per Field (2009). 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time, using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, was significant, F(2.58, 102.28) = 37.48, p < .001, partial η² = .48. Thus, there is 
some evidence to suggest that average total participant responses differed across the duration of 
the task. The main effect for Metric (i.e., the difference between total responses and correct 
responses) was significant, F(1, 40) = 75.27, p < .001, partial η² = .65, suggesting that, on 
average, for participants in the hard condition average total responses significantly differed from 
average correct responses. The interaction between Time and Metric was also significant using a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F(3.47, 138.77) = 5.18, p = .001, partial η² = .12. Thus, the 
pattern of change over time appears to differ depending on which metric of performance is 
assessed. 
 While both quadratic and order 4 polynomial contrasts were significant for the interaction 
between Time and Metric, a visual inspection of the plot of both suggests caution when 
interpreting either (see Figure 9). An examination of the profile plot shows both levels of Metric 
changing in concert with one another, suggesting that variations may have been due to target 
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availability. Furthermore, although the plot shows significantly lower response rates (in terms of 
both total responses and accuracy) at Time 3, this drop corresponds to a similar drop in easy 
condition performance. Thus, such a drop was likely due to target availability rather than being 
truly constrained by performance. That being the case, it is not clear that attempting to interpret 
the polynomial contrasts is of value in the present case when it comes to assessing performance 
over time. The variation caused by differing availability of targets makes meaningful 
interpretation difficult over the short condition.  
10.3.3.3 Performance over time, long condition, long participants only.  
 As with analysis of the short condition, a repeated measures ANOVA with two factors 
(Time, and Metric) was conducted for the participants of the long condition. The assumption of 
sphericity, as assessed by Mauchley's test, was met for the present analysis. 
 Using an alpha level of .05, the main effect for Time was significant, F(4,76) = 6.15, p < 
.001, partial η² = .24. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that average total participant 
responses differed across the duration of the task. The main effect for Metric (i.e., the difference 
between total responses and correct responses) was significant, F(1, 19) = 40.91, p < .001, partial 
η² = .68, suggesting that, on average, for participants in the hard condition average total 
responses significantly differed from average correct responses. The interaction between Time 
and Metric was not significant, F(4, 76) = 1.99, p = .10, partial η² = .10. Thus, the pattern of 
change over time appears not to differ as a function of which metric is being assessed. 
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Figure 9. Average number of total responses and average number of correct responses over five 
minutes for the hard version of the crossing off letters task, short condition. 
 
 For Time, both cubic and order 4 polynomial contrasts were significant, suggesting a 
non-linear change in performance (as combined total responses and correct responses) over the 
duration of the long crossing off letters task. Again, however, interpretation of these is 
confounded by the fact that a large amount of the variation appears to be a result of target-letter 
availability per time-period. Figure 10 provides a visual representation of the relationship 
between Total number of responses and number of correct responses over time at the long 
version of the task. As can be seen, there is no consistent trend to emerge from the overall data; it 
is clear, however, that performance in terms of error rate/number of correct responses remained 
constant throughout the task. Figure 11 provides a visual representation of the average number of 
total responses made by participants in the easy and hard conditions over 10 minutes. As can be 
seen, the pattern of responses between the two is broadly consistent, supporting the notion that 
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much of the variability causing significant polynomial contrasts is due to target-letter 
availability. 
 
 
Figure 10. Average number of total responses and average number of correct responses over ten 
minutes for the hard version of the crossing off letters task, long condition. 
10.4 Discussion 
 The hypothesis that there would be a depletion effect observed in the short/hard condit ion 
was not supported in the present experiment – grip persistence did not significantly differ 
between any of the experimental conditions. In this, the results were identical to those of 
experiments 1 and 2, which likewise found no depletion effect. The hypothesis that there would 
be an improvement in performance at the crossing off letters task, followed by a plateau, was not 
clearly supported by the present experiment. Although there certainly appeared to be no 
systematic decrease in performance over time, the large degree of variability in target-letter 
availability makes it impossible to claim that there was a systematic increase either. Although it 
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was not explicitly tested for, there was a clear effect of task difficulty, with participants in the 
easy condition "crossing off" far more target letters than did participants in the hard condition. 
 
 
Figure 11. Average number of total responses between hard and easy conditions over ten 
minutes, long condition. 
 
 The results of the manipulation checks suggest that regardless of the experimental 
condition to which they were assigned, participants reported expending an equivalent amount of 
effort on the manipulation task. This is at odds with previous published studies, including the 
replication by Hagger et al. (2016), who reported that the difficulty of their version of the 
crossing off letters task resulted in a large effect size for perceived effort (d = 0.86, 95% CI 
[0.68, 1.04]). It is not clear why the present version of the crossing off letters task failed to 
engender such a response – while the act of clicking on letters may be less effortful than pen-
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and-paper versions of the task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998), it is hard to see how it could be 
construed as less effortful than the version used in Hagger et al.'s replication (pressing a button 
when a valid target was detected). Participants in the hard version reported that the task was 
more difficult, consistent with previous studies; this did not, however, translate to an increase in 
the amount of perceived effort expended on the task, nor did it make the task less enjoyable or 
tiring.  
 The identification of the reasons as to why the manipulation task failed to elicit any 
changes between conditions on the manipulation checks can be a difficult process. The reported 
effect sizes for both effort and frustration (which could be taken as antonymous with the 
"enjoyment" check used in the present experiment, suggesting that a difference should have been 
observed between groups) were both large in the Hagger et al. (2016) replication. Thus, the 
sample size of the present experiment should have been sufficient to detect an effect if there had 
been one. Furthermore, the task used the most commonly-used procedure regarding instructions, 
and included features designed to overcome the criticism leveled by Baumeister and Vohs (2016) 
at the task used by Hagger et al. The only difference between the version used in the present 
experiment and that used in most strength model research was the mode of presentation 
(electronic vs. paper); however, the version used by Hagger et al. was presented electronically 
and still caused changes in perceived effort expenditure.  
 It is possible that the instructions given to participants may have impacted their 
experience of effort during the task. As with the previous experiments, participants were 
informed that the task could take up to 10 minutes, thus providing them with explicit information 
regarding experimenter expectations. As was argued for the Stroop, it is possible then that 
participants in the long condition found their experience according with their expectations, 
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causing them to rate their experienced effort as no higher than that of participants in the short 
conditions. It is surprising, however, that even if this accounts for the fact that task length had no 
effect, this would have been enough to overcome the difference between the hard and the easy 
versions of the task – the easy version required very little effort beyond reading the text, as there 
were no rules to follow. The hard version, in contrast (and as explained in the results), was a 
significantly more difficult task, requiring multiple detection efforts per target letter, keeping in 
mind the required rules, etc. The fact that total response rate was lower in the hard conditions 
than the easy suggests that participants were taking the task seriously, and attempting to apply 
the rule as instructed. It is not clear, then, why this resulted in no difference in self-reported 
effort. 
 The fact that there was no reported difference in effort, then, suggests that participants, 
despite completing different versions of the manipulation task, experienced it subjectively as 
similar to the other conditions. This has important implications for the results of the handgrip 
persistence task, as it has been suggested by both proponents and critics of the strength model 
(e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Hagger et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2016) that the initial task must be 
sufficiently effortful in order to engender a depletion effect. Because the current manipulation 
task was judged by participants to require equal levels of effort in all groups, it is unsurprising 
that there was subsequently no difference in changes in handgrip persistence – as drive theory 
suggests, it is the beliefs, expectations, and cognitions of previous behaviour that will affect 
subsequent drive expression (e.g., more self-controlled behaviour, or a shift away from such 
behaviour).  
 Performance at the crossing off letters task over the duration of the task did not follow the 
hypothesised pattern (i.e., a similar pattern to that of the Stroop). In retrospect, this is 
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unsurprising – the Stroop has no "detection" requirement as the crossing off letters task does, so 
performance can rapidly become practiced (as observed in Experiments 1 and 2). The crossing 
off letters task, however, requires constant detection of targets, and, when a target is detected, 
nearby letters must also be scanned to determine whether the target violates the rule or not. In the 
Stroop, only four colour words were used; in the crossing off letters task, target letters could 
have appeared in a wide variety of words, making practiced recognition much harder. If, rather 
than using passages of text, the crossing off letters task had drawn only from a small pool of 
words, it is possible that response speed and accuracy would both have improved as a result of 
increased familiarity with the target stimuli. The lack of observed improvement in performance 
over time, then, is likely a result of the large variability in target stimuli. 
 The current experiment contributes to the literature surrounding the depletion effect in 
numerous ways, in addition to its failure to produce a depletion effect. For instance, this 
experiment provided the first attempt to assess performance over time at the crossing off letters 
task, and provided evidence that performance, even in longer conditions, remains relatively 
constant throughout. Furthermore, the results of the manipulation checks suggest that the 
electronic version of the crossing off letters task used in the present experiment may be 
inappropriate for use in future depletion research (although further research is, perhaps, 
warranted, as very few studies have used electronic versions of the crossing off letters task). 
Lastly, the results of the present experiment are consistent with the claims of drive theory – the 
fact that no depletion effect was observed is entirely consistent with the pattern of results of the 
manipulation checks, in that no group reported higher levels of effort expenditure or lower levels 
of motivation. While these results can be taken as support for drive theory, the pattern of results 
of the manipulation checks precludes them from being taken as evidence for the lack of a 
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depletion effect at all (e.g., as per the claims of Carter et al., 2015, and Hagger et al., 2016), as 
the results are consistent with the type of situation that would not engender a depletion effect if 
the effect exists. That is, because no condition was rated as more effortful or less motivating, it is 
unlikely that, even assuming that the depletion effect does occur under ideal circumstances, there 
would be any systematic differences in grip persistence between the groups. It will be beneficial 
to the literature if further replications of depletion studies are conducted, paying careful attention 
to participants' subjective experiences of the research, as that may prove the key to unlocking 
further understanding of the effect (including whether it exists, and if so, under what conditions). 
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Chapter 10A: Supplemental Analyses 
10A.1 Introduction 
Although the results of all three experiments are consistent with the conclusions of Carter 
et al. (2015) and Hagger et al. (2016), that the depletion effect has been overstated and that the 
effect may not exist, the lack of power evident across all three precludes drawing any firm 
conclusions one way or another. Two methods for remedying such a shortcoming suggest 
themselves (in the absence of simply increasing the sample size, which, as noted, was not 
possible), however: conducting an internal meta-analysis so as to increase the effective sample 
size and improve power, as well as providing a more accurate measure of the effect size across 
all three experiments; and conducting Bayesian analyses in order to make more confident 
statements about the state of the null hypothesis (Andraszewicz, Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, 
Grasman, Verhagen, & Wagenmakers, 2015).  
In running such analyses, a decision must be made regarding focus. The primary purpose 
of these additional analyses is to provide greater confidence in the results of the prior three 
experiments regarding the existence of the depletion effect. To that end, the focus can justifiably 
be narrowed to just the main effect of task difficulty and the performance on the dependent task 
(i.e., focusing only on the existence of the depletion effect) – ignoring duration, performance 
over time, and manipulation checks. Performing these analyses (meta-analytic and Bayesian) can 
provide not only greater confidence in the results of the present analyses, but also make a clear 
statement of the strength of support (or lack thereof) for the null hypothesis (that the depletion 
effect does not exist). 
On the basis of this, supplementary analyses in the form of an internal meta-analysis and 
Bayesian hypothesis testing were conducted with the aim of strengthening the power of, and 
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thereby the confidence in, the results of the previous experiments. It was hypothesised that there 
would be no evidence of a significant depletion effect across the internal meta-analysis. It was 
also hypothesised that the Bayesian re-analysis of results would provide evidence affirming the 
null hypothesis (that there is no depletion effect) across all three experiments. 
10A.2 Method 
10A.2.1 Meta-Analysis 
No additional data were required to be collected in order to run the supplementary 
analyses. The meta-analysis was conducted on the main effect of task difficulty (easy vs. hard). 
The analyses were conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software (CMA), Version 3 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). 
10A.2.2 Bayesian Analysis 
As for the meta-analysis, the Bayesian analyses were re-analyses of the existing datasets, 
and thus required no additional data collection. Analyses were run using the JASP statistics 
package (JASP, 2016). In contrast to the approach used by Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, 
and van der Maas (2011) in their re-analysis of previous psi research (wherein they used a web-
based Bayesian applet with limited configuration options), using JASP allows for more extensive 
configuration of relevant Bayesian parameters. For example, it allows the specification of limits 
to the prior probabilities used in the analysis. This is important because the depletion effect has 
been hypothesised to be a decrease in dependent task performance following initial exertion, 
making it possible to characterise the alternative hypothesis for Bayesian testing directionally. 
Thus, the prior distribution for the alternative hypothesis can be restricted to being positive (i.e., 
control participants will show increased dependent task performance compared to hard-task 
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participants), on the grounds that the depletion effect has not occurred if hard-task participants 
outperform control participants on the dependent task. Anything else (whether no difference, or 
one in the opposite direction) is at odds with this, and thus constitutes the null. 
10A.3 Results 
10A.3.1 Meta-Analysis – General Depletion Effect 
Data for the main effect of task difficulty were entered in CMA as the mean of the 
dependent variable, SD, and group size for each of the conditions (easy vs. hard). The values for 
this are displayed in Table 6 below.  
Heterogeneity of the sample was acceptable, with a non significant Q-value of 2.76 
(df=2, p=0.25). Furthermore, the I
2
 result of approximately 27% indicates low heterogeneity 
according to the recommendation of Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, and Altman (2003). Thus, it can 
be concluded that it is appropriate to combine these experiments for analysis as there is no 
significant dissimilarity between them. 
A random-effects model was used, which suggested that the combined effect size of the 
three experiments was -0.17 (95% CI: -0.46, 0.13), Z = -1.13, p = .26. On average, performance 
at the dependent task was worse for participants in the easy conditions than it was for those in the 
hard, although this was not significant. As the 95% CI includes zero, it cannot be concluded that 
the depletion effect exists or is different to zero. 
10A.3.2 Bayesian Analysis – General Depletion Effect 
Data were entered separately into JASP for each experiment, and tested using the software’s 
inbuilt Bayesian t-test. For all three experiments, the comparison groups comprised the easy 
condition versus the hard (Stroop for Experiments 1 and 2; crossing off letters for Experiment 3), 
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with the relevant dependent task as the measured variable (anagram persistence for Experiment 
1; change in handgrip persistence for Experiments 2 and 3). For all comparisons, the alternative 
hypothesis specified that the easy group should demonstrate greater scores than the hard group, 
in line with the claim that depletion can only be observed if performance at the dependent task is 
worse for participants in the hard condition. 
 
Table 6 
Group Means, Standard Deviations, Size, and Weighted Mean Differences for Experiments 
Study Control Experimental WMD (fixed) 95% CI 
 N M (SD) N M (SD)  
Experiment 1 42 538.07 
(260.70) 
42 671.05 (362.21) -0.42 [-0.85, 0.01] 
Experiment 2 40 -5.93 (28.00) 40 -8.33 (19.14) 0.10 [-0.34, 0.54] 
Experiment 3 42 -8.40 (22.81) 41 -4.71 (17.36) -0.18 [-0.61, 0.25] 
Total (95% 
CI) 
124  123  -0.17 [-0.46, 0.13] 
Test for heterogeneity Chi-square=2.76 df=2 p=.25 I
2
=27.49% 
Test for overall effect z=-1.13 p=.26 
  
The Bayes Factors for all three tests are displayed below (Table 7), along with their 
classification according to the scheme outlined in Wagenmakers et al. (2011). Note that the 
Bayes Factors for all three analyses were calculated for BF01 – that is, the relative probability of 
the null hypothesis compared to the alternative. From these results, it can be concluded that the 
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evidence favours the null hypothesis (that there is no depletion effect) to some degree in all three 
experiments (e.g., for Experiment 1, the data suggest that the null hypothesis is almost 12 times 
as likely to be the case than is the alternative). 
Table 7 
Bayes Factor and Evidence Category for Experiments, Testing Probability of the Null 
Experiment N BF01 Evidence category (in favour of H.) 
1 84 11.80 Strong (H0) 
2 80 2.98 Anecdotal (H0) 
3 83 7.34 Substantial (H0) 
 
10A.4 Discussion 
The hypothesis that there would be no evidence of the depletion effect in the meta-
analysis was supported. If anything, the effect lay in the opposite direct – participants exposed to 
the easy experimental conditions, on average, performed slightly worse at the dependent task 
than did participants exposed to the hard conditions. However, the confidence interval for the 
effect size included zero, meaning that the difference was not statistically significant. The 
hypothesis that Bayesian analysis would provide support for the null hypotheses (that 
participants in the hard conditions would perform no worse at the dependent tasks than would 
participants in the easy conditions) was supported, as results suggested that across the three 
experiments the null was between 3 and 12 times more likely to be the case than was the 
alternative hypothesis. 
These results go a long way towards overcoming the limitations of the individual 
experiments – while each experiment was, on its own, severely underpowered, the combination 
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of all three using an internal meta-analysis gives 80% power to detect an effect size of 
approximately 0.35, and 50% power to detect an effect size of 0.25. Furthermore, the Bayesian 
reanalysis allows statements to be made regarding the relative probability of the null (that there 
is no depletion effect) compared to the hypothesis that there is a depletion effect, rather than 
simply “failing to reject” the null. In all three experiments, the evidence supported the null over 
the alternative. While these analyses do not address any of the methodological limitations 
mentioned in earlier discussions, they do provide greater confidence that given the set of 
experimental conditions observed in the present experiments, there appears to be no evidence of 
a depletion effect. 
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Chapter 11: General Discussion 
 The strength model, and its concomitant claim of self-control depletion, has generated a 
considerable amount of (largely supportive) research over the past two decades. Recently, 
however, there has been a move towards either finding alternative explanations for the effect that 
don’t necessarily rely on a problematic resource (e.g., Evans, Boggero, & Segerstrom, 2015; 
Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013a), or to claiming that the 
effect may be smaller than usually claimed, or may not exist at all (e.g., Carter et al., 2015; 
Hagger et al., 2016). The results of the present study failed to find evidence of a depletion effect. 
However, such results, as argued, should not necessarily be taken as support for the claim that 
the effect does not exist (although they are consistent with it). Several features of the present set 
of experiments may have contributed to the observed lack of depletion effect. 
11.1 Differences in Stroop Presentation Medium 
 Differing from a large proportion of published strength model research, the initial self-
control tasks in all three of the present experiments were presented electronically, rather than on 
paper. In a large number of published studies, the Stroop task (used in Experiments 1 and 2) has 
been presented as a printed list of colour words rather than electronically (e.g., Boucher & 
Kofos, 2012; Bray et al., 2008; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Muraven et al., 2007; Wallace & 
Baumeister, 2002). Likewise, the Crossing off letters task (Experiment 3) has also traditionally 
been presented in print form (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; DeWall et al., 2008; Muraven, 2008; 
Tyler & Burns, 2009). Hagger et al. (2016) appear to be first to have attempted an electronic 
version of the Crossing off letters task, and found no depletion effect. Similarly, Xu et al. (2014) 
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utilised an electronic version of the Stroop, and as with the present experiments, found no 
evidence of the depletion effect.  
 From the point of view of any motivational account of the depletion effect (e.g., drive 
theory), the medium in which a manipulation task is presented could very well have an impact on 
the task's efficacy in producing a depletion effect. Drive theory argues that "depleting" tasks 
serve as such by virtue of the fact that completing the task makes an individual feel that they 
have exerted some effort. This, in turn, acts as a causal factor in the drives' subsequent behaviour 
– if the degree of perceived effort is consistent with the drives' beliefs about what is required for 
their consummatory program, the activation of drives responsible for self-controlled behaviour is 
likely to be reduced, resulting in the depletion effect. If, however, the task was instead found to 
be enjoyable, it is less likely that this would occur, resulting in a reduced or absent depletion 
effect. While there is a paucity of published information regarding subjective enjoyment of the 
Stroop task, some research has been conducted comparing general performance at the Stroop 
across different mediums, which can potentially be used to derive an idea of how the different 
media could have affected the present results. 
 Edwards, Brice, Craig, and Penri-Jones (1996) suggest that print and computer versions 
of the Stroop are not totally analogous, as participants in their study who engaged in an 
electronic Stroop task showed greater improvements in response speed than did those presented 
with traditional printed lists. Edwards et al. suggest that this may have been due to pressing a 
button being a less automatic response than verbally stating the colour of a word, or that saccadic 
eye moments in the print version are more tiring. Penner, Kobel, Stöcklin, Weber, Opwis, and 
Calabrese (2012) likewise suggest that print and digital versions of the task differ in terms of 
how much interference they elicit (with digital versions demonstrating less of an interference 
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effect, as assessed by reaction time). Thus, there is some suggestion that print versions of the 
Stroop are perceived as more effortful than are electronic versions, making them more likely to 
elicit a depletion effect. In opposition to the claims of Penner et al., however, Repovš (2004) 
found that participants were significantly slower when responding to electronic versions of the 
Stroop than to print versions, suggesting that digital versions of the task elicit more of an 
interference effect than do print versions, and should therefore be perceived as more effortful. 
 The fact that no depletion effect was observed in the present experiments may support the 
notion that the electronic Stroop is less demanding and less effortful than is its printed 
counterpart. However, it may also be that the instructions given to participants (i.e., that all 
participants were told that the Stroop task could take up to 15 minutes) affected their perceptions 
of effort, resulting in the lack of depletion effect. This is supported, to a degree, by the fact that 
in Experiment 2, participants in all groups rated the Stroop as requiring roughly equivalent levels 
of effort (contrary to expectations). Participants in the short conditions who expected a 15-
minute Stroop may have attributed their shorter-than-expected task to their own effort (e.g., "I 
must have worked extra hard at that to have finished so quickly!"), thus rating the task as equally 
effortful as participants in the long condition, while participants in the long conditions would 
have found their reality in accordance with their expectations. 
 The literature comparing print and electronic versions of the colour-word Stroop is 
sparse, contradictory, and says nothing about participants’ subjective enjoyment of the task. 
However, participants’ subjective enjoyment of the task, and the degree to which that differs 
between print and electronic versions, could have had a significant effect on results. Informal 
conversations with several participants produced comments indicating that they “Enjoyed the 
colour game”, suggesting that some participants, at least, may have found the task enjoyable 
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(although at least one other participant expressed relief that the task was over, suggesting that the 
enjoyment wasn’t universal). According to drive theory, enjoyment of the task will make it less 
likely that the participant will feel that they have exerted effort – if enough participants found the 
task enjoyable, rather than effortful and onerous, then it is unlikely that there will be a decrease 
in average performance at a subsequent self-control task. However, previous research has also 
indicated that participants have informally reported enjoyment of the depleting task (e.g., Gailliot 
& Baumeister, 2007), in a study that still managed to produce a significant depletion effect. This 
was despite the fact that the Stroop was presented in print, rather than on computer. It is not clear 
why enjoyment in the present experiments would have had a different effect on subsequent 
depletion than in previous research, but it remains possible that it played a role in the lack of 
observed depletion effect. Future research could perhaps test different versions of the Stroop 
side-by-side in order to determine whether the format of the manipulation task affects subsequent 
expression of a depletion effect. 
11.2 Differences in Crossing Off Letters Task Presentation Medium 
 The case for electronic presentation of the Stroop changing subsequent depletion patterns 
remains open, and may be a fruitful area for future investigation. If that is the case, then it is also 
the case that changing the Crossing off letters task from print to electronic requires 
consideration. When developing the present experiments, it was considered than an electronic 
version of tasks would be essential for capturing accurate performance data. However, a number 
of factors related to the change from print to digital may have changed the effectiveness of the 
task when compared with more traditional versions. Unlike the Stroop task, there appears to be 
no research examining the difference between pen-and-paper and electronic versions of the 
Crossing off letters task, as it is not commonly used outside strength model research. However, it 
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is possible to consider several general differences between the two mediums that might have 
affected the results in the present series of experiments. 
 One factor that differs between the two versions of the task, and could affect participant 
reactions to it, is the action of clicking on a letter, rather than having to physically cross it out. 
There is some suggestion that, when compared to traditional pen-and-paper tests, the use of a 
computer mouse allows participants to respond more quickly (Pomplun, Frey, & Becker, 2002). 
Other research, however, has found little difference between the mediums, particularly when 
specifically investigating the use of computer-based mouse responding (CBMR) as a measure of 
general processing speed. McPherson and Burns (2005) found that CBMR-format tasks 
measured the same construct as did traditional pen-and-paper tests of speed and reaction time 
tasks, and that "...this response format does not introduce variance associated with psychomotor 
performance" (p. 538). This is an important point, as differences between the mediums in terms 
of the amount of psychomotor effort required could change the degree to which they affect 
perceived effortful exertion. 
 McPherson and Burns (2005) did, however, note that accuracy on CBMR tasks was 
lower than for pen-and-paper equivalents, and suggested that this might be due to a 
speed/accuracy tradeoff – the action of clicking a mouse is faster than using a pen or pencil, 
allowing participants to sacrifice accuracy for speed. This has implications for the Crossing off 
letters task – if participants were carelessly clicking on target letters without fully assessing 
whether they were valid, they would likely feel as if they had expended less effort than would 
someone using the traditional pen-and paper method. There is little suggestion that this occurred 
in the present experiment, however, as the average total response rate for participants completing 
the hard version of the Crossing off letters task was significantly lower than that of participants 
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in the easy condition, suggesting that they were consistently attempting to apply the rule. 
Nonetheless, without a side-by-side comparison of pen-and-paper and electronic versions of the 
task (assessing response speed over the same passage of text), it is impossible to know if the 
electronic version hinders or facilitates the rule-following required by the task, or whether it is 
perceived as more or less effortful. 
 Another factor which must be considered when comparing the two mediums is that of 
ease of reading. According to the strength model, the major self-control demands of the task 
come from the inhibition required to follow the rules, rather than the ease or difficulty of reading 
the passages of text. However, drive theory would suggest that increased difficulty in processing 
a passage of text would lead to higher percevied effort, and a potentially greater subsequent shift 
in motivation
11
 to engage in further self-control behaviours.  
 Unlike the other factors considered thus far (enjoyment, motor requirements), there has 
been substantial research investigating the differences between reading text on a computer screen 
as opposed to printed paper. For example, Bayazit and Aşkar (2012), and Daniel and Woody 
(2013) showed that participants took significantly longer to read a passage of text electronically 
than they did the print version (although there was no significant difference in text-
comprehension). Mangen, Walgermo, and Brønnick (2013) found that reading a text 
electronically significantly reduced reading comprehension when compared to print versions of 
the same text. In their study, however, they were concerned with assessing post-reading 
comprehension, asking participants questions about the text and allowing them to refer back to it. 
As such, factors such as the ability to remember where on a page information was to be found 
                                                             
11
 Baumeister et al. (1998, Study 4) did manipulate the readability of their presented passages of text in the crossing 
off letters task by lightening the text in the depletion condition, making it harder to read. It was suggested that this 
would force participants in the experimental condition to pay closer attention to the text, although little consideration 
was given to how this would subsequently affect the depletion effect. It is reasonable to assume that such a 
manipulation would increase the perceived effort of the participants, however. 
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played a significant role, and may have contributed to the difference in comprehension scores 
between the mediums. In the present study, there was no need for the participants to comprehend 
the text - they merely had to locate target letters and, if they were valid, select them (and, indeed, 
the task could presumably be equally well run with meaningless strings of text). Thus, it is not 
clear to what extent the findings of Mangen et al. generalise to the present task. 
 More relevant to the present studies is the difference in perceived effort between the 
mediums. Noyes, Garland, and Robbins (2004) studied comprehension, cognitive workload, and 
perceived effort between paper and electronic versions of a task. They found that although there 
was no difference in comprehension or cognitive workload between paper and electronic 
versions of a task, participants who read a passage of text on computer reported significantly 
greater perceived effort. Similarly, Emerson and Mackay (2006) found that participants exposed 
to an electronic version of a task reported significantly higher mental demand and effort than did 
those exposed to a paper version of the same task. There is some evidence, therefore, to support 
the claim that the electronic version of the crossing off letters task is more effortful than is the 
traditional version. If this is the case, then the electronic version of the task used in the present 
study should have been more effective as a manipulation of effort than print versions, and more 
likely to produce a depletion effect. The fact that it did not suggests that either the task overall 
was less effortful than anticipated (i.e., it was an ineffective manipulation), that the increased 
effort of reading on a screen overshadowed any differences that resulted from the hard versus 
easy conditions such that all participants experienced it as equally effortful (i.e., it was a 
confounded manipulation), or that there is some other factor which accounts for the difference 
between the results of Experiment 3 and those of previous studies which have used the crossing 
off letters task successfully (which could include the idea that the depletion effect does not exist). 
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 The fact that the manipulation checks in Experiment 3 revealed no differential effect of 
condition on experienced effort suggests caution in taking the results as confirmatory evidence 
for the non-existence of the depletion effect, despite being consistent with it. It could be that no 
group showed a depletion effect (i.e., that it doesn't exist); it could equally well be that all groups 
demonstrated an equal depletion effect (compared to, say, a hypothetical extra control group who 
engaged in no manipulation task and simply performed the handgrip persistence task). If that 
were the case, it is likely that, as argued for the Stroop, the instructions given to participants may 
have influenced their expectations of the task such that all reported exerting similar levels of 
effort.  
11.3 Limitations of the Present Study 
 The present experiments aimed to replicate previous depletion effect research in an effort 
to add to the literature regarding the existence of the effect. The lack of observed depletion effect 
may have been a result of the manipulation tasks being ineffective in differentially affecting the 
perceived effort expenditure by participants. However, there were also a number of limitations 
with the present study that may have affected the observed results, or which affect interpretation 
of them. 
11.3.1 Power. 
 All three experiments suffered from a lack of power regarding the analysis of the 
depletion effect. Although participant samples were roughly commensurate with many published 
studies – in fact, higher than over 75% of studies included in the meta-analysis by Carter et al., 
2015) – Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014) and Carter et al. (2015) suggest that, at a 
minimum, a desired sample size would be 273 participants per group (which, for the present set 
of studies, would have necessitated over 1000 participants per experiment). Post-hoc power 
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analyses using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul et al., 2009) revealed that the sample sizes of the 
present experiments would, on average, have provided good power (i.e., 0.95) only if the effect 
sizes were extremely large (d ≥ 0.80). Given the growing body of evidence suggesting that effect 
sizes of the depletion effect, if it exists, are typically not large, this was a weakness of the present 
series of experiments. This could have been remedied, to some degree, by attempting to recruit 
more participants. However, limitations due to the online recruitment portal and number of 
available potential participants mean that the final numbers would still have fallen far short of 
the recommendations of Carter et al. Furthermore, it is not clear that more recruitment would 
have made any difference to the final results of the present experiments – if the manipulation 
tasks were not adequately serving to manipulate participants' perceived effort, no amount of extra 
participants would have revealed the effect (as there would have been none to be found). Finally, 
the suggestion by Carter et al. that researchers drastically increase the sizes of their participant 
samples in order to more accurately gauge the size of an effect needs to be considered carefully 
alongside a point that has been made ever since the “inference revolution”. As Carver (1978) 
remarks, quoting Hays (1963), “Virtually any study can be made to show significant results if 
one uses enough subjects regardless of how nonsensical the content may be” (Hays, 1963, p. 
326, quoted  in Carver, 1978, p. 385). Statistical “significance” pursued to such extremes casts 
doubt on the scientific significance and meaningfulness of the “effect” thus obtained.  
 In an effort to overcome these limitations, supplemental analyses were conducted in the 
form of an internal meta-analysis and Bayesian re-analysis of the three experiments. These 
analyses had greater power (in the case of the meta-analysis) and increased confidence in the 
claim that there was no depletion effect to be found in the present experiments – given the set of 
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experimental conditions observed presently, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a 
depletion effect. 
11.3.2 Priming. 
 One factor which may have affected participants' subjective experiences of the 
manipulation tasks was the instructions which were given, where all participants were informed 
that the task could take up to 10 (Experiment 3) or 15 (Experiments 1 & 2) minutes. As argued, 
this may have provided an explicit cue regarding the experimenter's expectations of effort, 
causing a change in perceptions of the manipulation task, and in turn affecting subsequent 
engagement at the dependent tasks. However, a more subtle cue which may have affected 
participant expectations, even unconsciously, were the various psychometric scales administered 
prior to the initial tasks (the DGI-10, BSCS, and MCS1). Previous research has shown that 
priming participants with various concepts (e.g., persistence, Alberts et al., 2007; self-awareness, 
Alberts et al., 2011; money, Boucher & Kofos, 2012; unlimited willpower, Miller et al., 2012) 
can have an ameliorating effect on subsequent depletion. In the present studies, it is possible that 
administering the scales prior to the manipulation tasks primed the participants with the concept 
of self-control – that it, as an environmental cue, provided implicit information regarding 
expected behaviour (i.e., self-control) that affected subsequent behavioural expression. In 
hindsight, this was a poor design choice; if these experiments were to be replicated, the scales 
would be administered after all self-control tasks had been completed. 
 While such priming might have affected the behavioural expression of self-control, its 
effect on participants self-reported effort, motivation, etc. is less clear. Given that no participants 
mentioned suspicions regarding the nature of the experiments during debriefing, it is not clear 
why priming the concept of self-control would have subsequently affected the ratings on the 
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various manipulation checks. Neither the Stroop task nor the crossing off letters task are 
obviously self-control tasks in the sense that a layperson would understand them, so it is unlikely 
that even unconscious priming of the concept of self-control would cause a systematic change in 
participants' manipulation check self-report ratings. It is possible that administering the self-
control scales prior to the manipulation tasks primed the concept of self-control in participants, 
and subsequently affected the expression of self-control behaviour. The results of the 
manipulation checks, however, suggest that priming would not have been the sole factor 
responsible for the lack of observed depletion. 
11.4 The Appropriateness of Commonly-Used Self-Control Tasks 
 The present experiments' lack of observed depletion effect may have been caused by a 
confluence of various factors: lack of power, priming the concept of self-control in participants, 
expectations of required effort and subsequent subjective experience of effort expenditure, 
enjoyment of the tasks, or even that the depletion effect does not, in reality, exist. That 
behaviours judged to be "failures" of self-control occur, however, is a self-evident fact – if they 
did not, there would be no study of them. That various factors influence such failures is equally 
undeniable – as drive theory suggests, these factors ultimately boil down to the competition 
between drives or drive behaviours. It is not unreasonable to assume, then, that there are 
occasions when engaging in a self-control behaviour of some kind reduces an individual's 
willingness or desire to engage in subsequent self-control behaviours for some time, and instead 
motivated them to engage in more immediately gratifying behaviours – that there is a "depletion 
effect" of some kind. If a depletion effect does exist, then it must be considered why a growing 
body of evidence suggests the effect is more inconsistent in laboratory studies than previously 
believed, and what factors might influence its expression. 
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 One possibility that could account for the inconsistency of the effect in the (mostly 
recent) literature is that the tasks most commonly used in self-control research are not, as 
claimed, actually self-control tasks at all. While such a claim might be contentious, given the 
number of studies (including the present studies) that have utilised such tasks, it is not without 
foundation. Carter et al. (2015) touched on the topic when conducting their series of critical 
meta-analyses, noting that "...experiments...used measures of self-control that were so weakly 
linked to theory that, regardless of results, findings could be interpreted as support for the 
depletion effect" (p. 2). Their critique, however, was aimed primarily at less commonly-used 
tasks, those which had only the most tenuous connections between theory and operationalisation. 
The claim being made here goes deeper – suggesting that the vast majority of the tasks used in 
self-control research fail to adequately manipulate or measure self-controlled behaviour because 
they require little, if any, genuine self-control. 
 In order to understand why such a claim might be valid, it is important to consider both 
the concept of self-control, and the rationale that led to the commonly used (and potentially 
invalid) self-control tasks used by strength model research. Self-control, as conceptualised by 
drive theory, is a conflict between two competing motivations, one of which is strong enough 
relative to the other to produce the observed behaviour. These conflicts are often the result of 
more direct expressions of biologically-based drives (i.e., “impulses”) running counter to more 
elaborated and derivative operations of those same biologically-based drives in the form of 
socially-oriented responses (i.e., the response that the strength model claims requires ego 
strength to realise). Indeed, as has been mentioned, the paradigm case of self-control is that of a 
long-term, larger reward being realised over a short-term, lesser reward. 
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 The concept of self-control, however, has been extended to include "...externally-oriented 
acts of choice, active initiative, and volition, and internally oriented processes of self-regulation" 
(Baumeister, 2002, p. 129). This extension, and the relative lack of questioning of it, is a result of 
the popularity of the strength model, and not necessarily the result of careful theoretical 
extension (though it could be argued that it is the result of careful, but misguided, theoretical 
extension). Even most critics of the strength model have implicitly accepted that the methods 
used in ego depletion research are valid – there have been attacks on the theory itself and its 
explanation for results, but very few questioning the validity of the tasks used. Even Carter et al. 
(2015), when attempting to exclude invalid manipulations of self-control, included tasks such as 
the crossing off letters task, the Stroop, various attention tasks, thought suppression, and math 
tasks. Their claimed rationale was that "...researchers tend to select tasks that seem to be the 
most valid operationalizations of self-control and that provide the most interpretable results" (p. 
2). Such an approach is likely often reasonable – in a well-researched area, it would be expected 
that invalid measures would be quickly detected and discarded. However, when the research 
itself is based on a conceptually flawed model, there is the possibility that, no matter how 
popular a task is, it is based on incorrect assumptions, and is therefore invalid. 
 Such is the case with the majority of tasks used in strength model research. Baumeister et 
al. (1994) were initially inspired to propose the strength model on the basis of genuine failures of 
self-control (e.g., people failing their diets, smoking, aggression, etc.), the pattern of which, they 
argued, was a result of a failure of self-control strength. Further laboratory research, however, 
adopted a view of self-control heavily influenced by Baumeister's (1998) view of self - one 
which has been shown to be incoherent. As a result, tasks such as crossing off letters, the Stroop, 
geometric figure tracing, unsolvable anagrams, etc., have been considered to effectively 
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manipulate or measure self-control, on the basis that they involve "the active self" (Baumeister et 
al., 1998). There is little connection between these tasks and the paradigm case of self-control – 
they may involve "impulse inhibition", but are extremely unlikely to engage similar motivational 
structures as will genuine self-control conflicts. Rather, because of the strength model's view of 
the self as an active, controlling part of the individual (an incoherent notion), it is assumed that 
any "higher order" activities, such as attention switching, automatic response-inhibition, choice, 
etc. require some of the self's resources. In the absence of the strength model's posited 
controlling self, however, these tasks are denied the aspect of them that provided any link to 
"self-control". They might act as very minor self-control conflicts in that engaging in them as 
part of a laboratory experiment precludes the engagement in other, more rewarding activities, but 
they are unlikely to engender the same feeling of frustration that more paradigm cases of drive 
conflict will. 
 Support for this claim comes from Duckworth and Kern (2011), who conducted a meta-
analysis of the convergent validity of various self-control measures. They concluded that there 
was some degree of convergence between sub-types of self-control measures (executive 
function, delay of gratification, self-report, and informant-report). There were, however, 
important differences in the degree to which sub-types demonstrated heterogeneity. For example, 
there "...was substantial heterogeneity in the convergent validity of executive function tasks, both 
with other executive function measures and with other types of measures" (p. 265). In contrast, 
"Homogeneity of effect sizes among the four subtypes of delay tasks suggests that these tasks 
differ less from each other than do executive function tasks" (p. 265), possibly because "...as a 
group they may tap more similar processes than do executive function tasks" (p. 265). While the 
fact that there is some degree of convergence between the two sub-types suggests some degree of 
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overlap, the differences in heterogeneity are strongly suggestive of the fact that delay of 
gratification tasks are measuring something different than the majority of executive function 
tasks. If they were, as the strength model suggests, both tapping in to a single underlying 
construct then it would be expected that they would demonstrate a similarly high level of 
homogeneity, and strong convergent validity with one another. The fact that this is not the case 
supports the assertion that the types of executive function tasks commonly used in strength 
model research are largely tapping into a construct other than that of the paradigm case of self-
control (i.e., delay of gratification). 
 What overlap/convergence there is between the two constructs may be a result of genuine 
self-control conflicts among participants – there may, indeed, be times where executive function 
tasks cause a self-control dilemma for individuals, when their desire to leave/quit conflicts with 
their desire to be a good participant, or when the tasks are sufficiently onerous or effortful that 
they become aversive (increasing the desire to quit). However, in general it would appear that the 
actual degree to which standard "self-control" tasks used in strength model research actually 
cause a significant degree of drive conflict (the essence of self-control, according to drive theory) 
is quite low. 
11.5 Return of Interest in Replicability and Null Results  
 Historically, although recognised by some as being essential elements of scientific 
progress, the publication of both null results and replication studies has been grossly undervalued 
in psychology. One of the key notions in science is that a theory must be, in principle, falsifiable 
– that is, that it is able to be shown to be false if it is indeed false – and one of the most crucial 
elements of this is null results. If, however, null results were to be systematically ignored (say, 
through an institutional approach that diminished their value), then a great deal of valuable 
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information regarding the falsification of research findings would never be made known. 
Unfortunately, this is (and has been for decades) the case in scientific psychology – as Bakan 
(1966) notes: 
 
It is the practice of editors of our psychological journals, receiving many more papers 
than they can possibly publish, to use the magnitude of the p values reported as one 
criterion for acceptance or rejection of a study. (p. 426) 
 
If a paper reporting null results is published, then, particularly if it forms a replication of 
previous research, its importance is likely to be discounted. As Bakan goes on to say: 
 
Even the strict repetition of an experiment and not getting significance in the same way 
does not speak against the result already reported in the literature. For failing to get 
significance, speaking strictly within the inference model, only means that that 
experiment is inconclusive; whereas the study already reported in the literature, with a 
low p value, is regarded as conclusive. (pp. 427-428) 
 
 The rejection or diminution of null findings on the ground that they fail to achieve 
statistical significance, however, represents a confusion regarding what can be inferred from a 
statistically significant finding. According to Carver (1978), it is often assumed that statistical 
significance relates to the potential replicability of a finding – that is, if an experimental finding 
is deemed statistically significant, that it is not due to chance, and is therefore replicable. This, he 
argues, is a mistake: 
 
The only valid reason for considering statistical significance is to try to determine 
whether research results are simply a product of chance and will therefore not be 
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replicable. Yet it is not logical to deduce that if the results are statistically significant, 
they will replicate, or that if the results are not statistically significant, they will not 
replicate. But if researchers do obtain the same result more than once, it is more 
reasonable to conclude that the results are not due to chance. (p. 390) 
 
A misunderstanding of the value of statistical significance is not the only reason for the neglect 
of null findings, of course. As Pashler and Wagenmakers (2012) remark, the tendencies towards 
publication bias (i.e., publishing only "statistically significant" results and ignoring null 
findings):  
 
...have been exacerbated in recent years as academia reaps the harvest of a 
hypercompetitive academic climate and an incentive scheme that provides rich rewards 
for overselling one’s work and few rewards at all for caution and circumspection. (p. 528) 
 
The unhappy state of affairs to emerge from the push to publish only positive (i.e., statistically 
significant) findings, to ignore null results, and to de-emphasise replications, is, as Pashler and 
Wagenmakers put it, a "...crisis of confidence in psychological science reflecting an 
unprecedented level of doubt...about the reliability of research findings in the field" (p. 528). 
 Recently, however, there has been a slow (but welcome) shift in attention in psychology: 
away from purely statistical significance testing, and towards replicability of claimed research 
findings. The result is a promising re-cognition (lit. "being cognised again") of the importance of 
the cornerstone of good science – replication. Several journals have produced "special edition" 
volumes on replication (e.g., Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), and the 
Open Science Collaboration (2012) was a collaborative effort to produce multiple transparent 
replications of various psychological studies. This shift is an important one, as the reproduction 
310 
 
of research findings is, despite its history of being devalued, fundamental to scientific progress. 
As Hubbard and Ryan (2000) state: 
 
By attempting to essentially reproduce the findings of an earlier study, replications play a 
vital role in safeguarding the empirical literature from contamination by specious results. 
Replications with extensions also serve this purpose but go beyond this by examining the 
scope and limits of initial findings to see if they are capable of being generalized to other 
populations, geographic areas, time periods, measurement instruments, and the like. (p. 
676) 
  
Furthermore, as Nosek and Lakens (2014) note, replications also serve to add data to improve the 
precision of effect-size calculations in meta-analyses, and replications with null results (in the 
sense that the hypothesised relationships between variables are found not to hold, not necessarily 
statistically non-significant results) can help to facilitate the identification of the boundaries of 
real effects. 
 It is in the light of this Zeitgeist that the results of the present set of experiments should 
be viewed. All three experiments included substantive sections reporting the results of various 
statistical tests, in deference to the still-dominant paradigm of statistical significance testing, and 
it was argued that a possible reason for the statistically non-significant findings was their lack of 
power. At their heart, however, they were designed as replications with extensions, conducted in 
order to provide greater knowledge about a claimed experimental finding (the depletion effect). 
The fact that they did not find such an effect (neither a statistically significant one, nor a 
difference in group performance in the hypothesised direction) should be taken as valuable data 
regarding the generalisability of the effect (i.e., that it did not generalise to the present samples 
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using the present tasks), as well as potentially speaking to the existence of the effect (although, 
as argued, limited conclusions regarding that can be drawn from the present set of experiments).   
11.6 Conclusion 
 Based on drive theory's conceptualisation of self-control, there is very good reason to 
suspect that the tasks most commonly used in depletion research are inadequate and 
inappropriate for assessing and manipulating self-control. Their popularity has been sustained by 
the apparently robust findings of previous self-control depletion research, and the (mostly) 
uncritical acceptance of the incoherent view of the self espoused by the strength model. The first 
half of this thesis, however, aimed to show that such uncritical acceptance of the strength model 
is flawed, and that it rested on conceptual grounds so shaky that it could not be rescued. Thus, it 
was proposed that an alternative, deterministic, realist model based on coherent conceptual 
underpinnings – drive theory – could provide an alternative explanation for the existing research 
generated by the strength model. When self-control is reconceptualised in a coherent, 
deterministic way, as attempted by drive theory, it can be seen that the most common tasks used 
in self-control research fail to engage the motivational structures which would most likely result 
in self-control "depletion", if such an effect truly exists. 
 Despite this, the present series of experiments was conducted under the belief that a 
depletion effect may well exist and can be observed in the laboratory, despite claims to the 
contrary, and that some element of the tasks typically used in strength model research would 
produce the depletion effect, their lack of true "self-control" requirements notwithstanding. It 
was considered that, while not "depleting" any self-control resource, the types of tasks most 
commonly used in depletion research were likely to make participants feel as if they had 
expended effort, granting them the justification to quit faster on subsequent tasks. In this, the 
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present series of experiments were following the growing and admirable trend in psychology 
towards replications of important findings – of more use, some have argued, than statistical 
significance testing. The lack of any observable depletion effect suggests that either there was no 
depletion effect (due to either it not existing, the tasks failing to elicit experience of effort, or any 
of the other factors discussed), or that the depletion effect was uniform across tasks, such that it 
became undetectable (i.e., all participants experienced the tasks as equally effortful, and all were 
caused to be subsequently less motivated to perform at the dependent task). 
 While it is impossible to be sure which of these is the case, it is clear that serious thought 
is required before proceeding with further self-control research in this vein. A growing body of 
literature and empirical evidence casts doubt upon the existence of the depletion effect, and the 
model which first hypothesised it has been shown to be conceptually incoherent. In light of this, 
it is perhaps necessary to reflect upon the concept of self-control, and how best to further study 
it. As Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) note, the strength model "...has directed attention to a 
neglected area in the field, acted as a generative heuristic, and provided an organizing framework 
to understand a vital property of self-control" (p. 451). However, further research must consider 
whether there is value in pursuing the line of questioning initiated by the strength model, or 
whether more profitable lines of enquiry lie elsewhere.  
 The true value of this thesis lies not in the experimental results, however useful they 
might be in adding to the growing evidence that the depletion effect has been overstated, but in 
the conceptual analysis of the strength model and the positing of its replacement, drive theory. 
As argued, such an analysis is logically primary to the collection of empirical evidence, yet has 
thus far been neglected. In performing a conceptual analysis, the flaws inherent in the strength 
model were made obvious, leading to the conclusion that it must be rejected, and an 
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appropriately sound alternative taken up instead. Drive theory offers a coherent, deterministic 
framework through which to understand, via its explanation of drives and their conflicts, self-
control. It makes no a priori claims as to the existence of a depletion effect in the laboratory, 
although it is perfectly capable of explaining it. Its explanation of the mechanisms of self-
control, however, suggests that it is almost a certainty that for the majority of individuals there 
will be occasions where, due to the nature of drive conflict, behaviour consistent with the 
depletion effect will occur. That is, that engaging in initial "self-control" behaviour causes 
cognitions and drive activation that result in subsequent self-control "failure" (which, as has been 
explained, is not a failure in any objective sense of the word, merely a particular expression of 
drive gratification). It provides a starting point, then, for researchers to begin considering how 
best to study self-control in an experimental setting – to consider the sorts of task which might 
engender a genuine conflict between drives, and how best to explore the factors which affect the 
expression of self-controlled behaviour without being beholden to a conceptually unclear 
resource-based model. Drive theory offers self-control researchers a new approach to 
understanding not only how and why self-control fails but also how and why it succeeds.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Delaying Gratification Inventory (DGI-10 Short: Hoerger et al., 2011) 
 
Using the scale provided, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. 
 
Rated from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) 
 
Coded Statement 
Reverse I would have a hard time sticking with a special, healthy diet 
 I have always tried to eat healthy because it pays off in the long run. 
 I have given up physical pleasure or comfort to reach my goals. 
Reverse When faced with a physically demanding chore, I always tried to put off doing it. 
 I try to consider how my actions will affect other people in the long-term. 
Reverse I do not consider how my behavior affects other people 
 I try to spend my money wisely. 
Reverse I cannot be trusted with money. 
Reverse I cannot motivate myself to accomplish long-term goals. 
 I have always felt like my hard work would pay off in the end. 
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Appendix B 
Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) 
 
Using the scale provided, please indicate how much each of the following statements reflects 
how you typically are. 
Rated from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) 
Coded Statement 
 I am good at resisting temptation. 
Reverse I have a hard time breaking bad habits.  
Reverse I am lazy. 
Reverse I say inappropriate things. 
Reverse I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun. 
 I refuse things that are bad for me. 
Reverse I wish I had more self-discipline. 
 People would say that I have iron self- discipline. 
Reverse Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done.  
Reverse I have trouble concentrating. 
 I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals. 
Reverse Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong. 
Reverse I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. 
 
 
* Statements marked with an asterisk are reverse coded 
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Appendix C 
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale Short Form 1 (Ballard et al., 1992) 
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item 
and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. 
 
Coded Statement 
False I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
False On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little 
of my ability. 
False There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even 
though I knew they were right. 
True No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
False I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. 
False There have been occasions where I took advantage of someone. 
True I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
False I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
True When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. 
False I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
True I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
 
Participant responses corresponding to the code of a statement are scored 1, an opposite response 
is scored 0. Higher scores thus indicate higher levels of socially desirable responding.  
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Appendix D 
Stroop Task presentation as seen by participants 
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Appendix E 
Anagram sheet presented to participants 
Problem Solving 
The following task is designed to test your problem solving abilities. Below are 10 anagrams 
(jumbled up words). You are required to unscramble the letters to form a single word – for 
example, DEDFSAISIITS could be unscrambled to form the word “DISSATISFIED”. 
The anagrams on the next page were rated by a pilot study as being “extremely difficult”. 
Please make a serious attempt at each one – you are unlikely to get the answer immediately. 
Any solutions must make use of all the letters provided. Please let the experimenter know 
when you have completed them, or if you wish to give up.  
 
1. GCGIATNR ______________________________________________ 
2. BXOLTLOA ______________________________________________ 
3. VYPRUSPE ______________________________________________ 
4. UATEIBXG ______________________________________________ 
5. EEEXTMRB ______________________________________________ 
6. ISVOLERS ______________________________________________ 
7. PWSOLONE ______________________________________________ 
8. SURUTCRA ______________________________________________ 
9. QSTUAUEE ______________________________________________ 
10. IBNREWOK ______________________________________________ 
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Appendix F 
Information statement provided to participants 
Information Statement 
 
Project Title: Individual differences in reaction time and problem solving ability 
 
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Dominic Lees, PhD student, School of 
Social Sciences and Psychology, University of Western Sydney. This study is being supervised 
by Dr. Agnes Petocz. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
individual differences, people’s reaction times at a task requiring quick responses, and problem 
solving ability. 
You will be asked to fill out a short personality questionnaire, before engaging in a task where 
your reaction time and accuracy will be measured. The task involves pressing one button when 
a certain stimulus is displayed, and another when a different stimulus is displayed. You will then 
be asked to complete a problem solving exercise. The study is expected to take approximately 
30 minutes. 
If you have registered for the project using the SONA experiment management system, you will 
receive course credit for your participation, and all participants will gain firsthand experience of 
psychological research, considered by the School of Social Sciences and Psychology as an 
important part of your training. For those participating for course credit, there are alternatives to 
research participation should you wish to reconsider participating in human research.  
There are no direct risks associated with this experiment. You may feel anxious that your 
abilities are being assessed during the reaction time task and the problem solving. However, it 
is important to realise that your results are being pooled with those of all the other participants, 
and are completely anonymous. In addition, performance at the tasks is governed by many 
different factors, including fatigue, boredom, and prior exposure to the stimuli. You are simply 
asked to do the best you can, without worrying about your individual results. All aspects of the 
study, including results, will be confidential, and only the researchers will have access to the 
information you supply. 
Participation for all participants is entirely voluntary, you are not obliged to be involved, and, if 
you do choose to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and 
without any consequences. 
You can tell other people about the study by providing them with the chief investigator’s contact 
details. They can contact the chief investigator to discuss their participation and obtain an 
information sheet. However, you are asked not to disclose details of the study, as some 
participants may experience slightly different conditions during their participation. 
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When you have read this information, Dominic Lees will discuss it with you further and answer 
any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to 
contact Dominic Lees on 0415 887 814 or via email at d.lees@uws.edu.au, or Dr. Agnes Petocz 
on 97726624 or via email a.petocz@uws.edu.au. The results of this study will be disseminated 
in the form of a student PhD thesis. 
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The Approval number is [H9616]. 
If you experience any unexpected discomfort or distress after participating, please inform the 
research supervisor and/or Student Support Services either by phone on (02) 4736 0714 or via 
Email: e.brackenreg@uws.edu.au or Student Counselling Service (Ph: 02 9852 5199).  
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may 
contact the Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services via email 
humanethics@uws.edu.au  Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 
fully, and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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Appendix G 
Consent form provided to participants 
 
Consent Form 
 
Project title:  Individual differences in reaction time and problem solving ability 
 
Agreement to Participate: 
I have read the above information and any questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study, whilst knowing that I may withdraw without 
penalty at any time.  
 
  
Participant Name   
 
      
Signature 
 
______________________________ 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE:  
 This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The Approval number is [H9616]. 
If you experience any unexpected discomfort or distress after participating in this study, please 
inform the research supervisor and/or Student Support Services either by phone on (02) 4736 
0642 or via E-mail: e.brackenreg@uws.edu.au or Student Counselling Service (Ph: (02) 4736 
0235). 
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may 
contact the Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services via email 
humanethics@uws.edu.au 
 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be 
informed of the outcome. 
